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Abstract 
 
This study explores the impact of different types of governance at promoting sustainable 
tourism in developing states. Given the very limited research in this area, and yet the common 
challenges found in many developing states around achieving sustainable tourism, it assesses 
the significance of tourism governance in Costa Rica - a small developing state with an enviable 
international reputation for ‘ecotourism’. A theoretical model for the study of sustainable 
development governance is devised and employed, which defines sustainable development and 
identifies three different types of governance mechanisms - ‘legal’, ‘bargaining’ and 
‘persuasive’ - distinguished by the degree to which they are choice-constraining for ‘governed’ 
actors. The thesis then evaluates the effectiveness of these mechanisms in turn with respect to 
‘ecotourism’ in Costa Rica. The governance mechanisms identified as moderately effective at 
promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica include national park and coastal regulations, the 
state-run Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST) certification system, and the non-state 
Rainforest Alliance’s technical assistance programme. The thesis identifies a number of 
success factors related to the characteristics of these mechanisms that enhance their impact, 
including the collaborative nature of the bargaining and persuasive mechanisms and the high 
choice-constraining nature of legal mechanisms. Other, more contextual, success factors 
include a heightened receptiveness towards sustainable development, the state’s authority and 
bureaucratic competence, and the expertise of non-state organisations. The thesis also seeks to 
make a contribution towards theoretical debates around the degree to which the state has 
continuing significance in governance, and the relative significance of compulsory versus 
voluntary governance mechanisms. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
Tourism accounts directly and indirectly for nine per cent of global gross domestic product 
(GDP), one in 11 jobs and six per cent of the world’s exports (UNWTO, 2014). Since the 
1960s, tourism has replaced agriculture as the key economic sector in many developing states, 
in some cases accounting for as much as 30 per cent of total exports (UN, 2014). A 
conglomeration of the transport, accommodation, hospitality, tour package and food and 
restaurant sectors, tourism is most akin to service industries, but is unconventional in the way 
in which the consumer is transported directly to the developing state in order to consume the 
product. This has led the industry to become renowned for its negative local environmental 
impacts, including coastal erosion, water pollution and damage of coral reefs. These 
environmental impacts can be even more severe in small developing states, which often have 
few other development options, along with varied and unique ecosystems, which are 
particularly vulnerable to environmental damage. The potential for cultural erosion in 
developing states is also significant, as tourism has brought Western brands, languages and 
lifestyles directly to many local communities. The extent of positive gains for developing states 
from tourism is also questionable, given the tendency for the concentration of local 
employment in low-skilled - and thus, low-paid - jobs, and instability in jobs and income, due 
to the seasonal nature of the industry.  
 
The academic literature on tourism is limited, focusing largely on the issues aforementioned 
around the potentially negative impacts of the industry. Relatively little systematic research 
has been conducted into how the positive impacts of tourism might be better harnessed and 
these negative impacts addressed. This thesis will, therefore, explore the effectiveness of 
different mechanisms of governance at promoting a form of tourism that creates more 
economic and social benefits for developing states without causing significant environmental 
damage (defined in this thesis as ‘sustainable tourism’). In order to address this question, the 
first part of this thesis will develop a two-part theoretical model through which to conceptualise 
the ‘sustainable development’ that tourism can potentially facilitate, and the different types of 
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governance used to promote this. Sustainable development will be defined as economic 
development, social equity and environmental protection, promoted at all stages of the global 
value chain. The theoretical model will identify three different types of governance mechanism, 
distinguished primarily by the degree to which they are choice-constraining for ‘governed’ 
actors (which are largely tourism businesses and consumers). These three governance 
mechanisms are: highly choice-constraining legal mechanisms, moderately choice-
constraining bargaining mechanisms and low choice-constraining persuasive mechanisms. The 
model will identify the intrinsic characteristics of each of these mechanisms in order to support 
explanations of their effectiveness, including whether they are confrontational or collaborative 
in nature, and if they are run by state or non-state actors.  
 
The second part of the thesis will then assess the effectiveness of these three types of 
governance mechanisms in promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Costa Rica is selected 
as the primary case study due to its reputation as one of the premier ecotourism destinations in 
the world, and the fact that it has a relatively extensive framework of tourism governance, 
alongside one of the highest levels of development in Central America. The exploration of 
Costa Rica’s case aims to draw out insights into how far tourism governance is effective and 
to identify the success factors in effective sustainable tourism governance. Figure 1 
demonstrates this approach to the thesis in diagrammatic form.  
 
Figure 1: The Approach of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis makes three particular claims to originality. Firstly, it contributes to the limited 
quality research on the link between governance, tourism and sustainable development. In 
particular, it attempts to draw lessons from relatively effective tourism governance frameworks 
in order to understand how to better facilitate sustainable tourism in developing states. To do 
this, it draws on first-hand data from interviews in Costa Rica, exploring the impact of specific 
Core Research Question: 
How effective are different 
mechanisms of governance at 
promoting sustainable tourism 
in developing states? 
Theoretical 
Framework: 
A hybrid model of 
governance and 
sustainable 
development 
Empirical Case 
Study: 
Costa Rica 
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governance mechanisms of which to date there has been very little study. The second claim to 
originality of this thesis is that, while many existing studies on governance for sustainable 
development focus on individual or particular types of governance mechanisms, such as 
certification systems or state mechanisms (see, for example, Eagles, 2009; Sánchez-Azofeifa 
et al, 2003; Font, 2007; Honey, 2002 and Medina, 2005), this thesis compares and contrasts the 
impact of all different types of governance instruments within one state. This enables an in-
depth understanding of the relative impact of different types of governance on sustainable 
tourism in a single country context. The final, theoretical, claim to originality of this thesis is 
the development of a theoretical model through which to theorise the different types of 
governance mechanisms, and the precise meaning of sustainable development. The use of a 
model that combines conceptual tools for the study of both governance and sustainable 
development is novel in itself. This hybrid model can potentially be utilised more broadly, in 
sectors beyond tourism in order to analyse the governance drivers of sustainable development. 
The thesis will also provide insight into theoretical debates in international political economy 
around the degree of significance of the state, and the relative effectiveness of compulsory 
versus voluntary governance mechanisms. 
 
This introductory chapter will explain the focus and approach of this thesis in more detail. It 
will, firstly, discuss how the core research questions of this thesis depart from the existing 
literature on the tourism industry. Secondly, it will outline the theoretical model’s 
conceptualisation of sustainable development and governance, and explain how this framework 
will inform the subsequent empirical chapters of the thesis. Thirdly, it will discuss the 
methodology used in this thesis, describing the first-hand qualitative interviews and 
ethnographic research carried out in Costa Rica in order to gather data. Finally, the chapter will 
outline the structure and key arguments of the thesis.  
 
Core Research Questions 
 
This thesis, as indicated above, seeks to address a gap in the academic literature around how 
tourism, an industry on which many developing states are now heavily dependent, might be 
made more conducive to sustainable development. Tourism is relatively understudied - it is not 
taken seriously as a topic of study by many scholars, who see it as the ‘business of fun’ (Brown 
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and Hall, 2008). In particular, as identified by scholars such as Bishop (2010), Bramwell 
(2011), Brown and Hall (2008) and Richter and Steiner (2008), there are few studies of tourism 
in the discipline of politics and international relations, and those other studies that do exist 
rarely take a theoretically informed empirical approach. As such, studies of tourism are divided 
between those that appear to accept rather uncritically the role of tourism in developing states, 
and those which focus much more exclusively on the limited benefits and negative impacts of 
tourism in developing states (Bianchi, 2009).  
 
Concerns around tourism identified in the literature include the way in which the industry 
creates a concentration of local people in unskilled tourism jobs with lower salaries, the 
exclusion of local people from resorts and beaches, the diversion and monopolisation of local 
water sources for golf courses, and how ecotourism brings tourists to inherently ecologically 
fragile locations (Cabezas, 2008; Honey et al, 2010 and Pattullo, 2005). Bramwell and Lane 
(2013), for example, indicate how tourism businesses have little incentive to adopt more 
sustainable practices, as they have made significant investments in tourism infrastructure that 
facilitate more conventional forms of mass tourism, such as large airports, accommodations 
and attractions. These negative impacts of tourism have been so strongly emphasised that the 
‘Butler cycle’, outlined by Butler (1980: 6) and emphasising the inevitable stages of a tourism 
destination from the beginning exploration and development stages, through to stagnation and 
decline, has been commonly pointed to as the likely model for tourism in many developing 
states. Buckley (2012), for example, argues that mainstream tourism, like other industry 
sectors, is far from sustainable, while Bramwell and Lane (2013: 1) indicate that progress 
towards sustainable tourism is ‘at best almost static’.  
 
While the challenges posed by tourism for sustainable development are important to recognise, 
much of the literature appears to have stagnated through this assessment that tourism altogether 
fails to facilitate sustainable development. This thesis, therefore, seeks to move forward the 
debate by exploring cases where developing states have purposefully sought to promote 
sustainable practices, and identifying success factors behind these cases. In particular, this 
thesis focuses on the significance of governance as a driver of sustainable tourism and 
sustainable development. Studies of tourism often tend to ignore the impact of internal factors, 
such as governance, for the effects of the industry, instead focusing on external factors, 
including the implications of the degree of international control of the industry (Sharpley and 
Ussi, 2014).  
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The literature on sustainable development governance that does exist often focuses on isolated 
governance mechanisms, such as national park systems (see, for example, Eagles, 2009 and 
Sánchez-Azofeifa et al, 2003), certification schemes (see, for example, Font, 2007; Honey, 
2002 and Medina, 2005) and the role of NGOs (see, for example, Cashore, 2002; Keck and 
Sikkink, 2002). As the focus is often on isolated mechanisms, there is little in the literature that 
compares or contrasts the impact of these different types of governance instruments, for 
example, within a single country context. The findings on the impact of these isolated 
mechanisms, furthermore, are often negative, leading to few insights into effective tourism 
governance. There are concerns in the literature around the role of the state and traditional 
command and control mechanisms in sustainable development, as it is indicated that voluntary 
governance may be more suitable, given the potential for inefficiencies and corruption (Mauro, 
1997; Jordan, 2008). On the other hand, the literature also points to the challenges with 
voluntary governance, including low numbers of compliant actors, lack of evidence of any 
substantial increase in sustainability as a result of these mechanisms, and concerns that  
voluntary governance mechanisms only address those actors already interested in 
sustainability, the ‘lowest hanging fruit’ on the tree (Haufler, 2003). Commins (2000) and 
Fridell (2006), furthermore, point to the use of voluntary governance mechanisms to reduce 
the negative impacts of neoliberal globalisation, rather than to tackle the structural inequalities 
inherent in the global system. Thus, there is little understanding around the most effective types 
of governance mechanisms for sustainable tourism and sustainable development. 
 
This thesis will, therefore, draw on the relatively successful case of Costa Rica in order to 
explore the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms for sustainable tourism. Costa 
Rica’s status as one of the foremost ‘ecotourism’ destinations in the world, coupled with its 
relatively high level of development and well-embedded governance mechanisms, provides an 
ideal case study where there is high potential for governance to have positive impacts for 
sustainable development. Costa Rica has a considerable number of environmental laws, some 
of which have won international awards, and one of the most well-reputed certification systems 
for sustainable tourism in the world, with one of the highest levels of compliance. The 
Rainforest Alliance, an international environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
also has its Latin American headquarters in Costa Rica, where it supports tourism businesses 
to increase the sustainability of their practices, using Costa Rica as its testing ground for 
projects in the broader region. Costa Rica is, therefore, a data-rich case study through which to 
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explore the effectiveness of tourism governance, and potential success factors for effective 
tourism governance in developing states more generally. There are two types of success factors 
that may be identifiable. The first are success factors that are characteristics of specific 
governance mechanisms, and which are potentially identified in the theoretical model. The 
second are success factors that are specific to Costa Rica’s social and political context, and 
therefore, may not be identifiable in other developing states. 
 
‘Governance’ and ‘sustainable development’ are two of the most essentially contested terms in 
the social sciences (Jordan, 2008). This thesis, therefore, will develop a theoretical model to 
act as a framework through which to explore, define and unpick the meaning of these concepts 
in order to explore their role in the case study of Costa Rica. This theoretical model will provide 
a novel approach to the study of sustainable development governance, enabling a direct 
comparison of the impact of state versus non-state and compulsory versus voluntary 
mechanisms within a single country case study. Thus, it will provide insight for the diverse and 
fragmented literature around governance, which is currently polarised between state and 
society-centric views of governance. The main features of this theoretical model will be 
outlined in the following section of this chapter. The implications of the insights from this 
empirical case study for broader questions around the theory of governance and sustainable 
development will also be considered. As Jordan (2008) indicates, there is a need to test 
empirically how far a shift has taken place from government to governance, and to move 
beyond the grand theories and typologies of governance often produced in the literature.   
 
The following sub-questions will, therefore, be addressed in order to explore the core research 
question identified above: 
 
How effective are different mechanisms of governance at promoting sustainable tourism in 
developing states? 
 What are the most effective governance mechanisms for promoting sustainable tourism 
in Costa Rica? 
 What are the success factors for effective tourism governance mechanisms in Costa 
Rica? 
 What are the implications of the theoretical model and Costa Rica’s case study for 
broader questions of governance and sustainable development? 
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The Theoretical Model 
 
In Chapters Two and Three, this thesis will develop a two-tier theoretical model through which 
to frame the exploration of the impact of tourism governance on sustainable development. This 
theoretical model has two purposes for the following empirical analysis in the second part of 
the thesis. Firstly, it will define the ‘sustainable development’ that the governance mechanisms 
for tourism examined in this thesis potentially promote. This will enable a clear analysis of 
how far these governance mechanisms facilitate the different, and potentially competing, 
aspects of sustainable development. The second purpose of the theoretical framework is to 
identify a number of distinct governance mechanisms in order to provide a starting point for 
the empirical chapters, and to draw out the individual features and characteristics of these 
governance mechanisms that may create either strengths or weaknesses, in order to support the 
identification of the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the subsequent empirical chapters. 
 
Chapter Two develops a three-fold definition of sustainable development, which incorporates 
economic development, social equity and environmental protection. The chapter indicates 
through global value chain theories how economic power, and therefore profit, in many retail 
and service industries is concentrated in core capitalist countries, with lead firms responsible 
for branding/marketing/retailing stages, leaving service-providers - typically based in 
developing states - to shoulder disproportionately the costs and risks of an industry. The thesis 
uses this as a point of departure to investigate how far developing states can effect policies with 
positive economic, social and environmental impacts under these tight conditions of external 
dependency. Chapter Three then identifies three governance mechanisms that potentially 
promote the definition of sustainable development presented in Chapter Two. The model 
distinguishes between the three mechanisms by the degree to which they are choice-
constraining for ‘governed’ actors. Legal mechanisms are highly choice-constraining and 
require governed actors to adhere to their standards, or risk penalties. Bargaining mechanisms 
are moderately choice-constraining forms of governance and, while voluntary, have some 
levers through which to negotiate adherence to their standards, such as the offering of a 
certification mark or funding in exchange for more sustainable practices. Persuasive 
mechanisms are low choice-constraining, having only persuasive tactics in order to influence 
the behaviour of governed actors, such as arguing that sustainable practices are morally the 
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‘right’ thing to do, or persuading governed actors that sustainable practices are in their own 
best interests.  
 
Chapter Three identifies the potential strengths and weaknesses of these three types of 
mechanisms in addressing sustainable development, given their degree of choice-constraint, 
whether they are confrontational or collaborative and whether they are facilitated by state or 
non-state actors. Legal mechanisms are indicated to have significant potential influence due to 
their highly choice-constraining nature and the fact that they are run by states. This provides 
them with considerable ‘levers’ and authority with which to influence the behaviour of actors, 
and capacity to force the most prolific offenders against sustainable development to comply 
with regulations. The use and effectiveness of legal mechanisms, however, can also be limited 
by international legal obligations (such as the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) most-
favoured nation and national treatment principles) and local administrative restrictions (such 
as privatisation of state-run utilities and rules governing public procurement); along with 
implementation problems associated with corruption and inefficiency; and national remit, 
which can prevent legal mechanisms from addressing inequalities stemming from external 
structures and actors. It is suggested that these characteristics might be problematic in the 
context of tourism in small developing states, where resource shortages are common, levels of 
external dependency are often high and tensions within sustainable development can be 
problematic and complex. This chapter also elaborates on the conceptions of ‘effectiveness’ 
and ‘success factors’ that will be utilised in the thesis. 
 
Bargaining mechanisms, as moderately choice-constraining mechanisms of governance, have 
fewer levers than legal mechanisms with which to attract compliance, and therefore, potentially 
reach a reduced number of actors. On the other hand, where they are collaborative – that is, 
they work hand-in-hand with governed actors by offering them positive incentives to comply, 
as opposed to undertaking more confrontational action against them through negative 
incentives – they are indicated to have the potential to address sustainable development at a 
deeper level, as they can work with individual actors on a long-term basis. Bargaining 
mechanisms also have the potential to address actors at the global level, as their enforcement 
power is not limited to the national level. Where run by states, bargaining mechanisms can 
have additional authority, which may increase compliance levels, but potentially face obstacles 
such as inefficiency and corruption, which can negatively affect impact. Where bargaining 
mechanisms are run by non-state actors, the model indicates that they can potentially have 
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significant expertise, which can enhance their impact, but may conversely lack accountability 
and legitimacy.  
 
The theoretical model indicates that persuasive mechanisms can be advantaged by the fact that, 
like bargaining mechanisms, they can address sustainable development in considerable depth 
and at the global level, as well as the national level. On the other hand, persuasive mechanisms 
have even fewer enforcement powers than bargaining mechanisms, relying on their powers of 
persuasion, and therefore, may be unlikely to attract compliance from significant numbers of 
actors or the more prolific offenders of sustainable development, thus reducing their impact. 
Again, while state-run persuasive mechanisms can have more authority and legitimacy, non-
state persuasive mechanisms may have more technical expertise, which can enhance their 
impact.  
 
The three types of governance mechanisms identified by this model inform the structure of the 
rest of the thesis. They form the basis for which Chapters Five, Six and Seven address the 
impact of legal, bargaining and persuasive mechanisms in turn in Costa Rica. The intrinsic 
characteristics of each type of governance mechanism identified – including their degree of 
choice constraint, whether they are collaborative or confrontational, and if they are run by state 
or non-state actors – will support understanding of their impact in the case study of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the model will enable the identification of whether success factors are inherent 
characteristics of individual governance mechanisms, or specific to the broader social and 
political context of Costa Rica. This theoretical model is novel in the way in which it combines 
both a definition of sustainable development and a framework of mechanisms through which 
to study the impact of governance on developing states. This chapter will now outline the 
methodology used throughout this thesis, before discussing the structure and key arguments of 
the thesis. 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to tackle the question of the impact of governance for tourism in developing states, the 
thesis draws insights from the international political economy (IPE) literature, which has 
influenced both the subject of study and the analytical tools employed. Firstly, the thesis 
focuses on the relationship between the state and the market, the particular strategies that states 
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pursue and the structural conditions which shape, if not determine, the outcomes of these 
strategies (Cohen, 2008; Gilpin, 2003; O’Brien and Williams, 2004; Phillips and Weaver, 
2011). Secondly, the thesis uses the national level as the referent unit of analysis, and starts 
from the assumption that even small, economically weak and externally vulnerable states and 
their citizens pursue purposeful strategies and possess political agency. It is also recognised, 
however, that international actors have an influence on domestic development, for example, 
through dictating the feasibility of policies, or changing the choices and behaviour of domestic 
actors and institutions (Frieden and Martin, 2002). Global value chain analysis is referred to 
throughout the thesis in order to capture the interaction between the local, national and 
international spheres in which development takes place. Finally, this thesis recognises both 
state and non-state actors as significant in international political economy. 
 
The thesis draws on insights from a broad array of existing literature across social science 
disciplines as a point of departure, including international political economy, public policy, 
development studies, tourism studies, economics and environmental sciences. This enables an 
informed approach to a topic that has relatively little existing data, for example, using insights 
from the more general governance literature in order to identify three different types of tourism 
governance. Insights from the sustainable development literature are also drawn on in order to 
develop a conceptual framework for sustainable tourism. These allow the grounding of the 
study in existing theoretical debates, with the hypothetical strengths and weaknesses of 
governance mechanisms, for example, playing an important role in the assessment of the 
impact of tourism governance in the case of Costa Rica.  
 
This research, in addition, takes a case study approach in order to capture the rich contextual 
detail defining the lived experienced of the politics and governance of sustainable development. 
In particular, the case study approach enables the thesis to spend time unravelling the 
complexities of the tourism industry, and the relationships between firms at the international 
end of the industry and local stakeholders on the ground in developing countries. As there is 
little existing data or research to start from, the single case study approach enables in-depth 
insight into one example of tourism governance, providing a detailed understanding of how 
tourism governance operates, which is currently missing from the academic literature. This 
single case study approach creates a significant amount of data, as a result, into tourism 
governance in Costa Rica. Although the case study approach is often criticised for drawing 
conclusions that, in practice, may not always be generalisable to other contexts, in this case the 
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views and interests of a broad range of stakeholders are considered, which aims to broaden the 
applicability of the findings (Beeton, 2005). The single case study approach is also highly 
valuable in enabling a detailed exploration of the dynamics present within a single country 
context (Eisenhardt, 1989), again leading to broader and, therefore, generalisable findings. The 
use of the theoretical model and the descriptions of the shared experiences of many other 
developing states in terms of a dependency on tourism, also broaden the applicability of the 
findings.  
 
The thesis uses primarily qualitative research methods, including interviews, documentary 
analysis and literature reviews. This is suited to research into sustainable development, which 
is in many ways primarily about the impact of industry on people’s lives and their perspectives 
of these effects. Interviews were selected as the centrepiece of the research methodology, due 
to the researcher’s belief that sustainable development cannot be fully captured by quantitative 
indicators and econometric modelling. While quantitative approaches are able to create 
significant datasets, collecting information from a large number and range of participants, 
qualitative approaches are arguably better placed to capture the perceptions of stakeholders in 
greater depth, which is useful for the study of sustainable development, a concept that can have 
deep significance for individuals’ experiences. In the case study of this research, it is crucial to 
establish at the local level the perceptions of stakeholders around the effectiveness of different 
forms of governance. While this qualitative approach does not demonstrate statistically the 
precise extent of impact of governance on a nation-wide scale across Costa Rica, as a 
quantitative study might be able to, it allows an in-depth understanding of why different types 
of governance have more or less impact, which a quantitative study would not necessarily be 
able to show. This qualitative approach also provides a wealth of data on tourism governance, 
and thus makes a significant contribution to understanding a topic where there is relatively little 
existing literature. 
 
The core primary research took place in Costa Rica in the summer of 2012. 25 interviews were 
undertaken during a four-week stay in the capital of San José in August-September 2012. These 
interviewees were selected in order to represent a wide range of stakeholders’ views. They 
included sustainable managers in a number of hotels and tour companies, with a range of levels 
of certification from the Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST). A range of government 
departments involved in tourism governance were also interviewed, including the Costa Rican 
Tourism Board (ICT), the environment department, the Environmental Court and the 
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department responsible for the Ecological Blue Flag Programme. Three sustainable tourism 
consultants were also interviewed, along with two funding agencies for sustainable projects, 
the Rainforest Alliance, and NGOs and agencies providing technical assistance to communities 
and tourism businesses. An interview was also conducted in April 2013 with the international 
tourism organisation, Tourism Concern, based in London. A list of these interviews is provided 
in the Appendix to the thesis.  
 
Interviewees were identified primarily through internet searches into sustainable tourism 
organisations and experts, as well as through the identified of sustainable tourism professionals 
on Linked In, which offered a useful method for contacting relevant individuals. A number of 
interviews were arranged through the ‘snowballing’ effect, where interviewees recommended 
colleagues that it would be useful to speak to. The perspectives captured ranged from the 
passion of tourism businesses and civil servants about the achievements of sustainable tourism 
in Costa Rica, to the balanced, and at times critical, views of independent tourism consultants 
that had worked with a range of tourism businesses in Costa Rica in order to navigate the 
tourism governance landscape, such as supporting application for the Certificate for 
Sustainable Tourism (CST) certification system. Furthermore, the accommodation providers 
and tour agencies selected for interview had achieved a range of ‘leaves’ on the CST, enabling 
a breadth of insight into the views of businesses with differing levels of commitment to 
sustainability, or differing abilities to achieve certification. These were identified through the 
CST website. This enabled the garnering of insights from businesses with a varied range of 
sustainable practices. Thus, the aim of these interviews was to build up a vivid picture of the 
range of perceptions around the effectiveness of different governance mechanisms for tourism 
at the local level.  
 
One potential limitation was that interviews were conducted solely in the capital city of San 
José and nearby towns, rather than in a variety of locations and environments across Costa 
Rica. Perceptions of sustainability and the effectiveness of tourism governance might be 
expected to vary, for example, between a city and more isolated mountainous region, as the 
challenges of sustainable tourism, and subsequently the impact of governance, are likely to 
differ. In order to address this potential limitation, a number of the interviewees were selected 
as a result of their experience working in or with tourism businesses across a range of locations 
in Costa Rica. One sustainable tourism management company, for example, managed hotels in 
locations including the Osa Peninsula (a rainforest region in the south-west), Nosara (a beach 
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destination on the north-west pacific coast) and an inn in the central valley mountainous region. 
The sustainable tourism consultants, furthermore, had worked with tourism businesses across 
different parts of Costa Rica. As a result, the interview data reflected the diversity of 
experiences across Costa Rica, for example, showing how the Environmental Tribunal had 
limited resources to operate outside of the San José region, and how local municipalities 
struggled to find the resources to implement the coastal zoning regulations.  
 
The interviews were all semi-structured, with the majority around an hour in length. Three sets 
of standard interview questions were used, one for each of the different types of stakeholders 
interviewed: tourism businesses, governance organisations and sustainable tourism 
consultants. Interview schedules for tourism businesses included a general initial question 
around the types of sustainable practices that they used, followed by more probing questions 
into the types of governance mechanisms that they engaged with for sustainable tourism and 
how these had affected their practices. Interviews with governance organisations started with 
a question around the role of the organisation in sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, followed 
by more probing questions into the exact role and impact of the governance mechanism that 
they operated, and their perception of the role and impact of other types of governance 
mechanisms for sustainable tourism. Sustainable tourism consultants were asked, firstly, to 
identify what they perceived to be the most important programmes and organisations in Costa 
Rica for sustainable tourism, followed by a more specific focus on the role and impact of each 
of the types of governance mechanisms, and queries into perceptions of tourists and the public 
around sustainable tourism. The questions for all three types of interviewees were designed to 
be open, so as to avoid leading the responses in any particular direction. Research was 
conducted into the role of an interviewee prior to each interview in order to identify any 
potentially useful non-standard interview questions. This information was garnered largely 
through the internet, and particularly the websites of organisations and businesses interviewed, 
and also, through conversations with other interviewees. 
 
Around three-quarters of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, the rest in English. Data 
from the interviews was anonymised for the purpose of the thesis, in order to protect the 
identities of the interviewees. Interviewees were also told that they would not be quoted directly 
in the research. This was important as there were tensions between some governance 
organisations, and anonymity enabled interviewees to speak candidly about these relationships. 
In certain cases, furthermore, individuals had views that were not necessarily representative of 
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their organisation’s approach, and thus, this was treated sensitively, with information given 
confidentially not referred to directly in the thesis. The researcher stayed in separate lodgings 
from interviewees in order to avoid a cross-over in interests, which might potentially have 
affected the objectivity of the responses of interviewees. While interviewing in the San José 
region in 2012, the researcher stayed with a local family who also provided useful context to 
Costa Rica’s tourism industry and sustainable development. It became evident, after around 
18-20 interviews, that a significant amount of data had been collected, and similar arguments 
and points were being made across interviews, indicating that there was enough data to draw 
conclusions for the thesis. 
 
This interview data was complemented by data from a series of documents and a data set on 
certified CST businesses. Interviewees provided access to a number of documents, including 
an evaluation of the Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST) certification system, which is 
referred to in Chapter Six (document #1). The origin and agenda of these documents is taken 
into consideration when the data is used in the thesis. Data on the size and location of 
certification of certified CST businesses compared to non-certified businesses was also drawn 
from two separate data sources, one on tourism businesses in general in Costa Rica, and the 
other on certified tourism businesses. This data enabled insights into the nature of certified 
businesses, for example, the average size of businesses with the lowest and highest levels of 
certification, and their regional location. As this was quantitative data, however, it was not able 
to show why this was the case, and thus, the qualitative interviews were useful in providing 
insights here. This triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data in the case of the CST was 
particularly useful in providing insights into tourism certification, which is a complex area of 
governance with relative little quality study. Again, therefore, this approach addressed the lack 
of existing data on this topic.  
 
Two previous trips to Costa Rica, in the years leading up to the fieldwork, also contributed to 
the researcher’s understanding of the context of tourism in Costa Rica from many different 
locations and viewpoints. In July 2011, a month was spent in the beach destination of Flamingo, 
on the northwest peninsula, in a Spanish language school. The researcher lived with a Costa 
Rican family who owned a construction business which had built many of the tourism 
developments in the area, and therefore, were a useful source of information about the local 
tourism industry. Two months from August to September 2011 were then spent in the mountain 
town of Monteverde, again in the north-west of Costa Rica, and one of the most famous locales 
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for eco and rainforest tourism, with much of the employment in the local area in the tourism 
industry. The father and sons of the family that the researcher stayed with during this period 
had worked in a number of different roles related to tourism, including in construction, a hotel 
reception and a local cheese factory, which is popular among tourists for tours. During these 
periods in both Flamingo and Monteverde, the researcher was attending full-time Spanish 
lessons at local language schools, where one–to-one lessons with a different local teacher each 
week enabled many opportunities to discuss the impact of tourism in Costa Rica, as many of 
the teachers’ families and friends were involved in the industry. This period also provided 
opportunities to speak with tourists, many of whom were from either the United States (US) or 
Europe, and who were often seeking ecotourism experiences and had their own opinions and 
impressions of tourism in Costa Rica. A further ten day trip to Manuel Antonio, a popular beach 
destination in the south-west of Costa Rica, in October 2011, including a tour around its 
national park, one of the most endangered natural areas in Costa Rica, added to the researcher’s 
understanding of the broader tourism industry in Costa Rica.  
 
The researcher had also made a separate trip to Costa Rica in 2008 for four weeks, involving a 
two-week conservation volunteer project in the Osa Peninsula, in the south west of Costa Rica, 
where the accommodation was again staying with a local family. This involved the collection 
of data for research into various frog species in the rainforest and dolphins in the waters of 
Golfo Dulce. This enabled the researcher to comprehend the current lack of knowledge around 
many species in Costa Rica and the subsequent need for research into species, in order to make 
a case to the government for an area to be protected, as well as an understanding of how this 
research is carried out and the threats that these species face. This trip then concluded with a 
two-week tour around popular tourism destinations in Costa Rica, which provided a broad 
overview of the different types of tourism in Costa Rica, including a stay in one of the most 
highly rated sustainable hotels in the country on the CST, Selva Bananito Eco Lodge and 
Preserve, which sparked the researcher’s interest in sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Other 
destinations included Rio Pacuare, Tortuguero, La Fortuna, Monteverde, Playa Ocotal and 
Heredia. Thus, this five and a half months spent in total in Costa Rica provided very useful 
contextual information on, and background insight into, the key issues analysed in the thesis.  
 
The interviews were transcribed by the researcher in the period shortly after returning from 
fieldwork. The empirical material gathered was collated in written form into a single folder 
upon the researcher’s return from fieldwork. The data was then evaluated systematically, with 
 23 
 
each interview and data source examined in turn for common themes. These themes were 
mapped out in order to plan for the arguments to be made in the theoretical chapters. The 
empirical data was constantly referred back to in order to confirm the validity of thoughts and 
arguments. Key statements and ideas from the interview data were presented and referenced in 
the empirical chapters in order to support the arguments put forward. The data presented fairly 
clear conclusions, with few contradictions, and therefore, the arguments in the empirical 
chapters were fairly intuitive from the data collected.  
 
The Main Arguments and Structure of the Thesis 
 
As indicated above, this thesis has two main parts, divided into eight chapters. In the first part, 
Chapters Two and Three develop the theoretical framework of governance and sustainable 
development described above. The second part of the thesis then uses this theoretical 
framework to assess the effectiveness of governance at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa 
Rica. This focus is in particular on the effectiveness of the legal, bargaining and persuasive 
mechanisms identified in Chapter Three at promoting Chapter Two’s definition of sustainable 
development as economic development, social equity and environmental protection. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the development challenges faced by Costa Rica as a small developing 
state, which have led to the adoption of tourism as a development strategy, and the associated 
challenges that the industry poses to the country. It is indicated how Costa Rica’s dependence 
on the coffee and banana industries, followed by attempts at diversification into high-
technology industries under neoliberalism, which concentrated profits at the international level 
and environmental impacts at the local level, led to the adoption of tourism as an alternative 
‘non-traditional’ development model. As with other small developing states, Costa Rica has 
the beaches, volcanoes and rainforests that many tourists seek and, therefore, the industry 
appears an obvious choice for a development strategy. The chapter explains, however, through 
global value chains analysis, how economic profit and influence in tourism are often 
concentrated at the branding/marketing/retailing and airline stages of the industry, owned by 
foreign firms based in developed countries, rather than with service-providers in host countries 
such as Costa Rica. In contrast, the industry often results in potentially significant 
environmental damage at the local level. The chapter outlines how these concerns in Costa 
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Rica have led to the use of governance mechanisms by state and non-state actors in an attempt 
to make the industry more conducive to sustainable development.  
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven then explore how far each of the three types of governance 
mechanisms developed in Chapter Three in turn are responsible for the relative success of 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Four key legal mechanisms are identified: the national park 
system, the Maritime Zone Law, legislation recognising rights to land for communities, and 
the Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia International Airport investment. Chapter Five 
indicates that there is moderate evidence of their impact on sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, 
due to the high choice-constraining nature of legal mechanisms. Further impact is limited by 
factors including the promotion of economic objectives by the state, inadequate design unsuited 
to the complexities of sustainable development, resource shortages for implementation and 
corruption. These factors are largely captured in the theoretical model.  
 
Chapter Six then identifies three certification systems in Costa Rica as the primary bargaining 
mechanisms for tourism: the state-run Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST), the state-run 
Ecological Blue Flag Programme and the non-state Rainforest Alliance Verification 
programme. Costa Rica’s CST is argued to have a moderate impact on service-providers in the 
tourism industry, and the most significant impact of all the governance mechanisms for 
sustainable tourism. Furthermore, the CST is indicated to be slightly more effective than the 
legal mechanisms identified in Chapter Five. The other two certification systems have only a 
limited impact. As a collaborative bargaining mechanism, the CST is argued to have adequate 
levers to reach a relatively significant proportion of tourism businesses, and in some depth, due 
to close collaboration with individual businesses. The CST’s relative success compared to other 
certification systems is argued to be a result of its authority as a state-run programme, the 
bureaucratic competence of the state, the support offered the CST programme by non-state 
organisations, which provide technical assistance in the design of standards and for businesses 
seeking certification, and a heightened receptiveness among stakeholders towards sustainable 
development in Costa Rica, which incentivises businesses to comply. The heightened 
receptiveness towards sustainable development is indicated to be a result of Costa Rica’s varied 
and unique biodiversity, which has facilitated a historic affinity between people and nature. 
The theoretical model is indicated to partly identify these factors. 
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Chapter Seven identifies and assesses three key persuasive mechanisms for tourism in Costa 
Rica: technical assistance programmes run by non-state actors for tourism businesses and 
communities, education programmes run by both state and non-state actors for the public and 
tourists, and the lobbying of government and businesses for more sustainable policy and 
business activities. The chapter argues that the most significant persuasive mechanism for 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica is the Rainforest Alliance’s technical assistance programme 
for tourism businesses. This has a moderate impact, and is only slightly less significant than 
the CST discussed in Chapter Six. On the other hand, the other persuasive mechanisms are 
shown to have only a limited impact on sustainable tourism. The particular success of the 
Rainforest Alliance’s technical assistance programme is attributed to the status of this 
programme, a result of the organisation’s international reputation, and the heightened 
receptiveness towards sustainable development. It is suggested, however, that the reach of the 
Rainforest Alliance to service-providers is still limited by resource shortages, and the way in 
which they only reach the actors most interested in sustainability. It is indicated how the 
theoretical model again partly identifies the intrinsic characteristics of these persuasive 
mechanisms that led to these levels of impact. However, it is also indicated how the fact that 
these mechanisms do not adequately address key stakeholders in the tourism industry at the 
international level reduces their overall effectiveness.  
 
Chapter Eight concludes with an outline of the key arguments and findings from the thesis. It 
first outlines the nature of the theoretical model, followed by the findings from the empirical 
chapters on Costa Rica. The chapter then discusses the utility of the theoretical model utilised 
in this thesis. It argues that the model provides a useful framework for exploring governance, 
through the distinction of three types of governance mechanisms that are used to structure the 
research, and identification of a series of potential strengths and weaknesses. The chapter, 
finally, suggests a number of potential avenues for further research, which would contribute 
further to knowledge around the impact of governance for sustainable tourism.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the central research question of this thesis: the extent to which 
different types of tourism governance are effective in developing states. It has explained the 
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approach that this thesis will take in addressing these questions, including a theoretical 
framework to conceptualise both sustainable development and governance, and introduced the 
case study of Costa Rica, a potentially successful case of tourism governance that will be 
explored in this thesis. The chapter, firstly, discussed the core research questions and the 
existing literature on tourism and governance, before outlining the theoretical model that will 
be employed in order to answer these questions, the methodology used by the thesis, and the 
structure and main arguments that will be made throughout. The next two chapters will now 
establish the theoretical framework for this thesis, before Chapters Four to Seven discuss the 
impact of tourism governance in Costa Rica.  
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Chapter Two 
A Theoretical Framework for Sustainable 
Development 
 
This thesis explores the effectiveness of different mechanisms of tourism governance in 
promoting sustainable development and seeks to identify success factors. This research focus 
is based on the premise that ‘development’, as defined up to this point, has been theoretically 
and conceptually problematic. The task of this chapter is to establish a framework through 
which to understand the concept of development. This chapter will explore, first of all, how 
existing conceptions of development from modernisation theories to agency and local-based 
theories are problematic, as they fail to consider adequately local economic, social and 
environmental aspects of development. This chapter will then explore insights from sustainable 
development and global value chain theories in order to address these three paucities of 
traditional conceptions of development. Finally, this chapter will develop a framework for 
understanding the concept of ‘sustainable’ development that will be utilised throughout this 
thesis. This will recognise how three essential aspects to development - economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection - must be addressed in a potentially challenging 
context, where the costs and risks of industry are disproportionately shouldered by local 
stakeholders. This framework will be used throughout the rest of the thesis in order to explore 
how far governance mechanisms promote sustainable development in Costa Rica. 
 
The Paucities of Traditional Conceptions of ‘Development’ 
 
In order to construct a framework of sustainable development for this thesis, it is useful to first 
explore the challenges of existing conceptions of development. This section will identify how 
traditional development theories have problematic understandings of development, which 
make them inadequate for use in this thesis. It will be indicated how historically, economic 
profit for large actors such as transnational corporations and governments has been prioritised 
over economic gains for more local and smaller actors. Furthermore, the need in development 
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for socio-cultural indicators, for example, gender and ethnic equality, has often been ignored, 
along with the requirement for environmental protection, which, when recognised, is often 
measured through inadequate environmental indicators. The following section will 
demonstrate how these concerns are inherent throughout the traditional development theories, 
from modernisation theories to present day, before the chapter indicates how sustainable 
development theories and global value chain theories provide methods through which to 
address these paucities.  
 
From very early on, development was conceived almost purely in economic terms. The 
domination of the discipline of economics saw the early development strategies of England and 
France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries primarily seek economic success in the form 
of the accumulation of precious metals and agricultural production (Payne and Phillips, 2010). 
Social and environmental concerns of development were here largely ignored and where the 
environment was recognised, it was only in terms of its utility for economic development. 
Adam Smith (1910), for example, recognised the crucial role of the environment in the creation 
of useful products through the land.  
 
This economic focus was again reflected in modernisation theories of development, emerging 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s and shaped decisively by the first industrial revolution. While 
diverse, modernisation theories generally argued that development is a teleological process, 
that is, that there are a number of discrete stages through which all societies must pass in order 
to develop. Rostow (1971), a key proponent, identified five key stages: traditional society, pre-
conditions for take-off, take-off, the road to maturity and the age of mass consumption. These 
stages of development, however, again focused primarily on economic development. Rostow 
(1971), for example, understood the ‘take-off’ stage of growth to require a rise in the rate of 
productive investment from five per cent or less to over ten per cent of national income; the 
development of one or more significant manufacturing sectors, with a high growth rate; and 
the existence of a political, social and institutional framework. While phenomena such as 
urbanisation, a large reduction in birth and death rates, the creation of a centralised bureaucratic 
government, an effective education system and an increase in technology were considered to 
be symptoms of development, it was implied that as long as economic development took place, 
these factors would follow (Landes, 2003; for modernisation theorists see, for example, 
Eisenstadt, 1964, Huntington, 1971 and Rostow, 1971). Modernisationists also believed that 
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development involved a higher degree of control of man over the environment (Huntington, 
1971), thus again subordinating the environment to human development needs.  
 
The dependency theories that emerged in the 1960s also continued the trend of an economic 
conception of development. These included the work in Latin America of Andre Gunder Frank 
(1969), Furtado (1964) and Cardoso (1972); those in the Caribbean, such as Beckford (1970) 
and Best (1968); and world systems theorists such as Wallerstein (1976). These theorists 
argued that it was not internal conditions that determined whether or not a country developed, 
but rather the external structure of the international system. They argued that a ‘structural 
duality’ existed within many developing countries, which linked the most advanced sections 
of these ‘hinterland’ economies to the ‘metropolitan’ or developed economies (Cardoso, 1972 
and Best, 1968). For dependency theorists, development was not taking place in the developing 
world due to economic transfers draining from hinterlands to the metropole, and in particular, 
the supply of raw materials to industrialised countries (Baran, 1957). Development itself was 
little discussed, apart from to illustrate its absence. However, where development is implicitly 
mentioned, it is often used interchangeably with economic development, defined as an 
‘increase over time in per capita output of material goods’ (Baran, 1957: 18). The environment 
was recognised by dependency scholars only in terms of how the metropole was tearing natural 
resources from the hinterland for its own development.  
 
The 1970s saw two new development strategies, again both largely with a focus on economic 
development: ‘developmental state’ theory and neoliberalism. The first was specific to East 
Asia, conceptualised by Chalmers Johnson (1982) as ‘developmental state’ theory, and 
developed by scholars such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1998). This theory emerged to 
describe the sudden and unprecedented growth of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan through the 
use of a ‘plan-rational capitalist developmental state, conjoining private ownership with state 
guidance’ (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 2). Here, the state was argued to have taken a crucial role in 
steering the course of development. The success of the strategy extended to a second wave of 
East Asian nations that dramatically increased their growth rates, including Thailand, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. The strategy was challenged, however, by the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 
1990s, that disrupted the impressive rates of growth of many of these economies.  
 
The indicators for development here were again primarily economic, ‘defined in terms of 
growth, productivity, and competitiveness’ (Öniş, 1991: 111). Wade (1998) discussed the 
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predominantly economic successes of the East Asian states, with large annual growth rates of 
around eight per cent, high savings rates and capital spending. These were all measured 
nationally, ignoring the distribution of economic development among different actors within 
the developing countries. Where developmental states were afterwards measured through 
social indicators, such as the Human Development Index, there was evidence of ‘striking 
performances in the domains of employment expansion, poverty reduction, and income 
distribution’ (Őniş and Şenses, 2005: 265-266). Yet, while social factors, such as improved 
health and education, are seen in retrospect as  positive outcomes from the developmental state 
model, at the time they were often not used as indicators for development themselves. 
Furthermore, the methods for achieving these gains often involved large-scale oppression of 
human rights, particularly of students, labour, political and religious groups (Leftwich, 2000). 
Thus development again failed to conceptualise the unequal distribution of economic gains and 
the need for social equity.  
 
The second influential theory in the 1970s onwards was neoliberalism, which emerged from 
the Chicago School of Economics and scholars such as Milton Friedman and John Williamson 
(2004). This theory replaced the role of the state in development with that of the market, but 
remained strongly focused on producing economic gains, particularly for large transnational 
corporations. Many developing countries were advised, and in some cases more forcefully 
persuaded through conditional loans, to adopt economic policies that increased the power of 
the market, such as privatisation, deregulation on barriers to entry and exit, and fiscal 
discipline. This was the beginning of a general shift towards policies that enhance the role of 
the market that is still influential today. Neoliberalism suffers from similar problems to the 
previous development theories, however, prioritising economic profit for business interests and 
governments, taking ‘privatization and trade liberalization as ends in themselves, rather than 
as means to more sustainable, equitable and democratic growth’ (Stiglitz, 1998). Where 
development is mentioned, it is more often than not referring to economic development, 
virtually excluding non-economic factors of development from serious consideration 
(Brohman, 1995: 297).  Factors considered as important indicators of development include 
strong financial organisations and judiciaries; and a stable economy with minimal debt, rather 
than economic and social gains for groups within a nation-state (see Williamson, 2004). 
Increasing social equality was assumed by neoliberals to follow naturally through the trickle-
down effect, where the profits created by business interests would filter down to benefit all 
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stakeholders in an industry. In practice, however, there is little evidence that this trickle-down 
effect has taken place.  
 
The environment is also often omitted from neoliberal conceptions of development, which have 
led in cases to significant environmental damages, as a result of the prioritisation of economic 
profit and privatisation of goods such as water, forests and biodiversity, which rests on the 
assumption that these goods are better managed by private owners. In cases, there has been a 
large backlash against neoliberalism due to concern around its management of the environment. 
In Cochabamba, Bolivia, strikes, roadblocks and protests during a six month period led to a 
reversal of water privatisation, as a result of the belief that privatisation would lead to changes 
such as farmers having to pay for previously free water for irrigation from underground sources 
(Nickson and Vargas, 2002). The discouragement of regulation has also led to significant 
environmental damage in the search for economic profit. In the tourism industry, for example, 
rapid resort development has led to the erosion of beaches, marine and coastal pollution, 
dumping of waste and raw sewage, destruction of wetlands and breakdown of coral reefs 
(Pattullo, 2005). Where the environment is recognised in neoliberalism as an indicator of 
development, it is measured through economic means. While this is fairly easy to do, for 
example, in terms of the social costs of pollution, it is less straightforward to calculate the 
positive value of an environmental asset to society as there are no markets for rivers or clean 
air and thus, it is difficult to gather data on how they might be valued by the public (Brohman, 
1995). Thus, the neoliberal conception of development is problematic in that it fails to 
recognise the importance of local economic gains, tackling inequalities, and environmental 
protection.  
 
Concerns over the poor record of neoliberal policies in many developing countries led to the 
emergence of a post-Washington Consensus development model, pioneered by scholars such 
as Joseph Stiglitz, Dani Rodrik, Stanley Fischer, and the World Bank’s ‘Voices of the Poor’ 
report (Narayan et al, 2000). This model aimed to add a ‘human face’ to the neoliberal concept 
of development, through targets of not only raising GDP per capita, but also living standards, 
recognised through health and literacy indicators (Stiglitz, 1998). The emphasis was, thus, on 
social aspects of development alongside economic development. The post-Washington 
Consensus also indicated how development had not benefited many poor people and thus, 
finally recognised the diversity of development experiences within countries. In practice, 
however, the post-Washington Consensus agenda is often criticised as being little different to 
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original neoliberal theory. When countries such as Argentina and Turkey suffered frequent 
financial crises, for example, the post-Washington Consensus approach encouraged them to 
focus on the same neoliberal short-term adjustment and regulatory reforms, side-lining poverty 
and inequality targets (Őniş and Şenses, 2005). Thus, the claims to hear the needs of the poor 
within states were largely tokenistic. The post-Washington Consensus, therefore, did not 
emerge as a strong counterpoint to neoliberalism, which in many countries retains a dominant 
influence on policy today. As a result, development is still often defined in terms of economic 
development for larger actors at the expense of local actors, social equity and the environment. 
 
Development Studies has been in somewhat of a quandary since these challenges to 
neoliberalism and the post-Washington Consensus. With the exception of the ‘Beijing 
Consensus’, a very controversial attempt to provide a state intervention explanation of the rapid 
economic development in China, few coherent new development models have emerged (Ramo, 
2004; Huang, 2010). Development Studies has also been further challenged by significant 
changes in the landscape in which developing countries operate. The rapid onset of 
globalisation has led to a hugely increasing number and significance of transnational 
corporations, as investors expand across national borders in search of new and larger markets 
(Kaplinsky, 2005). Developing states are limited in how far they can regulate these 
transnational corporations, as a result of international agreements such as those made in the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs’ (GATT) Uruguay Round of trade talks in 1994 
(Madeley, 1999). These changes have significantly increased inequalities both between 
developed and developing countries and within developing countries, and have, therefore, 
made it even more crucial that a framework of development recognises the importance of 
economic profit at the local end of the development scale. 
 
A number of potential new development theories have emerged in recent years. None, however, 
have become widely recognised as viable alternatives to neoliberalism. Local theories of 
development, for example, became popular from the mid-1980s, including participatory 
theories (see, for example, Gaventa, 2002; Williams, 2004; and Cooke and Kothari, 2001), 
which emphasise the need to bring the focus down to the ground level, as a response to growing 
disillusionment with governments. These, however, still neglected to recognise the 
environment, and, arguably, ignore the implications of development at the broader nation-state 
level. Theories of human development, based on the work of Amartya Sen (1985), conceive of 
development in terms of capabilities, or what people can actually ‘do’ and ‘be’ (Anand and 
 33 
 
Ravallion, 1993). Thus, development is measured through social indicators such as health, 
nourishment and education, rather than income. The environment is again omitted from this 
conception of development. Gender theories of development have also become more prominent 
in recent years, stressing how understandings of development need to take into account the 
differences between the role of men and women (see, for example, Mohanty et al, 1991 and 
Tinker, 1990). Yet again, environmental issues are generally underplayed here.  
 
The understandings of development used by mainstream development theories overall, 
therefore, are problematic. They indicate the need for an understanding of development for this 
thesis to recognise the importance of economic profit for smaller, local actors as well as large 
actors such as business interests and governments. Furthermore, development should include 
socio-cultural indicators, such as gender and ethnic equality, and the preservation of developing 
country cultures. Finally, environmental protection should be recognised as an indicator of 
development, and measured appropriately. The following sections will explore how sustainable 
development theories and global value chain analysis offer a number of valuable insights into 
how these problems might be addressed, before a framework of development for this thesis is 
developed.  
 
Theories of Sustainable Development 
 
Sustainable development theories are useful in developing a framework of development, as 
they are one of the few development theories that explicitly understand the concept to include 
protection of the environment and, furthermore, they emphasise the importance of the poor in 
the development process (Arnold, 1989). As with the concept of development more broadly, 
however, sustainable development is also criticised for its lack of clarity, due to the 
‘tremendous’ diversity of definitions and interpretations (Lafferty, 1996). Sustainable 
development theories emerged from the 1980s, although the environment had become an 
important issue for many from the 1960s onwards. Extensive worldwide social movements had 
emerged to tackle issues such as the environment, anti-nuclear and rights for women (Estes, 
1993), while international environmental events such as the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 saw the environment increasingly seen as crucial 
in the fight for the alleviation of poverty (Sachs, 1999). These early ideas blamed population 
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growth for environmental degradation, arguing that the earth has natural limits to human 
development (see, for example, Meadows et al, 1972 and Schumacher, 1973). They saw state 
regulations as an important solution to these problems and argued that huge and immediate 
cutbacks in population size and resource use were necessary to avoid environmental disaster. 
These debates, however, focused primarily on the environment at the expense of recognition 
of human development needs. 
 
Mainstream sustainable development theories emerged to challenge these radical notions of 
limits to growth of the 1970s. They also challenged the assumption of economic policy that 
international prosperity and human well-being is achievable through increased global trade and 
industry. In these theories, the environment is viewed as an important aspect of development, 
often of equal or greater importance to economic development and social equity. Ecological 
economics scholars at the heart of mainstream sustainable development, such as David Pearce, 
Tom Tietenberg and William Nordhaus, argued that the absence of the environment in 
economic models beforehand was ‘as if biology tried to understand animals only in terms of 
their circulatory system, with no recognition of the fact that they also have digestive tracts’ 
(Daly, 1990: 25). Musters et al (1998), for example, accounts for environmental aspects of 
development as enabling ‘future’ development while the Brundtland Report’s vision (1987) is 
based on notions of inter-generational justice, which suggests that each generation should have 
equal access to natural resources. What has set ‘sustainable development’ apart even further 
from previous conceptions of development is that it does not come with a specific ideology 
attached for how it might be achieved. As such, it has been a popular concept for some time, 
with ideological opponents employing similar sustainable development vocabulary.  
 
Hopwood et al (2005) provide a useful mapping of different approaches to sustainable 
development, shown in Figure 2, which indicates how ideologically diverse these theories can 
be. Sustainable development theories are divided into three categories: status quo, reform and 
transformationists. Those in the ‘status quo’ category (see for example, Lomborg, 2001 and 
Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000) view sustainable development as achievable within the current 
neoliberal context, with a reduced role for regulation, leaving consumers and ethical business 
owners to promote sustainable development. Growth, or the price mechanism, is viewed as the 
way to solve environmental problems. As such, advocates of these approaches generally either 
assume that the price mechanism is the most efficient means of distributing scarce resources 
and, thus, that sustainability will take place automatically, or view environmental protection as 
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a secondary goal to growth. Those in the ‘reform’ category, largely NGOs and academics, 
accept the mounting problems in current policies and societal trends, however, do not see large 
environmental disasters as imminent or likely, or that radical change is necessary (see, for 
example, Hawken et al, 1999 and Weizsacker, 1997). They argue that large shifts in policy and 
lifestyles are required but that they can take place within existing economic and social 
structures. ‘Transformationists’, on the other hand, argue that system-wide change of economic 
and social structures and humans’ relationships with the environment is necessary to avoid the 
mounting crisis and potential future disasters (see, for example, Pepper, 1993 and Dryzek, 
1997). They argue that a lack of concern for human well-being and environmental protection 
is embedded in the economic and power structures of societies, causing many development 
problems. 
 
Figure 2: Mapping of Different Approaches to Sustainable Development (Hopwood et al, 2005) 
 
 
As a result of this diversity of approaches, a range of definitions of sustainable development 
have emerged. Mainstream sustainable development in the early stages often assumed that 
GDP was an adequate single indicator of sustainable development, believing that sustainable 
development is ‘economic development that endures over the long run’ (Turner et al, 1994: 
55). The understanding of both ‘human’ and environmental aspects of development were, thus, 
rather limited. While this approach uses a single figure to represent development, which is easy 
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to interpret and compare across contexts and time periods, as above with traditional 
development theories, it does not indicate that social equity has increased, as higher rates of 
GDP do not necessarily mean that basic needs are met, while GDP rates can be very low where 
the basic needs of most of a population are met (Goodland and Ledec, 1987). Later models of 
sustainable development that aggregated a number of measurements into one indicator, such 
as ‘green GDP’, or the World Bank’s ‘genuine savings’ approach also remained focused 
primarily on economic development, at the expense again of equality measures. However, as 
Bossel (1999) argues, this single model requires the adding together of indicators that cannot 
be measured in the same way, such as monetary income and damage to the environment, and 
is therefore problematic. 
 
More recently, frameworks have been developed that use multiple indicators for sustainable 
development, including specific indicators for environmental protection (Steurer and 
Hametner, 2010). Some of these are complex, making them rather inaccessible to scholars and 
students of sustainable development. Hass et al (2002) note how Sweden uses a four-fold 
approach to sustainable development that is claimed to capture the transition towards 
sustainability instead of sustainability in one given moment: efficiency, contribution and 
equality, adaptability and values and resources for coming generations. Haughton (1999), on 
the other hand, uses the concept of ‘equity’ in order to explain five aspects of sustainable 
development: inter-generational equity; social justice (intra-generational equity); trans-frontier 
responsibility (geographical equity); procedural equity (people treated openly and fairly); and 
inter-species equity (importance of biodiversity). 
 
More simplistic frameworks include that of the Brundtland Report (1987: 34): ‘sustainable 
development seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the 
ability to meet those of the future’. This definition, although broad and, therefore, relevant to 
many different contexts, is not specific enough as to the ‘needs’ that the present and future 
generations require. The ‘three legged stool’ or ‘three pillar’ model, which integrates economic, 
social and environmental aspects of development is a very commonly used model by local, 
regional and national governments, as well as businesses, and international organisations such 
as the United Nations (Dawe and Ryan, 2003). The ‘three legged stool’ approach suggests that 
each of the three aspects of development represents one leg of a stool and that, if one leg is not 
appropriately addressed, it will be shorter than the others, and therefore the stool will be 
unstable but usable, at least for a period of time (Scottish Environment Protection Agency in 
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Dawe and Ryan, 2003). If one leg is not addressed at all, then it will be missing and, therefore, 
the stool will not be usable.  
 
Dawe and Ryan (2003) argue the environment should be recognised as of more importance 
than economic and social aspects of development in the three-legged stool model, as there 
cannot be economic or social development without the environment. To prioritise the 
environment over economic and social aspects of development, however, implies that 
development should not be taking place at all in order to avoid environmental impacts. 
Furthermore, it risks isolating international political economy and development studies 
scholars, who are less inclined to recognise the significance of the environment for 
development due to their focus on economic and social aspects of development.  
 
This three-fold definition of sustainable development meets the requirements outlined above 
for the integration of social and environmental indicators into an understanding of 
development. Its simplicity also makes it easy to understand and utilise. This definition does 
not, however, recognise the implications of powerful international political and economic 
structures for development and, particularly, the inequities between the interests and gains of 
large national and international actors and small local actors in development (Redclift, 1987). 
Therefore, insights will now be drawn from global value chain theories in order to develop 
further this three-fold definition of sustainable development into a framework useful for this 
thesis.  
 
Global Value Chain Theories 
 
Global value chain theories have their roots in world-systems theory from the 1980s, variations 
of which include original commodity chain analysis (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1977), global 
commodity chain analysis (Gereffi, 1999), global value chain analysis (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005) and global production networks (Hess and Yeung, 2006). Global value chain 
theories recognise the development implications of the reorganisation of capital at the local, 
regional and global levels (Clancy, 1998), incorporating ‘globalisation’ into understandings of 
economic development by drawing on the core, periphery and semi-periphery concepts of 
world-systems theory. This addresses the concern identified above that development should 
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recognise interests of stakeholders at both the local and the global levels (Boulanger and 
Bréchet, 2005). As Gibbon et al (2008: 330) argue, the value of the ‘chain’ metaphor is that it 
allows ‘a highly abstract idea (economic globalisation) to be grasped concretely, in terms of a 
series of relations organised around the economy’s most tangible entities (commodities or 
goods)’. Global value chain theories, furthermore, prompted a movement away from the 
historical unit of analysis as the state in development studies, towards recognition of the role 
of firms in development (Payne and Phillips, 2010). Thus, global value chain theories have 
significant potential to offer insight into how a framework of sustainable development for this 
thesis might recognise the implications of development not only for large national and 
international actors, but also people at the local level.  
 
In these theories, ‘chains’ refer to the ‘whole range of activities involved in the design, 
production and marketing of a product’ (Gereffi, 1999: 1). Gereffi (1999) outlines two different 
types of commodity chains, distinguished by their concentration of developed and developing 
country firms at different stages. Firstly, in ‘producer-driven’ chains, developed country firms 
dominate most of the design, production and marketing stages of industry, apart from the 
labour-intensive stages of manufacturing, which are often subcontracted out to developing 
country firms (Gibbon, 2001). These chains are common in capital and technology-intensive 
industries, such as cars, aircraft, computers and heavy machinery, where developed country 
firms are keen to retain control over the capital-intensive, higher-value added and, therefore, 
more profitable stages of manufacturing. 
 
‘Buyer-driven’ chains, on the other hand, are often present in more labour-intensive industries 
and, therefore, the production stages are often all subcontracted out to developing country 
firms, while developed country firms dominate the higher value-added branding, marketing 
and retailing stages of the chain. Korzeniewicz (1994), for example, demonstrates through 
commodity chain analysis how employees of the international shoe company, Nike, work 
almost solely in advertising, design or sales, with no Nike employees actually making shoes, 
as production contracts are established with foreign-owned producers in developing countries. 
Figure 3 shows a diagram from Bair and Gereffi (2001), which illustrates how the production 
stages of the blue jeans industry in 2000 were located in both the US and Torreon, Mexico, 
while the design and product development, marketing and retail stages of the industry were 
based exclusively in the US. This arrangement enables firms to respond quickly to ever-
changing consumer tastes and demand.   
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Figure 3: Location of Stages of the Blue Jeans Industry in 2000 (Bair and Gereffi, 2001) 
 
 
The overall premise of global value chain theories, therefore, is that those firms operating in 
the higher value-added stages of the industry, usually from developed countries, are ‘lead’ 
firms, and that in order for development to be achieved, stakeholders need to link up with the 
most significant of these lead firms, as they control access to major resources (such as product 
design, new technologies, brand names, or consumer demand) that generate the most profitable 
returns in the industry (Gereffi, 1999: 3). These ‘lead’ companies are in effect ‘strategic 
brokers’, linking the products with the right consumer markets (Gereffi, 1999). This model 
leads producers in developing countries to shoulder disproportionate amounts of risk and costs, 
as employment and income is extremely volatile as a result of flexible production, while ‘lead’ 
firms can negotiate cheap prices with producers through the threat of moving production 
elsewhere (Clancy, 1998). In producer-driven chains, therefore, the influence over the 
distribution of benefits from an industry lies with lead firms at the capital-intensive 
manufacturing, branding, retailing and marketing stages, while in buyer-driven chains, this 
influence lies primarily in the branding, marketing and retailing firms.  
 
Global value chain theories are thus very valuable in understanding the nature of development, 
as they provide a very visual and detailed analysis of how power is concentrated at particular 
stages of industries, which is a common blind spot for state-centric theories of development. 
While the utility of the distinction between producer and buyer-driven chains has been 
criticised by some scholars (see, for example, Gellert, 2003 and Henderson et al, 2002), they 
are more extensive than many other theories in explaining why the complex industries that 
have emerged through globalisation are not bringing the expected economic and social benefits 
to developing countries. Global value chain theories, however, focus primarily on economic 
aspects of development at the expense of social and environmental indicators and, therefore, 
bring their own benefits but also limitations to understanding development. The final chapter 
of this thesis will develop a framework for understanding sustainable development that draws 
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on insights from both sustainable development and global value chain theories in order to 
address the paucities highlighted in existing conceptions of development above.  
 
The Conceptual Framework of Sustainable Development 
 
This thesis will use a conceptual framework of development drawn from various aspects of the 
above sustainable development and global value chain theories. The three-legged stool 
approach to sustainable development, with the three indicators of economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection, will be the foundation of a framework for 
sustainable development for this thesis. All three of these indicators will be required to take 
place in tandem for sustainable development to exist. This approach, therefore, addresses the 
lack of recognition in traditional understandings of development of social and environmental 
aspects of development. The simplicity of this approach is also of benefit, given that a second 
framework of governance will be added to this theoretical model in the next chapter.  
 
As traditional theories of development and indeed, even sustainable development theories, have 
also failed to recognise the significance of inequalities between stakeholders at the local and 
global levels of industry, the framework for this thesis will integrate an explicit model from 
global value chain theories in order to ensure that local benefits are paramount in development. 
It will, therefore, recognise the external challenges that developing states face in achieving the 
three aspects of sustainable development above, and in particular, how the costs and risks in an 
industry are often disproportionately shouldered by local stakeholders. The key basic stages of 
an industry will be understood as ‘service-providers’ at one the local end of a chain, through to 
‘branding’, ‘marketing’ and ‘retailing’, often based at the international level, as demonstrated 
in Figure 4. These stages can be adapted for specific industries, and indeed, Chapter Four will 
develop a chain specifically to explain the implications of development from the tourism 
industry. 
 
Figure 4: Stages of a Global Value Chain 
 
 
 
Service-providers Branding 
 
Marketing 
 
Retailing 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a framework through which to understand sustainable 
development throughout this thesis. The chapter highlighted how traditional conceptions of 
development are problematic, as a result of the dominance of economic profit for large and 
international actors as opposed to local actors, the neglect of social and cultural aspects of 
development, and lack of recognition of the importance of environmental protection. The 
chapter then explored a range of frameworks of sustainable development, highlighting how, 
while many of these address some of the paucities of traditional development frameworks, they 
do not adequately recognise the structural constraints on local stakeholders of development, 
given inequalities in influence, cost and risk between the local and global levels of industry. It 
was therefore discussed how global value chain theories provide a way of recognising the 
importance of this distribution of economic development. Finally, insights from sustainable 
development and global value chain theories were combined in order to create a framework of 
sustainable development for this thesis that requires economic development, social equity and 
environmental protection to be achieved at the local level, given a challenging context where 
costs and risks are disproportionately shouldered by local stakeholders.  
 
This definition of sustainable development identifies a number of features of sustainable 
development that require governance, including in particular, the potential for tension between 
the interests of international business interests, who are keen to generate profits, and local 
stakeholders. The disproportionate influence seen between these local and international 
stakeholders may also challenge the role and effectiveness of governance for sustainable 
development. The next chapter will develop a theoretical model of governance mechanisms 
through which this framework of sustainable development might be pursued by developing 
states, before Chapters Four to Seven examine the case study of Costa Rica, in order to gain 
insight into the effectiveness of governance for sustainable tourism and potential success 
factors for tourism governance. 
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Chapter Three 
A Theoretical Model of Governance for 
Sustainable Tourism 
 
 
 
Chapter Two outlined a framework through which to define sustainable development as 
economic development, social equity and environmental protection, which must take place in 
a challenging context where stakeholders at the local level are often disproportionately affected 
by the risks and costs of industry. Given the central concern of International Political Economy 
around the extent to which states influence market forces for their own advantage, this thesis 
will explore how far governments and other non-state actors attempt to influence market forces 
in order to facilitate sustainable development (Gilpin, 2003). ‘Governance’ or ‘governing’ can 
be defined as a system of rules that shape the actions of social actors (Mayntz in Treib, 2007). 
This chapter will, therefore, develop a theoretical model for conceptualising, and comparing 
and contrasting, the different types of rules used in sustainable development to shape the 
actions of social actors. The term ‘governance’ is sometimes used to refer solely to rules 
employed by non-state actors, with those rules used by states classed as ‘government’. In this 
thesis, however, the term ‘governance’ will refer more broadly to systems of rules created by 
both state and non-state actors.  
 
As indicated in the Introduction, the International Political Economy approach adopted by this 
thesis takes the national level as the primary referent of analysis; however, it recognises the 
significance of both state and non-state actors in governance. A theoretical model of 
governance for this thesis, therefore, needs to be suitable to this context, including in particular, 
recognition of the different types of governance and actors across all of these levels, but 
primarily within the nation-state level. This chapter will, firstly, explore the current debates in 
the governance literature, in order to understand the context for different approaches to 
governance typologies, and to embed the following theoretical model and case study of this 
thesis in broader theoretical debates around governance. Secondly, it will draw insights from 
the governance, environmental governance and tourism and sustainable development 
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literatures in order to explore the various typologies of governance already used in the 
literature. It will then draw on these in order to develop a theoretical model suitable for this 
thesis. The theoretical model developed will include three types of governance mechanisms, 
distinguished by the degree to which they are choice-constraining for ‘governed’ actors: highly 
choice-constraining ‘legal’ mechanisms, moderately choice-constraining ‘bargaining’ 
mechanisms, and low choice-constraining ‘persuasive’ mechanisms. 
 
Current Debates in the Governance Literature 
 
In order to develop a theoretical model, it is first useful to explore debates in the broader 
governance literature within which existing models of governance are embedded, and in which 
a theoretical model for this thesis must be founded. The existing governance literature centres 
around the key question as to how far decision-making has shifted from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’, and particularly, whether there has been a decline in significance in the role of 
the state, along with traditional command and control mechanisms, in favour of non-state, and 
more voluntary, forms of influence. This section will give an overview of these debates, before 
a theoretical model of governance is developed below, which will explore in more depth the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of different types of governance mechanisms.  
 
Accounts of governance can be divided into two ‘camps’: normative, which offer perceptions 
of how governance ‘should’ be in order to deliver outcomes such as economic efficiency and 
democratic accountability; and empirical, which use real world evidence to explain the nature 
of governance. In the first camp, the two most dominant strands are neoliberal and civil society 
literatures. Neoliberals argues for the need to devolve power from central government 
institutions to the market in order to increase economic efficiency. Scholars such as Bauer 
(1972), Lal (1983) and Krueger (1980), suggest that central state mechanisms warp the market, 
producing perverse incentives that lead to the permanent subsidy of inefficient industries with 
little potential to promote international competitiveness, and large-scale rent seeking, where 
economic gain is sought without providing any benefits to societal wealth. These challenges 
have been indicated to be a particular problem in developing states, where governments can 
suffer from weak, imperfect, poorly resourced and coordinated institutions (Grindle, 2004; 
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Dodds and Butler, 2010). Thus, neoliberals argue for the merits of decentralised government, 
with empowered local authorities and non-state actors. 
 
Civil society scholars similarly argue for the need to disperse power for effective government 
or governance, but for outcomes of democratic accountability and empowerment (see, for 
example, Cashore’s (2002) non-state market-driven governance; Gemill and Bamidele-Izu, 
2002; Glasbergen, 2011; Jepson, 2005; and Keck and Sikkink’s (2002) references to 
transnational advocacy networks). These accounts focus particularly on the role of non-state 
actors in governance, stressing perceived strengths such as their bottom line of empowerment, 
which enables local people to articulate their needs and participate in politics (Banks and 
Hulme, 2012). Civil society mechanisms are also argued to have the potential for in-depth and 
long-term relationship with actors due to their participatory nature, and the ability to work with 
stakeholders outside of the national domain. Thus, again, the emphasis in this literature is on 
the reduced value of the state in governance. 
 
In the other governance ‘camp’, empirical debates draw on evidence to point to theories of how 
governance operates in practice. General opinion indicates that up until the 1970s, the 
traditional model of government was ‘monocentrism’, underpinned by the notion that the most 
effective way to allocate power was through a strong centralised state, using command and 
control mechanisms of influence. Since then, however, the increasingly global nature of 
communications, travel, mass media, corporations, financial flows and environmental 
problems, along with the emergence of many non-state actors and the growing economic 
influence of transnational corporations, has led many to question the continuing role of the 
state in governance (Scholte, 2005). 
 
These debates have been shaped both by perceived internal state ‘failures’ (indicated above in 
the neoliberal literature), and a changing international political and economy context for 
governance. As a result of concerns around internal state challenges, New Public Management 
ideology (inspired by neoliberal arguments) is perceived to have been promoted by many 
governments, leading to the perceived ‘unravelling’ or ‘unbundling’ of the state, whereby 
policy responsibility is delegated to arm’s-length public bodies, creating a growing role for 
agencies, public-private partnerships, the voluntary sector, markets and quasi-markets 
(Flinders, 2011; Bramwell, 2011). As indicated above, these are argued to increase 
accountability and provide a voice for local people. Concerns around the perceived increasing 
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distrust among the public for the decision-making powers of ‘distant’ and faceless (central) 
institutions, furthermore, have reinforced the role of local and regional authorities (Lawrence, 
2005). Batterbury and Fernando (2006) indicate, for example, how there is evidence that new 
powers have been allocated downwards to many communities in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. 
 
States are also indicated to have been replaced, or at least joined, by a diverse range of 
international actors, such as NGOs, transnational corporations, international financial 
organisations and international governmental organisations, and it is viewed that states must 
now work with these actors in order to achieve their aims (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). This is 
a view particularly taken in the global governance literature, where it is emphasised how global 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have become 
increasingly concerned with topics such as development, human security, international 
relations and environmental management, thus potentially detracting from the remit of nation 
states, which have traditionally been the dominant actors in these areas (Duffy, 2006; Streck, 
2002; Thomas, 2001). The authority of these international organisations is argued by some to 
restrict the power of developing states to make their own policy decisions (Wade, 2003). As a 
result, power is indicated to have dispersed upwards to supranational institutions, outwards to 
transnational organisations and social movements and downwards to subnational groups and 
communities, not only devolution of authority from central to local government, but also a 
handover of authority from state institutions to non-state actors (Yüksel et al, 2005; Rosenau, 
1994). These actors are also often indicated to use more voluntary forms of governance, rather 
than the command and control mechanisms of the state.  
 
The extent to which these empirical findings, however, signal the demise of the state is 
contested. Some argue that these trends have led to a new era of ‘governance without 
government’ where private enterprise has become more powerful than states (see, for example, 
Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau, 1992; Strange, 1996; Tosun, 2001). On the other hand, others indicate 
that this power dispersal has been over-emphasised, and that the state remains a crucial actor 
in governance, with its role merely changing to include more voluntary mechanisms of 
influence (see, for example, Bramwell, 2011; Kemp et al, 2005 and Newman and Clarke, 
2009). It is suggested that politicians have realised that voluntary mechanisms can be less 
politically contentious and more cost effective (Pierre and Peters, 2005; Jordan et al, 2003). 
Others argue that states are better placed to address certain policy issues that require command 
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and control intervention. Klick (2011), for example, indicates how states are often ascribed by 
non-state actors the responsibility to protect, along with management of the macroeconomy 
and public health. Furthermore, Őniş and Güven (2011) argue that the series of financial crises 
from the mid-1990s onwards, culminating in the 2008 global financial crisis, have reinforced 
the need for proper public supervision and coordination of markets, and thus potentially revived 
the need for the command and control mechanisms of the state. 
 
Similarly, these scholars point to perceived challenges for non-state actors in governance. 
Fisher and Green (2004), for example, argue that non-state actors have even less influence in 
policy-making than developing states, with non-state actors from developing states in particular 
left at the periphery of international governance. Critics point to the lack of ‘levers’ in voluntary 
governance in order to enforce compliance, and thus, low number of compliant actors, a 
maximum of five per cent in the case of certification (Bendell and Font, 2004). Holloway 
(1999), furthermore, argues that while people who work in NGOs still see themselves as 
operating within the moral high ground, in the South many people now see NGOs as charlatans, 
affording their employees large salaries and air conditioned offices. Pearce (2000) points to 
how the world of NGOs and donors is characterised by mistrust and fierce competition for 
funding and resources. Indeed, voluntary mechanisms are viewed by some as having the 
purpose of covering up, rather than challenging, structural inequalities in the existing 
governance system (Commins, 2000; Edwards and Hulme, 2000). 
 
Other scholars point to how the influence of states varies according to factors such as a 
country’s level of development. Scholars such as Fisher and Green (2004) indicate that 
developed states are in the strongest position as only a small number of states have any 
meaningful influence over international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and World 
Trade Organisation, while the G20 excludes members of 150 of the 192 states and developing 
states in North, East and West Africa, the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe (Thomas 
(2001, Payne, 2010). Where developing states do legally have equal inputs into international 
policy-making as more developed states, there are perceived to be a number of informal barriers 
that impede their influence, such as limited resources, personnel, training and experience 
(Fisher and Green, 2004).  
 
These debates around the degree to which the state, and traditional command and control 
mechanisms, still have a role in governance, therefore underpin the theoretical context for this 
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study into the impact of tourism governance. This thesis takes an approach which recognises 
the potential significance of both state and non-state governance mechanisms, and command 
and control mechanisms alongside those that are more voluntary. As a result, the theoretical 
model developed in this chapter will enable the identification and study of the impact of these 
different types of governance mechanisms, and indeed, a ‘test’ of the above arguments. This 
objective is reflected in the third research question presented in the Introduction, which 
proposed a reflection of the implications of the findings in the case study of this thesis for 
broader theoretical debates around the nature of governance. Therefore, each of the empirical 
chapters, along with the concluding chapter of this thesis will return to these key discussions 
in order to identify the theoretical contributions of this research. The rest of this chapter will 
now explore existing governance models and develop a theoretical model for use in this thesis. 
 
Exploring Existing Typologies of Governance Mechanisms 
 
Examining existing typologies of governance mechanisms provides insight into how best to 
address the requirements of a theoretical model of governance for the study of sustainable 
development. There are a broad range of models of governance in the existing academic 
literature, as the concept is applied to a multitude of ‘arenas’, from the local to the national, 
regional and international, across a large number of disciplines, including international political 
economy, international relations, European studies, comparative politics and public 
administration and public policy. Treib et al (2007) identify three main typologies for 
governance mechanisms: ‘polity’ (where mechanisms are differentiated by the overall system 
structure – such as whether authority is centralised or dispersed); ‘politics’ (where mechanisms 
are differentiated by the type of actors involved – such as state or non-state actors) and ‘policy’ 
(where mechanisms are differentiated by the type of governance instruments used – such as the 
degree of legal bindingness). This model, shown in Figure 5, is useful in understanding the 
different ways in which a theoretical model of governance can differentiate between 
mechanisms. The merits and limitations of each of these will now be discussed in turn. 
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Figure 5: Treib et al’s (2007) Framework for Governance Typologies: Polity, Politics and 
Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity typologies distinguish between governance mechanisms through the structure of 
governance at the system level, for example, whether authority is centralised or dispersed. One 
example is that of Hooghe and Marks’ (2003) model of Type One and Type Two governance. 
Type One governance suggests that the role of the state has been transformed rather than 
undermined and, therefore, that authority is still largely centrally located, albeit with a number 
of local and intermediate jurisdictions. The Type Two multi-level governance model argues 
that authority is broken down into a larger number of jurisdictions, which often have 
overlapping responsibilities. Another common policy typology is that of hierarchies, markets 
and networks, such as that presented by Keast et al (2006). In this model, the state or 
‘hierarchies’ mode derives its capacity from hierarchy, or legitimate authority. The ‘markets’ 
mode depends on price signals and legal contractual agreements to affect change, while the 
‘networks’ mode draws on relationships built on trust and reciprocity. Polity typologies are 
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useful in comparing the broad structure of governance systems, for example, across time or 
between two different nation-states. They do not, however, distinguish clearly between 
different types of governance mechanisms within the national level, as is required, and 
therefore are not useful for this thesis. Politics and policy typologies are potentially more useful 
as they make clearer distinctions between individual modes of governance.  
 
Politics typologies distinguish between different mechanisms by the type of actors involved in 
governance, often derived from the source of authority of the instrument. Discussions around 
governance in the literature often distinguish between modes of governance as run by either 
state or non-state actors, or public and private governance. Non-state or private actors are broad 
categories that can include but are not limited to NGOs, international governmental 
organisations, independent activists, professional associations and criminal networks. This 
category is residual, in that it comprises of everything that is not a state actor, and as a result, 
can include a very wide range of actors that differ considerably (Buthe, 2004). Cashore (2002) 
distinguishes between three types of actors in governance: traditional government, where 
authority lies with the government and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force; shared 
public/private governance, where the government gives authority to an instrument but 
policymaking is shared with a non-state actor; and non-state market driven governance 
(NSMD), where market transactions are the source of authority, following evaluations by 
external audiences. 
 
Whether or not mechanisms of governance are employed by state and non-state actors is a 
factor that has some usefulness in explaining the impact of these mechanisms, such as through 
the extent of accountability and legitimacy of these actors or their access to resources. The fact 
that states use both formal regulation and more voluntary mechanisms of governance, as 
indicated above, suggests that there are more significant factors at play in explaining the impact 
of governance than whether the governance instrument is promoted by a state or non-state 
actor. 
 
Policy typologies of governance often use the differentiating factor of the extent to which 
‘governed’ actors are required to comply with the mechanism. A number of different sets of 
terms are used to describe the mechanisms in these typologies, including hard versus soft law, 
hierarchical versus non-hierarchical governance or binding versus non-binding instruments. 
Another differentiating factor used is the degree of flexibility of the implementation of a policy 
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instrument: there may be detailed standards without much flexibility or there may be more 
capacity for implementing actors to adapt standards to local contexts (Treib et al, 2007). Often, 
this factor is used alongside the degree to which the mechanisms are voluntary or compulsory. 
These policy typologies have potential to be useful for this thesis as they identify individual 
mechanisms of governance within a nation-state and differentiate between mechanisms by 
means that are more likely to have significance for the impact of each instrument than the actors 
involved, such as the degree to which the instrument forces compliance. A number of these 
policy typologies will now be discussed in turn and their insights drawn out for a theoretical 
model of governance for this thesis. 
 
Treib et al (2007) suggest a policy typology based on four governance categories that are 
divided into binding or non-binding legal instruments, and rigid or flexible implementation 
(see Figure 6). ‘Coercion’ represents binding legal instruments that do not allow much 
flexibility in the standards that they require implemented. ‘Framework regulation’ has binding 
legal instruments but offers more leeway in implementation, such as by only defining broad 
goals. ‘Targeting’ involves non-binding recommendations that are more detailed and specific, 
and thus, allow less flexibility in implementation. ‘Voluntarism’ also includes non-binding 
instruments but again these have only broad goals for implementation. This typology presents 
a potentially useful division of governance instruments of hard/soft law. The extra factor of 
flexibility of implementation, however, over-complicates the model, as it is arguably less likely 
to be a determining factor for the impact of a governance mechanism. Furthermore, many 
governance mechanisms employed by non-state actors will likely fall into the ‘non-binding’ 
and ‘flexible’ category of ‘voluntarism’, therefore, given the complexity of the model, a factor 
that further divides up this category would be more useful. 
 
Figure 6: Treib et al’s typology of four modes of governance  
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There are a number of policy typologies of governance mechanisms that are simpler, and divide 
the binding/non-binding factor into a greater number of categories in order to better explain the 
differences between mechanisms. Börzel and Risse (2002) utilise a typology that includes 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical governance, and then divides non-hierarchical governance 
into two further categories: bargaining and governing by incentives, and persuasion. Here, 
hierarchical governance reflects the binding category, whereas non-hierarchical governance is 
more voluntary. ‘Bargaining and governing by incentives’ refers to non-hierarchical 
governance from a rational choice perspective, where a change is sought in actors’ behaviour 
through convincing them that an action is in their own interest, essentially by influencing the 
cost-benefit calculations of utility-maximising actors. The second form of non-hierarchical 
governance, ‘persuasion’, seeks to change behaviour by convincing actors that an action is ‘the 
right thing to do’, based on the assumption that actors are more likely to comply voluntarily 
with a rule the more they are convinced of its legitimacy (Risse, 2003).  
 
Börzel and Risse’s (2002) model, therefore, attempts to distinguish between voluntary 
mechanisms of governance. It is confusing, however, in that it uses one factor to distinguish 
between hierarchical and non-hierarchical governance, and then another to distinguish between 
bargaining and persuasive non-hierarchical mechanisms. Furthermore, in reality, as Risse 
(2003) notes, persuasion and bargaining often take place together as governors may argue that 
an action is both in an actor’s interest and morally the ‘right thing to do’ simultaneously. Indeed 
they may also argue that moral action is inherently in an actor’s interest itself, for example, as 
it could enhance the public image of the actor. Therefore, the dividing factor between 
persuasion and bargaining does not actually distinguish effectively between mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the terms ‘hierarchical’ and ‘non-hierarchical’ are not particularly self-
explanatory, and might be better substituted for simpler labels.  
 
A similar model that uses one single differentiating factor is that of Bemelmans-Videc et al 
(1998), who present a typology of public policy instruments based on the degree to which 
mechanisms are choice-constraining. Regulation is highly choice-constraining, seen as a ‘stick’ 
mechanism; the creation of rules that are backed by negative sanctions or the threat of negative 
sanctions, such as fines or imprisonment (Vedung, 1998). Economic instruments are 
moderately choice-constraining, a ‘carrot’ mechanism; including the provision or removal of 
material resources, making it less expensive in terms of resources such as time, money or effort 
to pursue particular actions (Vedung, 1998). Here, the governed are not obliged to change their 
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practices. Information mechanisms are free choice, named the ‘sermon’ instrument; involving 
‘attempts at influencing people through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of 
reasoned argument, and persuasion’ (Vedung, 1998: 33). These include governance activities 
such as the distribution of books, leaflets and fliers, and training programmes and educational 
facilities, as well as advertising, labelling and demonstrations (Vedung, 1998). These may give 
information outlining the problem, the actions currently taken, and potential measures to 
address the problem. Here, the governed are even less obliged than with economic instruments 
to change their practices.  
 
This model provides a very clear and simple distinction between instruments of governance 
through the degree to which they are choice-constraining for ‘governed’ actors. As indicated 
above, the extent to which a governance mechanism is choice-constraining is likely to be a 
determining factor in the impact of each mechanism. The names of the three categories, 
however, are a little unclear. ‘Regulation’ is used to describe the highly choice-constraining 
mechanisms. Yet, moderately choice-constraining mechanisms might also use informal 
‘regulation’ in order to ensure that participants in a certification system meet certain standards, 
therefore the term is rather non-specific. Furthermore, the label ‘economic instruments’ for the 
moderately choice constraining mechanisms suggests that instruments such as certification 
systems are market mechanisms, where the market can be manipulated without legal influence. 
Yet, the free/greater choice mechanisms are also potentially economic instruments, as a 
business might be persuaded to change its practices for its own economic advantage. Overall, 
however, this model is certainly the clearest and most straightforward and will therefore be 
used below in order to develop a theoretical model of three governance mechanisms for use in 
this thesis.  
 
Forming a Theoretical Model of Governance 
 
It was highlighted above how a theoretical model of governance for the IPE approach taken in 
this thesis needs to be applicable to the national context, while also recognising the significance 
of both state and non-state actors in governance. The previous section then indicated a number 
of further requirements for a theoretical model through exploring existing models, including 
the need for a simple model with clear labels, and a model that uses a factor to differentiate 
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between governance mechanisms that might help to explain the impact of each mechanism for 
sustainable development. This section will now develop a theoretical model of governance 
mechanisms for use in this thesis, drawing on insights from the above models.  
 
As indicated above, the framework of Bemelmans-Videc et al (1998) is particularly useful for 
this thesis due to its differentiating factor of the degree to which governance mechanisms are 
choice-constraining. Therefore, this differentiating factor will form the basis for a theoretical 
model for this thesis. Börzel and Risse’s (2002) labels of ‘bargaining’ and ‘persuasive’ 
mechanisms will, furthermore, be employed for the less choice-constraining instruments of 
governance. This thesis therefore will use a three-fold theoretical model of governance 
mechanisms, including highly-choice constraining ‘legal’ mechanisms, moderately choice-
constraining ‘bargaining’ mechanisms, and low choice-constraining ‘persuasive’ mechanisms. 
Figure 7 provides a table illustrating these three mechanisms and potential examples of each in 
practice.  
 
Legal mechanisms are highly choice-constraining, a ‘stick’ approach to governance, and 
usually employed in order to correct certain types of market failures, in particular those related 
to the environment and non-renewable resources, health and safety and social issues such as 
fairness, equality and justice (Lemaire, 1998). They involve negative sanctions, rather than 
positive interventions. Legal mechanisms are usually run exclusively by the state, as a result 
of its coercive power and therefore, ability to enforce highly choice-constraining standards. 
Legal mechanisms potentially have significant enforcement capacity; indeed, ‘the governee is 
obligated to do what the governor tells her to do’ (Vedung, 1998: 31). The 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia gave states sovereignty and thus, the ideological justification and exclusive 
authority for total control over their territories (Caporaso, 2000). 
 
Moderately choice-constraining mechanisms will be termed ‘bargaining’ mechanisms. They 
involve the exchange of resources such as funds, equipment, expertise, technical assistance or 
the ability to use eco-labels in exchange for particular behaviour on behalf of the governed, or, 
on the other hand, the introduction of negative sanctions such as taxes, charges of levies, in 
order to encourage certain behaviours (Leeuw, 1998). This is a ‘carrot’ approach to 
governance. As these mechanisms are moderately choice-constraining, they have less powerful 
‘levers’ of influence than legal mechanisms, but more powerful ‘levers’ than persuasive 
mechanisms. ‘Governed’ actors will not be fined or imprisoned for failing to comply with 
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standards (Cashore, 2002). A common bargaining mechanism is certification, whereby actors 
that comply with a certain level of standards are able to use a certification ‘mark’ on their 
products, which informs consumers of the practices used in the production of the product. The 
lever here is the use of the certification mark, which firms are often keen to use in order to 
promote their products in a competitive market. 
 
The final category will be named ‘persuasive’ mechanisms, as suggested by Börzel and Risse’s 
(2002) typology. While this mechanism also has ‘levers’, only information is offered in 
exchange for compliance. Cashore (2002) lists three potential ‘levers’ of persuasive 
mechanisms: pragmatic legitimacy, where the actions are argued to be in the self-interest of 
governed actors; moral legitimacy, where the actions are argued to be the ‘right thing to do’; 
and cognitive legitimacy, where the actions are argued to be generally viewed as 
understandable or accepted practices. As a result, this is a much more voluntary mechanism 
than the resource exchange seen in bargaining mechanisms. Bargaining mechanisms do, 
however, often use these persuasive methods alongside their material exchange in order to 
support their case. The first persuasive lever is the provision of general advice or 
recommendations to an actor about their behaviour; or consumers making buying choices based 
on information about products and, for example, avoiding purchasing a product produced in an 
unsustainable manner. The second persuasive lever is naming and shaming, or demonstrations 
and campaigns by the public or non-governmental organisations of the practices of other actors, 
such as businesses. The final persuasive lever is pressure from other sections of industry, 
where, for example, a group of sustainable businesses might seek to persuade the rest of the 
industry of the benefits of using sustainable practices, both for themselves, and for the ‘greater 
good’.  
 
These three types of governance mechanisms can have either a confrontational or collaborative 
relationship with governed actors, which will be indicated to have implications for their level 
of impact. Legal mechanisms are largely confrontational, as they impose compulsory demands 
on governed actors with little flexibility, although there can be opportunities for consultation 
in the design process of legal mechanisms, which may make them partly collaborative. 
Bargaining mechanisms can be either collaborative, where they offer positive incentives to 
governed actors, or confrontational, where they involve a negative incentive for behaviour-
change, such as where a government introduces a tax in order to discourage smoking. 
Persuasive mechanisms can also be either confrontational or collaborative. Confrontational 
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actions include protests and demonstrations, such as those of environmental NGOs against 
Shell’s disposal of the Brent Spar oil rig in the Atlantic Ocean, which was influential enough 
to cause Shell to abandon their disposal plans and made reputation sensitive companies aware 
of the power of voluntary mechanisms of governance such as protests (Gunningham, 2009). 
Since the 1990s, however, confrontational persuasive governance has become less common. 
Both industry and NGOs now often prefer collaboration, as businesses can gain credibility 
through working with NGOs, while NGOs found that industry would often make more 
substantial commitments when working alongside them (Gunningham, 2009). An example of 
collaborative persuasive governance is where a governance actor provides technical assistance 
to a business in order to improve their sustainability. The implications of the confrontational 
or collaborative nature of these three types of governance mechanisms will be explored later 
in this chapter. 
 
Figure 7: Three Types of Governance Mechanisms 
 
Legal Mechanisms 
(Highly choice-
constraining 
mechanisms) 
Bargaining Mechanisms 
(Moderately choice-constraining 
mechanisms) 
Persuasive Mechanisms 
(Low choice-constraining 
mechanisms) 
Regulation/ legislation Voluntary standards, including 
certification systems, awards and 
ecolabels, and industry standards 
General advice/ 
recommendations 
 Negotiated agreements (eg. 
between industry and state) 
Consumer preferences 
 Provision of grants, subsidies, tax 
exemptions and other benefits with 
attached conditions 
Naming and shaming/ 
demonstrations/ campaigns 
 Taxes and levies to provide a 
disincentive for behaviour 
Pressure from other 
sections of similar industry 
 
As indicated above, the actors involved in governance can also affect the impact of a 
mechanism through, for example, their level of authority and legitimacy. Therefore, this model 
will also recognise the significance of the use of these mechanisms by either state or non-state 
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actors. Non-state actors will be defined as those actors that are not states or state-based, and do 
not rely exclusively on the actions or explicit support of states (Hall and Biersteker, 2002). 
Instead of gaining legitimacy through elections, these non-state actors gain legitimacy through 
their endorsement by the public, often including states, as authors of policies, practices, rules 
and norms. They can include a wide variety of actors, such as charities, businesses, 
international and regional organisations, religious organisations and communities. While legal 
mechanisms are usually employed by state actors, due to their inherent characteristic of a high 
choice-constraining capacity, which is provided by the legitimacy and authority of 
governments, bargaining and persuasive mechanisms can be employed by either state or non-
state actors. The implications of whether these governance mechanisms are run by state or non-
state actors will also be discussed below. 
 
This theoretical model of governance meets the requirements outlined throughout this chapter 
for a set of governance mechanisms that can facilitate sustainable development within a nation-
state context, which recognise the significance of both state and non-state actors, and which 
differentiates between the mechanisms through a factor that may have an impact on their 
significance in any particular context. The theoretical model is, furthermore, parsimonious, 
hence easy to understand and broad enough to be applicable to many different contexts. These 
distinctions between governance mechanisms provide a departure point for the empirical 
section of the thesis to explore the effectiveness of different types of governance for sustainable 
tourism. The final part of this chapter will now draw insights into the implications of the 
intrinsic characteristics of these mechanisms – whether they are legal, bargaining or persuasive; 
confrontational or collaborative; or run by state or non-state actors – for their impact on 
sustainable development. This will support the identification of strengths and weaknesses of 
individual governance mechanisms in the empirical part of this thesis. 
 
The Implications of the Model for the Governance of Sustainable 
Development 
 
The previous chapter identified the challenges of sustainable development that require 
governance, and which also likely challenge the effectiveness of governance. The potential for 
tension was identified between profit-seeking business interests, and economic, social and 
environmental benefits for developing states. Furthermore, the way in which economic 
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development is often prioritised at the local level, at the expense of social equity and 
environmental protection was identified. There was a discussion earlier in this chapter around 
the main debates in the governance literature, and in particular, the continuing significance of 
state versus non-state actors, and compulsory as opposed to more voluntary forms of 
governance. This section will expand on this broad overview of these debates in order to 
indicate the expectations of the theoretical model for how far the three types of governance 
mechanisms identified above will be able to promote sustainable development, given the 
tensions highlighted in the previous chapter. 
 
Upon first glance, legal mechanisms appear to be the most effective mode of governance for 
sustainable development, as their highly choice-constraining nature and authority garnered 
from the fact that they are state-run lead to a likely high compliance rate from a wide range of 
actors. This is particularly pertinent in the case of sustainable development, where strong 
economic business interests need to be balanced against the weaker voices of local people in 
their search for economic, social and environmental benefits from an industry. States gain 
legitimacy due to their accountability through mechanisms such as re-call or denial of re-
election or re-appointment (Haufler, 2003). As a result, legal mechanisms give a clear signal 
of no compromise and strong action, as they are able to allocate values authoritatively and 
enforce rules, while any infringement of regulations is threatened with sanctions (Börzel and 
Risse, 2002; Lemaire, 1998).  
 
Despite this potential power, however, as indicated above there are many arguments for the 
declining role of the state and legal mechanisms, which suggest that the traditional command 
and control method of governance is becoming obsolete and, therefore, is less effective for 
sustainable development. Critics point to two particular internal obstacles for the state which 
have implications for sustainable development: first, states have increased potential for 
corruption. Incentives for bribery and corruption exist when a public official has discretionary 
power over allocation of a benefit or cost to the private sector (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Low 
wages, for example, can tempt public officials to collect bribes in order to supplement their 
salaries (Mauro, 1997). This corruption can deter the achievement of objectives towards 
sustainable development. Investors are discouraged by what they see as effectively an extra 
tax, aid funds can be diverted from their intended projects, and public procurement contracts 
allocated as a result of corruption may prevent a high quality of public services, if for example, 
cheap, substandard materials are permitted in building works (Mauro, 1997). Corruption can 
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also reinforce inequalities, as it increases the power of actors willing and able to pay bribes 
over those which are not, and can make effective governance more challenging by alienating 
the citizenry from its political leaders (Elliott, 1997). This is particularly problematic in 
sustainable development, where governance is sought in order to address these very inequalities 
between those with the most and least influence.  
 
The other internal state obstacle is increased potential for inefficiency; for example, in the use 
of resources, which can be wasted if not appropriately allocated (Marsh and Lewis, 2014). This 
can result from weak incentives for managers to reduce costs, and the transfer of resources by 
governments to political supporters, such as excess employment at state firms and agencies or 
above-market wages, in order to reward political supporters (Shleifer, 1998). These 
inefficiencies can prevent decisive action where it is required in sustainable development, and 
in effect retain inequalities in the distribution of benefits from an industry.  
 
As pointed to in the general discussion on governance above, legal mechanisms for sustainable 
development are also restricted in use by a series of international regimes and legal obligations 
under international law and the heavy influence of new public management in the reform of 
the state, both of which call for a move away from the use of legal mechanisms. The internal 
state obstacles described above have been argued to distort the market and cause more 
problems than the market forces they were seeking to restrain (Lemaire, 1998). As a result, 
international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
have displaced certain political capacities and responsibilities from the national and regional 
levels to the global level (Hay, 2008). The General Agreement on Trade in Services’ (GATS) 
most-favoured nation clause, for example, requires that equal treatment is given to national and 
foreign companies, preventing countries from protecting their own industries (Hoad, 2003). A 
series of new public management reforms, promoted primarily by OECD countries and filtered 
through to developing states, have also challenged the role of legal mechanisms, aiming to 
deliver better quality services and value for money for taxpayers through methods including a 
greater decentralisation of authority and control (Hood, 1995). As a result, many developing 
states have ‘raced to the bottom’, reducing the use of highly choice-constraining regulation in 
order to attract mobile capital (Gill and Law, 1989).  
 
Legal mechanisms hypothetically face three additional challenges as a result of the factors 
inherent to sustainable development. The first is the focus of states on short-term policy 
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making, based on a four or five year political term, which focuses on actions that gain favour 
with the electorate, such as the creation of jobs and economic growth fuelled by excessive 
public spending (Dodds and Butler, 2010). This can deter environmental protection, which 
often requires a long-term approach of ten years or more in order to anticipate and plan for the 
unfolding of an ecosystem’s complete dynamics (Dodds and Butler, 2010; Boulanger and 
Bréchet, 2005). The second challenge for legal mechanisms for sustainable development is the 
evolution of modern states towards increased specialisation in order to improve responses to 
particular problems, which, along with their rigid institutional structures, can prevent them 
from effectively addressing tensions between the three diverse economic, social and 
environmental aspects of sustainable development (Kemp et al, 2005). In particular, state 
effectiveness is hampered by a lack of close coordination between sectors related to sustainable 
development, such as transportation, housing, and environmental conservation, contradictions 
between policies, and little consultation between levels or departments (Dodds and Butler, 
2010). Progress can be hampered by competing policy objectives and bureaucratic conflict 
between different departments. 
 
The third challenge for legal mechanisms in addressing sustainable development is the 
interconnected nature of the search for profits by business interests and sustainable 
development by developing states, indicated by global value chain analysis in the previous 
chapter. This requires action at both the national and international levels in order to balance the 
benefits of an industry between these actors, however, the authority of legal mechanisms is 
restricted to the national level. Therefore, legal mechanisms are potentially limited in their 
impact on the international actors that the previous chapter indicated can have significant 
influence over the distribution of benefits across actors in an industry.  
 
As less choice-constraining mechanisms of governance, the literature offers a range of potential 
strengths and weaknesses of bargaining and persuasive mechanisms. They are able to operate 
where legal mechanisms are restricted by international law, as they are voluntary and therefore 
not restricted by the limitations on highly choice-constraining governance by international law 
and new public management trends. While there is the potential that the WTO and GATS, more 
specifically, may in the future view bargaining mechanisms as distorters of the market, at the 
moment they are small-scale enough to be under the radar of these international regulations 
(Vivanco, 2013). Bargaining and persuasive mechanisms are also not constrained by the 
national authority of legal mechanisms, and therefore, have a potentially global reach in order 
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to address the tensions inherent in sustainable development between profits for business 
interests and economic, social and environmental benefits for the developing state.  
 
While bargaining and persuasive mechanisms have fewer levers with which to encourage 
compliance, due to their less choice-constraining nature, their methods are still influential 
enough to attract compliance in a number of ways. The offering in a bargaining mechanism of 
the use of a certification mark in order to promote the practices of a business, for example, can 
enhance the commercial image of a business and develop relationships with other stakeholders 
(Font and Buckley, 2001). Both bargaining and persuasive mechanisms also benefit from three 
other methods through which to persuasive actors to comply, identified by Cashore (2002) 
from the discipline of organisational sociology. These include pragmatic legitimacy, where the 
action is argued to be in the narrow self-interest of the governed actor; moral legitimacy, where 
the action is argued to be the ‘right thing to do’; and cognitive legitimacy, where the action is 
argued to be the obvious action to take, or to do otherwise would be unthinkable. 
 
The overall impact of bargaining and persuasive mechanisms, however, is reduced to an extent 
by these limited levers. The group of actors that comply is self-selecting and limited to the 
‘lowest hanging fruit’, or those actors which are most interested in the practices promoted or 
already carrying them out and seeking recognition (Haufler, 2003). Where bargaining and 
persuasive mechanisms are confrontational, they have more potential to facilitate more 
structural changes as they can address the most prolific offenders in development, such as those 
facilitating the worst environmental damages, or those with the lowest rates of employment of 
local people.  
 
Collaborative bargaining and persuasive mechanisms do not address the most challenging or 
structural issues in sustainable development, such as unfair terms of trade or distribution of 
resources among social groups, as they rely on actors to approach them (Edwards and Hulme, 
2000). As a result, these methods can be seen as merely useful ‘fig leaves’ for covering up 
problems in sustainable development, for example, with neoliberal policies, as they fail to 
tackle embedded inequalities in international political and economic structures (Commins, 
2000). Collaborative bargaining and persuasive mechanisms can, however, address 
sustainability in considerable depth, as their standards can be more stringent and detailed; they 
do not have to apply to all actors and cannot rely on coercion (Prakash and Potoski, 2006). This 
depth of influence is particularly significant for sustainable development, which requires an 
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approach that recognises the complexity of the competing priorities of businesses and local 
people/ developing states, alongside tensions between the three different aspects of sustainable 
development.  
 
Furthermore, there can be competition between very similar bargaining and persuasive 
mechanisms for sustainable development, leading to actors becoming confused by the costs 
and benefits of compliance across the varying schemes and, potentially, deciding to avoid them 
altogether (Kirton and Trebilcock, 2004). As a result, it has been suggested that bargaining and 
persuasive mechanisms are able to attract at most a five, ten or twenty per cent compliance 
rate, given the way in which they are predicated upon the voluntary behaviour of targets 
(Vedung and van der Doelen, 1998). 
 
While the privatisation and decentralisation facilitated by new public management reforms 
have weakened the authoritative power of the state, they have provided points of access to non-
state actors in governance. Where bargaining and persuasive mechanisms are run by states, 
they likely face many of the challenges identified with legal mechanisms above, including the 
internal state obstacles of corruption and inefficiency, the likelihood of short-term policy 
making and fragmented and conflicting institutional responsibility for sustainable 
development. Non-state actors, however, are more able to avoid these challenges as they are 
less prone to corruption and inefficiency. They are not restricted by political priorities and, 
therefore, are more able to focus on longer-term priorities, and furthermore, their often 
considerable expertise enables them to address complex issues such as environmental 
sustainability more effectively. In addition, their more flexible institutional structure enables 
them to better accommodate the three diverse aspects of sustainable development, and indeed, 
address sustainable development as a single goal, as opposed to delegating responsibility for 
its different aspects across different institutions. As a result, this model suggests that non-state 
bargaining and persuasive mechanisms face fewer challenges in order to impact on sustainable 
development than legal mechanisms or state-run bargaining and persuasive mechanisms.  
 
While non-state run mechanisms have less formal authority than state mechanisms, they have 
other forms of legitimacy. Non-state actors benefit from the pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy described by Cashore (2002) above. Non-state actors can also gain legitimacy from 
their participatory nature, which brings decision-making closer to the population, can be more 
supportive of difference and provides access to expertise (Yüksel et al, 2005; Wearing et al, 
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2005). This expertise also potentially increases the effectiveness of interventions by non-state 
actors, as they can be more tailored to the specific needs of local people and environments. 
Non-state actors also draw authority from producers and consumers in the market supply chain, 
who make a choice about whether to require that the products and services they buy or use 
comply with the standards (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007).  
 
Overall, therefore, this model suggests that governance for sustainable development faces a 
number of hypothetical challenges. The rest of this thesis will test empirically how far this 
theoretical model of governance and sustainable development can explain the experience of 
tourism in Costa Rica, and what, if any, further insights for this theoretical model can be drawn 
from Costa Rica’s case. This theoretical model will also enable the exploration through this 
case study of the two broader theoretical questions around the role of state versus non-state and 
compulsory versus voluntary mechanisms outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The 
model’s clear division of the different actors and levels of choice-constraint inherent in 
governance mechanisms allows for insight into these questions. In particular, the breakdown 
of different types of voluntary mechanisms of governance, which are so often conflated into 
one category when in reality they are so diverse, into bargaining/persuasive and 
conflictual/collaborative, will enable identification of the specific impacts of each 
characteristic.    
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Figure 8: Theoretical Model of Governance 
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Measurement of Effectiveness and Identification of Success Factors 
 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the above three types of governance mechanisms at 
promoting sustainable development, it is useful to have a method of measurement for this 
impact. Effectiveness will, therefore, be measured as low, moderate or high, according to the 
number of actors that a mechanism reaches, and its depth of impact, as shown in Figure 9. A 
low impact will be considered to be found where there is some evidence of impact only in 
isolated case studies, and only a low depth of impact on actors’ behaviour. A moderate impact 
will be identified where there is evidence of impact on a fairly significant number of actors, 
and a moderate level of depth of impact on sustainable practices. Finally, a governance 
mechanism with a high impact would be required to both address a broad number and range of 
actors, and to have a fairly significant depth of impact on individual actors. This typology will 
be used throughout the empirical chapters in order to assess the impact of legal, bargaining and 
persuasive mechanisms in turn.  
 
Figure 9: A Typology of Effectiveness of Governance Mechanisms 
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mechanisms, for example, might be found to be a factor causing an increased level of impact 
due to the greater incentives for actors to comply. The second type of success factor is 
contextual, brought about by the specific social and political environment in a case study. This 
might include, for example, a particularly strong coordinated state, which increases the 
authority and efficiency of a state-run governance mechanism. The following empirical 
chapters will seek to identify where these two types of success factors may have had an impact 
in the case study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify a number of different types of governance 
mechanisms that might facilitate sustainable development in any given context. The chapter 
highlighted how, as this thesis is taking an IPE approach, a theoretical model of governance 
needs to be relevant primarily to the national level of analysis, and to recognise the significance 
of both state and non-state actors in governance. The chapter then explored a number of existing 
typologies in the governance literature, drawing on Treib et al’s (2007) framework for 
differentiating typologies between ‘politics’ (the different actors involved), ‘polity’ (the 
structure of governance) and ‘policy’ (the nature of governance instruments), arguing that the 
‘policy’ typologies were the most appropriate as their differentiating factor was likely one that 
would help to explain the difference in impact between alternative modes of governance. 
Insights were drawn from ‘policy’ typologies from Treib et al (2007), Bemelmans-Videc et al 
(1998) and Börzel and Risse (2002), including that a simple and clearly labelled model is most 
useful, and that a division along the lines of the degree to which mechanisms are choice-
constraining provides the potential to explain differences in impact of mechanisms.   
 
The final section of the chapter then drew on these insights in order to develop a three-fold 
theoretical model of legal, bargaining and persuasive mechanisms, which range from highly 
choice-constraining to low choice-constraining towards governed actors. The model identified 
a series of hypothetical challenges facing the three different types of governance mechanisms. 
These included restrictions in the use and effectiveness of legal mechanisms from international 
law, national limits to authority, and internal obstacles common in state mechanisms, such as 
corruption and inefficiencies. Bargaining and persuasive mechanisms, on the other hand, are 
theoretically restricted in their impact by their less choice-constraining nature and their 
 66 
 
employment by non-state actors, which may limit their authority and the quantity and types of 
actors that they are able to reach. The chapter then explained the notions of ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘success factors’ that will be used in the rest of the thesis in order to explore the impact of 
tourism governance. 
 
The theoretical model thus developed in these two chapters will have two specific purposes in 
the rest of the thesis. Firstly, it provides a definition of the sustainable development that tourism 
governance is seeking to promote. Secondly, its identification of three types of governance 
mechanisms, and their inherent characteristics, provides a starting point for studying the impact 
of different types of governance for sustainable tourism, and a structure for the research – 
leading to the investigation of each of the three types of governance mechanisms in turn. This, 
furthermore, supports the assessment of the effectiveness of the different types of governance 
mechanisms, through the intrinsic characteristics identified of each. 
 
Part Two, and the following four chapters, of this thesis will now explore the effectiveness of 
the three types of governance mechanisms identified in this model for tourism governance in 
Costa Rica. As discussed in the Introduction, Costa Rica’s tourism industry is a useful case 
study as it is likely a fairly successful case of sustainable tourism due to widespread recognition 
for its ‘eco’ and ‘sustainable’ tourism, coupled with its relatively high level of development 
and numerous governance mechanisms for tourism. Chapter Four will outline the particular 
development challenges that Costa Rica faces, shaped by its experience as a small developing 
state. Chapters Five, Six and Seven will explore how far the experiences of legal, bargaining 
and persuasive mechanisms for tourism in Costa Rica are reflected in the theoretical model. 
The aim, therefore, is both to explain Costa Rica’s particular case of tourism governance 
through the use of this theoretical model, and to further develop the model itself through 
insights from Costa Rica’s case.  
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Chapter Four 
The Challenges of Sustainable 
Development in Small States: The Case of 
Costa Rica 
 
 
 
The two previous chapters developed a theoretical model through which to explore the 
effectiveness of different governance mechanisms in promoting sustainable development. 
Chapter Two developed a framework of ‘sustainable development’ that stressed the need to 
facilitate economic development, social equity and environmental protection in a context where 
many of the risks and costs of industry are shouldered at the local level. Chapter Three created 
a theoretical model of legal, bargaining and persuasive mechanisms of governance, 
distinguished by the degree to which they are choice-constraining to ‘governed’ actors. The 
remaining chapters in this thesis will use this theoretical model to examine the effectiveness of 
governance for sustainable tourism in the case study of Costa Rica with three key aims. The 
first is to understand precisely how effective tourism governance is in Costa Rica. The second 
aim is to identify success factors for tourism governance in this case study. The final, 
theoretical, aim is to test the utility of the theoretical model and its expectations, and to draw 
broader inferences for governance theory.   
 
As indicated in the Introduction, Costa Rica is a useful case study for the research question of 
how far governance can and does facilitate sustainable development in small developing states. 
Tourism is a key development industry in Costa Rica, similar to many other small developing 
countries in the Caribbean and elsewhere, and therefore, insights from its experience are likely 
generalisable to other contexts. Furthermore, Costa Rica is renowned as one of the more 
successful cases of ‘eco’ or ‘sustainable’ tourism, and this, coupled with the fact that it has one 
of the highest levels of development in Central America, suggests that the governance 
mechanisms for sustainable tourism are well-embedded and potentially effective. Finally, 
Costa Rica also has a number of fairly extensive governance mechanisms for tourism, including 
numerous environmental laws, one of the most well-reputed certification systems for 
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sustainable tourism in the world - the Certificate for Sustainable Tourism - and the Rainforest 
Alliance runs a well-renowned technical assistance programme for tourism businesses looking 
to improve their sustainability. These mechanisms, therefore, have significant potential to 
provide useful insight into how governance might facilitate sustainable development in 
developing states.  
 
The task of this chapter is to establish the particular development challenges that Costa Rica - 
as a small developing state - faces, before the following chapters explore how effectively 
governance addresses these challenges. This chapter will, firstly, identify the sustainable 
development challenges posed to small developing states, followed by a discussion of Costa 
Rica’s particular experience of these challenges. The final section will then explore Costa 
Rica’s difficulties in achieving sustainable development through the tourism industry, 
including that tourism often fails to create stable local employment, or economic and social 
benefits for isolated communities, and can cause significant damage to local environments.  
 
The Challenges for Small Developing States 
 
In order to explore Costa Rica’s particular development experience, given its status as a small 
developing country, this chapter will first engage critically with the ‘small states’ and ‘small 
island developing states’ literatures to provide the necessary theoretical vocabulary to discuss 
Costa Rica’s case. While Costa Rica is not an island, the challenges to economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection caused by ‘smallness’ and its ‘developing’ country 
status are still very relevant. ‘Smallness’ can be measured in terms of population size, territory 
or Gross National Product (GNP), although population size is generally the measure used, with 
varying population sizes designated as ‘small’, from 1.5 million (Commonwealth and World 
Bank, 2000), to up to 10 million (Streeten, 1993). Costa Rica is a relatively ‘small’ state in 
terms of population size, territory and GNP: its population is around four million, its territory 
only approximately 51,000km². Costa Rica is generally considered a middle-income 
developing state: in 2012 it was estimated to have generated US$12,800 GDP per capita, with 
an estimated 24 per cent of the population living in poverty in 2010 (CIA World Factbook, 
2013). 
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The small states and small island developing states literatures argue that small developing 
countries have particular features that affect their ability to achieve economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection. Some scholars in this field argue that certain small 
states have been able to achieve significant economic development and social equity since the 
1980s despite these features (Read, 2004). Easterly and Kraay (1999), for example, argue that 
small states have lower infant mortality and higher life expectancies than other states. However, 
there are also many arguments that in other cases small developing states face significant 
challenges to development. The first of these is that small developing states often have limited 
options for development industries. Developing states, in general, have historically relied upon 
primary products, which present a number of challenges. Small developing states often rely on 
foreign investment to extract natural resources for these industries, which reduces the domestic 
benefits of primary product industries (Armstrong and Read, 1998). The often small 
populations of small developing states also lead them to have limited domestic markets, which 
makes them heavily dependent on international trade for these primary products, a vulnerable 
position as the price of primary commodities on the world market is falling and there are few 
guaranteed global markets or prices for primary products (Streeten, 1993; Scheyvens and 
Momsen, 2008). Neoliberalism has further reduced the certainty of income for primary 
products, as previously protected trade arrangements between developing and developed 
countries were removed, particularly those of the European Union (EU), which phased out 
preferential trade agreements on which these primary industries often depended (Weis, 2007). 
 
Small states, furthermore, often struggle to develop their own manufacturing industries, as they 
are unable to afford high capital-intensive manufacturing, such as aircraft industries, car 
production or production of heavy railway stock (Streeten, 1993). They are often unable to 
compete with larger countries in low-skilled labour-intensive export sectors and as a result, 
rely on higher value-added sectors based on specialist skills (Armstrong and Read, 1998). 
Small developing countries can struggle to find the experienced and efficient workers that they 
need in order to make their industries competitive, however, as specialists often emigrate 
abroad to larger countries where their skills will be better utilised and more highly rewarded 
(Briguglio, 1995). Therefore, options for development industries are often very limited for 
small developing states.  
 
Small developing states, furthermore, often face challenges in developing competitive 
industries, as protection of domestic industries is dissuaded by neoliberal ideology. Loans 
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given to many developing countries from international organisations, such as the IMF and 
World Bank, were in exchange for commitments to structural adjustment packages, which 
restrict protection of industries, while international agreements such as the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the GATS and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) also restrict policy in developing states (Wade, 
2003). Small developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the influence of foreign 
ideologies, due to their often limited influence over international decision-making processes as 
a result of the expensive cost per capita of sending representatives (Briguglio, 1995). Small 
states also often open their economies in order to trade for imports that they cannot produce 
themselves due to their limited skills and production capacity. This lack of ability to protect 
domestic industries is particularly problematic for small developing states, as they do not have 
the domestic demand in order to gain experience to create an efficient and competitively priced 
industry for the international market (Armstrong and Read, 1998; Srinivasan, 1986). 
 
Some scholars argue that developed states have ‘kicked away the ladder’ to development 
through their influence over international decision-making, forcing neoliberal policies that they 
themselves never used to progress in order to keep developing countries ‘undeveloped’ (see, 
for example, Chang, 2003). Wade (2003) argues that the TRIMS, GATS and TRIPS 
agreements are the modern equivalent of ‘kicking away the ladder’, as they enable developing 
states to have less control over developed country firms in their territories. Thus, the challenges 
that small developing states face are embedded in international political and economic 
structures, making them difficult to avoid.  
 
Due to these challenges in establishing their own development industries, small developing 
states are often dependent on a limited number of exports and markets. Lack of export 
diversification, combined with their economic openness, can leave them vulnerable to shocks 
in the international market, as they are more likely to be affected if, for example, prices in a 
particular industry suddenly drop, as coffee prices have, or in the case of an economic downturn 
(Briguglio, 1995). Of those goods that they do export, small developing countries often have 
little control over prices due to the relatively small size of their trade compared to the world 
market (Briguglio, 1995). Global value chain theories would argue that developing state firms 
are often concentrated in the low value-added often labour-intensive stages of industry, such 
as manufacturing and production, and that as a result, much of the profit from the industry is 
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retained by developed country firms in the higher value-added stages of branding and 
marketing (Gereffi, 1999). 
 
As a result of these limited options or narrowing of ‘development space’ for small developing 
countries (Bishop, 2010), many have turned to focus on developing niche markets and labour-
intensive activities, such as tourism or financial services, which can be unstable and volatile 
(Armstrong and Read, 2006). Services have become a key development strategy for many small 
developing countries, and particularly, tourism, which is perceived to have the greatest 
potential to attract foreign exchange earnings and employment both directly in tourism and 
indirectly in related sectors (Abeyratne, 1999; Craigwell, 2007). Furthermore, while small 
developing states often have a small resource base, they do have natural and cultural features 
appealing to tourists, such as waterfalls, rainforests, volcanoes and endemic species (Jules, 
2005). Smaller countries are also better able to develop a coherent brand and present 
themselves as a niche tourism product, and therefore, many used their natural assets to do this 
(Scheyvens and Momsen, 2008). Tourism is, therefore, an obvious choice for many small 
developing countries. As a result, arrivals in small-island developing states increased from 
eleven million tourists in 1988 to over twenty-seven million tourists in 2004, a 145 per cent 
increase (Craigwell, 2007: 2). The particular challenges posed by the tourism industry to small 
developing states will be discussed further below, however, they include factors such as 
instabilities in income as a result of natural disasters or changes in consumer preferences, and 
lack of stable local employment as foreign workers are imported to meet the quality of service 
expectations of tourists, while tourism jobs for locals are often only seasonal.  
 
While small states are suggested to have a greater degree of social homogeneity, cohesion and 
identity, which facilitates strong social capital and, therefore, potential for economic 
development, there are many significant internal social and political challenges for small 
developing states (Armstrong and Read, 1998). They have to import a lot of the goods that they 
need and therefore, have little control over the price of many domestic goods. There is often 
only a small pool of potential workers from which to draw experienced and efficient 
administrators to work for the state, and there is a shortage of specialists as they often go abroad 
in search of jobs where remuneration is better (Briguglio, 1995). Small states can also struggle 
to develop the infrastructure and expertise to provide an adequate range and quality of health 
services; there are often shortages of personnel and facilities (Charles, 1997). The provision of 
this infrastructure, as well as other provisions such as environmental protection, national 
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defence and representation in international debates and organisations also costs considerably 
more per capita than in larger economies, as the degree of people and resources required are 
not directly relative to the size of the economy (Campling and Rosalie, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, small developing states often have fragile ecosystems, which can be damaged by 
their dependency on resource-intensive industries such as tourism. They are often unable to 
significantly regulate their industries in order to reduce environmental impacts, as a result of 
discouragement of regulation by neoliberal ideology. Resource shortages can also reduce the 
use of governance mechanisms for the environment. Small states are, furthermore, particularly 
vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, 
tsunamis and landslide, which have a proportionally larger, and often devastating, impact in 
smaller territories. Small developing states emit a very low proportion of carbon emissions, but 
the cumulative global impact will likely affect them adversely; the impact of climate change is 
likely to be particularly significant in small states with large areas of coastline, as factors such 
as erosion, flooding, loss of wetlands and increased salinity of surface and ground water will 
affect relatively more of the country’s geographical area (Schatan et al, 2010; Ashe, 1999). 
Environmental disasters can affect a state’s infrastructure, residential and commercial property 
on land and water, human health and life, transport, agriculture, livestock, and business 
activities (Charles, 1997). Small developing countries, furthermore, often have fewer resources 
in order to prevent and address the aftermath of these disasters, and when they frequently have 
to allocate already limited budgets to addressing these problems, there is less money to spend 
on factors such as infrastructure and welfare. Small states can become indebted to foreign 
powers as a result of the need for capital to remedy these environmental disasters, thereby 
leading again to factors such as influence by international law and new public management 
ideology. 
 
These challenges to small developing states, therefore, appear to present Costa Rica with 
significant obstacles to all three aspects of sustainable development: economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection. These include limited options for a development 
strategy, a dependence on international markets to sell goods due to a small internal market, 
limited resources for infrastructure and welfare, and increased vulnerability to environmental 
disasters. The chapter also indicated above how governance mechanisms for sustainable 
development in small developing countries can be restricted by the influence of international 
law and new public management ideology, and resource shortages. The following section will 
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explore how these challenges have shaped Costa Rica’s development experience up to present 
day, and how they have led it to adopt tourism as a sustainable development strategy, which 
again presents many similar challenges that potentially might be addressed through 
governance.  
 
The Challenges to Sustainable Development in Costa Rica 
 
There is evidence that Costa Rica’s small developing country status has shaped its development 
in a number of ways. Historically, it has had limited options for development, a result of low 
levels of natural resources and mountainous terrain, and has depended largely upon primary 
products, as is common in developing countries. Elites in Costa Rica experimented with various 
potential export products, such as cattle, cacao, mining and tobacco, but coffee was the only 
product that was really successful (Wilson, 1998). In order to reduce the cost of transporting 
coffee to Pacific ports for shipment to Europe and the US, a railway was opened in 1880, which 
brought about the unexpected outcome of the banana industry, as bananas were grown on the 
lands adjacent to the railway in order to finance construction (Weaver, 1994). By the 1920s, 
Costa Rica’s coffee and banana earnings accounted for nearly 90 per cent of export earnings, 
reflecting the limited export diversification highlighted above (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). Further 
diversification was prevented, as Costa Rica’s banking system had developed to the needs of 
coffee production and was reluctant to adapt, and the state was heavily influenced by coffee 
and banana interests due to its considerable previous investment of resources in the 
establishment of these industries (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). The United Fruit Company 
attempted to transform some land used for bananas to cacao production up until 1954, when 
cacao exports comprised 10.1 per cent of foreign exchange earnings (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). 
A fall in international prices for cacao, however, saw the collapse of production. 
 
Costa Rica’s dependence on the coffee and banana industries was problematic for development 
in a number of ways. The coffee industry was made up largely of small farmers dependent on 
elites to provide credit as coffee trees take between three to five years to mature, and therefore, 
there is a substantial period when labour and land are required but no income is produced, and 
furthermore, the processing of coffee also required major investment (Weaver, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the coffee industry, as it was largely locally owned, led to widely shared material 
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benefits for nearly all involved in the production, processing and transport processes. 
Unforeseen impacts of the railway, however, prevented the coffee industry from having 
considerable linkages to other local sectors, as the cheaper transport links created by the railway 
made consumer goods much cheaper to import from EU and North American markets, rather 
than produce domestically (Weaver, 1994). As a result, potential income multiplier linkages 
from coffee, where the increasing income of local people through wages and profits of coffee 
farms can lead to an increased domestic market for consumer goods, were minimal (Weaver, 
1994). Local food production was also hard-hit by the railway, as it was cheaper to import 
grains and meat from Argentina and the US and, furthermore, as Costa Rica was thus so 
dependent on income from coffee, it became vulnerable to food shortages when international 
demand for coffee decreased (Weaver, 1994). Therefore, Costa Rica’s coffee industry created 
significance challenges to sustainable development. 
 
The dependence of Costa Rica on a US company to build the railway, due to the high capital 
costs required, furthermore, caused the banana industry to be under foreign control, as 
plantations were established by foreign investors on the land alongside the railway. The self-
contained enclave nature of the banana industry meant that it had few linkages with the rest of 
Costa Rica’s economy (Weaver, 1994). Although the banana industry brought tax revenues for 
the government, labour on the banana plantations was comprised largely of Africans brought 
in from the Caribbean, while expenditure from employees went to foreign company-owned 
stores, and the vertically-integrated nature of the industry, where foreign companies owned and 
controlled all aspects of the industry from production to marketing, meant that export sales led 
to a demand for banking services in North America and Europe rather than Costa Rica (Weaver, 
1994; Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). Such a dependency on two core products also made Costa Rica’s 
income vulnerable to internal problems, such as banana disease that struck Costa Rica in the 
1920s and significantly decreased banana exports (Weaver, 1994). Incomes from both the 
coffee and banana industries were vulnerable to significant fluctuations in demand and product 
prices on the international market. Recessions in Europe and the US in the 1880s, 1890s, 1920 
and 1921, and major collapses in commodity prices in 1929 and 1978, for example, reduced 
demand for coffee and banana exports across Central America (Weaver, 1994). Furthermore, 
the World Wars and Great Depression caused markets to be closed and shipping routes to 
become more difficult and thus, much coffee had to be exported at lower prices to the US 
instead of Europe (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). 
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Costa Rica’s vulnerability to shocks on the international market also left the country vulnerable 
to foreign intervention. In the late 1970s, the steep rise of gasoline and petroleum prices hit 
non-oil producing developing countries extremely hard; with oil prices doubling and coffee 
prices dropping dramatically (Honey, 1994). Forced to borrow heavily from abroad, Costa Rica 
was unable to pay back its debts as international interest rates sharply increased and was left 
with over $3 billion in debt, the highest per capita in Latin America (Honey, 1994). Costa 
Rica’s ‘smallness’ meant that it had little power to renegotiate its debts, as its lack of economic 
diversification led to  suspicion over whether it could meet obligations (Edelman, 1999). The 
falling price of coffee exports led Costa Rica to turn to the IMF for loans, which imposed policy 
conditions including the elimination of subsidised credit for favoured sectors, ending control 
of interest rates, reduction of public sector spending and reductions in tariff protection 
(Sheahan, 1987). These liberal policies saw Costa Rica start to diversify exports away from 
primary goods towards manufacturing, including new consumer goods, capital goods and food 
and beverages, and also services, such as call centres and tourism. In this period, foreign direct 
investment increased dramatically, the most significant investment being that of Intel of over 
$300 million into the building of a microchip factory near San José in 1996 (Paus and 
Gallagher, 2008). By 2005, primary products were only making up 23 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
exports, a dramatic drop from 90 per cent in the 1920s (ECLAC, 2007; Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). 
 
These new industries, however, brought economic profit for business interests, but relatively 
few benefits for Costa Ricans. The economic adjustment created jobs, but these were often low 
paid and insecure (Edelman, 1999). Backward linkages, where foreign companies buy parts for 
their products from local firms, are also minimal, as companies in free trade zones only 
purchase 10 per cent of their goods and services locally (Ernst and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2008). 
Local companies are unable to compete as they often lacked the economy of scale, 
technological knowledge and safety standards possessed by larger corporations (Paus and 
Gallagher, 2008). As a result of these minimal backward linkages, there have been few 
technological spill overs for Costa Rica (Ernst and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2008). Costa Rica’s tax 
ratio of 13 per cent has, furthermore, been too low to fund required improvements in 
infrastructure and education (Paus and Gallagher, 2008). 
 
Costa Rica’s wealth therefore became concentrated in the hands of industrialists, bankers and 
large agricultural exporters. In 1973, the richest ten per cent of Costa Rica earned an average 
16 times more than the poorest ten per cent; this gap increased under neoliberal policies as by 
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1990, the richest ten per cent earned 31 times more than the poorest ten per cent (Honey, 1994). 
Costa Rica also experienced corruption; in 2004, a former president from 1998-2002, Miguel 
Angel Rodríguez, was accused of taking a £1.2 million payoff to support a large French 
telecommunications company to win a large contract in Costa Rica, while a week later, a former 
president from 1990-1994, Rafael Angel Calderón, was accused of taking a nearly half a 
million dollar kickback from a loan from the Finnish government in order to finance the 
purchase of medical equipment (Lehoucq, 2005).  
 
During the neoliberal period, furthermore, Costa Rica’s vulnerability as a small developing 
country to the pressures of the international market saw serious environmental degradation as 
a result of exploitation from foreign companies. The environment was seen across Latin 
America as a resource for exploitation, with a focus on the privatisation and commodification 
of resources such as forests, water and biodiversity; payments for environmental services; 
deregulation and cuts in public expenditure for environmental issues; the opening up of trade 
and investment; and the transfer of responsibility for environmental issues to local or 
nongovernmental bodies (Liverman and Vilas, 2006). 
 
As a result of the negative impacts of the neoliberal policies, Costa Rica broke its commitments 
to the IMF, but was left with few development options. The traditional industries of coffee and 
bananas were in decline and the diversified industries that it had developed in the 1980s and 
1990s were not producing the development hoped for. The income of Central America from 
coffee declined by 44 per cent between 1999 and 2001, largely due to lower coffee prices as a 
result of increased supply from states such as Vietnam and Brazil, alongside hurricanes, erratic 
rainfall and drought in Central America, which impeded coffee production (Varangis et al, 
2003). As indicated above, the limited options for small developing states due to the low price 
and instability of primary products and the competition from larger developing countries with 
more potential to provide manufactured products at large scales and cheaper prices, led 
countries such as Costa Rica to adopt service industries, particularly tourism, as a development 
model.  
 
The Challenges Posed to Costa Rica by the Tourism Industry 
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Costa Rica is an appealing destination for tourism, due to its wealth of natural features, 
including waterfalls, rainforests, volcanoes and endemic species. Costa Rica is one of 20 
countries with the highest diversity of species in the world, with an estimated four per cent of 
world species in only 0.03 per cent of the world’s territory (Jules, 2005; INBio, 2001: 21). 
Costa Rica has also effectively developed the niche tourism product that many small 
developing countries seek (Scheyvens and Momsen, 2008), focusing on nature and adventure 
tourism, given its natural assets. Social and political factors which also make Costa Rica 
attractive to tourism investors include its literacy rate of 95 per cent, which provides an 
educated workforce for the industry; a relatively large middle class, already familiar with 
tourism and travel and a stable and democratic government with no army. Costa Rica was also 
attractive due to its infrastructure, including the best public healthcare system in Latin America 
and paved roads and telephones and electricity; while its proximity to the US makes the country 
appealing to tourists (Chemonics International Inc, 2002; Bien, 2002; Duhá Buchsbaum, 2004). 
Therefore, as in many other small developing countries, tourism was an obvious choice for 
Costa Rica as an alternative to its traditional agro-export model.  
 
Costa Rica was already popular as a tourist destination for scientists and conservationists keen 
to study its nature, but in 1987, hard currency from tourism only accounted for three per cent 
of GDP (INCAE, 1997). From the mid-1990s, tourism became a key development strategy in 
Costa Rica, and has since become a leading industry, comprising 13.5 per cent of GDP, 13.1 
per cent of total employment and 17.1 per cent of exports in goods and services (World Travel 
and Tourism Council, 2008). This section will now explore the challenges that tourism, and 
particularly, forms of mass tourism, pose to sustainable development in Costa Rica. Many of 
these challenges are recognised as a concern by the government, non-state actors and the 
public, and have directly led as a result to the establishment of various governance mechanisms. 
 
In terms of the impacts of tourism on economic development, it was hoped in small developing 
countries that tourism would boost local business and employment, as locals would establish 
their own tourism businesses or become employed in the industry. As developing country 
governments have often lowered taxes in order to entice foreign investors as a reflection of 
neoliberal ideology, however, the tax returns from tourism are often limited. Other potential 
economic benefits of tourism include local employment and economic linkages. The 
complexity of the tourism industry, however, makes understanding its impacts rather 
challenging. Global value chain theories can provide useful insight into the economic and 
 78 
 
power structures of the tourism industry, which help to unravel their impacts on small and 
developing countries.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Two, global value chain theorists (see, for example, Bair and Gereffi, 
2001; Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon, 2008) present industries as a series of stages from the ‘service-
provider’ businesses at the local end of the value chain in the host country, to the branding, 
marketing and retail businesses often run by foreigners from developed countries. Some 
tourism scholars, such as Clancy (1998), have applied global value chain analysis to the tourism 
industry. Clancy (1998) argues that the recognition of global value chains of the consequences 
for development of the changing organisation of capital at the local, regional and global levels 
make them useful in understanding the concentration of power and profit in the industry. 
 
An eight-stage ‘chain’ is most appropriate for tourism, illustrated in Figure 10. This includes 
the development of brands for accommodation, such as Holiday Inn and Hilton; the owning 
and running of accommodation businesses; local tours, such as day trips and events; domestic 
transport, including trains, buses, taxis, hire cars and domestic flights; food from wholesalers, 
supermarkets and restaurants, handicrafts and souvenirs; international airlines; and those firms 
that package and sell holidays to tourists. These tour packagers negotiate with accommodation 
and tour providers, as well as other suppliers, and parcel together a holiday experience, which 
is then sold to tourists as a single package (Sheldon, 1986). While the tourism industry also has 
other stages, such as construction, the above are the most significant and therefore, in order to 
keep the chain as simple as possible, these stages will be the main focus of discussion. 
 
Figure 10: The Basic Elements of a Tourism ‘Value Chain’ 
Brand development 
for accommodation 
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A key element to global value chain theories is the identification of the concentration of 
developed and developing country firms at each stage, which indicates the balance of economic 
power within an industry. Gereffi (1999) discusses two chains with different distributions of 
firms: producer-driven chains, where foreign-owned firms dominate most, if not all, stages of 
the value chain; and buyer-driven chains, where foreign-owned firms dominate the higher 
value-added branding and marketing stages of the value chain, leaving the lower value-added 
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service-provision and production stages to developed country firms. Taking this into account, 
there are two different ways in which firms are concentrated in the tourism industry, illustrated 
in Figure 11 as ‘enclave’ and ‘franchise’ tourism, with the stages where developed and 
developing country firms are most concentrated highlighted in grey.  
 
The first value chain, ‘enclave’ tourism, reflects producer-driven chains, where large 
international transnational corporations own much of the different stages of industry. Thus, as 
demonstrated in Figure 11, the various stages of this type of tourism are dominated by firms 
based in developed countries. This type of chain is exacerbated by the negotiations of the 
Uruguay Round of GATS, which many developing states argued provided foreign companies 
unfair access to tourism in developing countries, while not opening up access for developing 
state firms to developed state markets (Cleverdon and Kalisch, 2000). 
 
The second ‘chain’, ‘franchise’ tourism, reflects the buyer-driven commodity chains, where 
core firms buy products from suppliers, focus themselves on higher value added activities, such 
as branding, marketing and retailing, and then sell products to consumers. This emerged more 
recently than ‘enclave’ tourism. In ‘franchise’ chains, instead of core firms buying products 
from suppliers - as usually happens in industry chains - hotel chains often sell, or rent out, their 
brand name and operating expertise to suppliers, in this case, hotel and accommodation owners 
(Clancy, 1998). The selling of the use of brand names to service-providers is particularly 
common in tourism, as while in most industries, consumers can inspect a good before they 
purchase it, consumers are usually not able to view a hotel before staying there, which leads 
consumers to often rely on brands that they feel familiar with, prompting many chain hotel 
businesses (Clancy, 1998). The InterContinental Hotels Group, for example, which owns the 
Holiday Inn brands and has two Holiday Inn brand hotels in Costa Rica’s capital, owns less 
than one per cent of the InterContinental brand hotels, managing and franchising the rest 
(InterContinental Hotels Group, 2014). In managing and franchising arrangements, third party 
businesses own the bricks and mortar of the hotels, and have varying degrees of control over 
employment, quality and services. More up-market brands tend to exert more influence through 
management arrangements in order to ensure the quality of the products under their brand 
name, while brands focused on budget accommodation more often allow service-providers 
more independence over the running of the accommodation. 
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Adopting this buyer-driven model, therefore, in the ‘franchise’ tourism chain there is a bell 
curve structure, where the brand development for accommodation starts in the developed 
world, then the service-provision is often run by developing country firms, and then the airlines 
and packaging and selling of holidays are largely conducted by developed country firms. 
Airlines, like branding, marketing and retailing, are technologically-advanced and capital-
intensive, leading to high start-up costs as a skilled workforce and expensive equipment is 
required (Clancy, 1998). As a result, they are frequently owned by multi-national corporations, 
often run by investors from developed countries (Carbone, 2005). Similar to the production 
chains for manufacturing, developed country activity is often concentrated around the higher 
value-added activities, including brand development, airlines and the packaging and selling of 
holidays. ‘Enclave’ and ‘franchise’ tourism are two commonly-found value chains in 
developing countries and each has different implications for small developing countries, which 
will be drawn out in the discussion below.  
 
Figure 11: ‘Enclave’ and ‘Franchise/Local’ Tourism Chains 
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The two different structures of the tourism value chain in Figure 11, therefore, help to explain 
why local employment and linkages can be limited in tourism. In the ‘enclave’ model, labour 
and goods are imported, leading to fewer gains for local stakeholders. While not always 
synonymous with ‘all-inclusive’ resorts – which are notorious for their lack of local benefits – 
enclave and all-inclusive resorts are often similar in structure. They both tend to encourage the 
isolation of tourists within the confines of a foreign-owned resort, and thus, fewer opportunities 
for local tourism businesses to sell their products. Data suggests that Costa Rica has fewer of 
these enclave models than some other small developing states, as she is well-known for having 
thriving local tourism businesses, and only 63 per cent of Costa Rica’s hotels are foreign owned 
compared to over 75 per cent in small developing states such as Antigua, Turks and Caicos and 
Cayman Islands (Pattullo, 2005).  
 
There are two regions in Costa Rica where this enclave tourism is particularly popular, 
however. There has recently been rapid development of all-inclusive resorts on the Pacific 
coast, as ‘sun, sea and sand’ tourism has increased in popularity, and also around the major 
international Juan Santamaría airport in the Central Valley (UNEP, 2014; Honey et al, 2010). 
To demonstrate the increased propensity of large – and therefore, often foreign-owned – hotels 
in these regions, the average number of rooms in hotels in the north-west region of Guanacaste 
is 23, and 29 in the Central Valley, significantly higher than the country’s average of 19 rooms 
(Costa Rica Tourism Board, 2013). Furthermore, these regions also have the highest proportion 
of four and five star hotels, six per cent in Guanacaste and 17 per cent in the Central Valley, 
compared with five per cent and less in the other regions, suggesting that they are more likely 
to be foreign-controlled (Costa Rica Tourism Board, 2013). The cruise ship industry, 
accounting for 16 per cent of tourist arrivals in Costa Rica, also fits into this ‘enclave’ model, 
as tourists purchase most of their holiday through the cruise-ship company, including 
accommodation, food and entertainment. 
 
In these enclave resorts, employees and products are often brought in from abroad in order to 
meet the language and service expectations of tourists from developed countries. Where local 
people are employed, it is often in the lower paid and semi-skilled jobs rather than management 
positions, and it is often the better educated people from around the capital city rather than 
those in poor rural areas that are given employment (Honey et al, 2010). Furthermore, tourism 
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employment is unstable, as workers are often only paid for the work that is available, which is 
heavily concentrated in the high tourist season, leaving local people with little employment 
during the low tourist season. In addition, tourists often pay for the majority of their holiday 
before they leave their origin country, paying tour package operators a single fee for a whole 
package holiday. Thus, in this model, as the tourism value chain is largely dominated by foreign 
firms, local businesses are often left with what is considered ‘crumbs on the table’, perhaps in 
the form of sale of a few relatively cheap souvenirs (Omotayo Brown, 1995).  
 
Alongside local employment, the tourism industry can potentially create ‘backward linkages’, 
where the industry creates demand for domestically produced goods and services such as 
transport, food-processing and construction and ‘income multiplier linkages’, where demand 
is created for consumer goods by the employees and beneficiaries of the industry (Weaver, 
1994). ‘Enclave’ resorts, however, as described with the banana industry above, often produce 
fewer linkages. As demonstrated in Figure 11 above, mass tourism resorts often include all the 
local amenities that resorts and tourists need, including shops, spas and golf courses, 
particularly as vacation homes are often built in the same complex (Honey et al, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, as tourists generally expect food, goods and services that reflect their experiences 
at home, local produce is often not of the required type or quality and thus, much is imported 
from abroad or run by foreign firms, including food, local tours, local transport, and even 
handicrafts and souvenirs. Cruise ship passengers spend the vast majority of their money on 
board, including accommodation and food, limiting their benefits for the local economies 
(Honey et al, 2010). Where cruise-ship passengers go on local tours, cruise ships often receive 
a significant commission, around 50 per cent, for selling tours to passengers before they leave 
the ship (Honey et al, 2010). As a result, stayover visitors spend on average 18 times more in 
Costa Rica than cruise ship visitors (CREST-INCAE study in Honey et al, 2010). Furthermore, 
as many of the goods sold to tourists are imported, 40 to 50 per cent of gross tourism earnings 
in small developing countries are estimated to leak abroad, as opposed to between 10 and 20 
per cent for more advanced and more diversified economies (Diaz, 2001: 8). As local 
employment can be low and unstable, income-multiplier linkages are also limited as there is 
less demand for consumer goods from local people. Indeed, worse still, tourism can inflate 
prices in local communities near tourism resorts to the extent that local people are unable to 
afford basic goods (Koens et al, 2009). 
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Local ownership of tourism businesses has, however, been increasing in developing countries. 
As indicated above, Costa Rica has a higher number of local-owned tourism businesses than 
many other small developing countries. This has led to the emergence of ‘franchise’ or ‘local’ 
tourism value chains. In ‘franchise’ chains, local businesses operate in parts of the chain and 
operate under a recognised international brand name. ‘Local’ tourism chains also include local 
businesses in parts of the value chain, but do not use international brand names to market 
themselves, instead they often rely on a more ‘authentic’ native tourism experience. These 
‘local’ models often market themselves as ‘ecotourism’, characterised by small-scale hotels 
and businesses run often by locals and with an emphasis on nature, whether through the use of 
sustainable practices or simply the running of a nature tour. These ‘franchise’ and ‘local’ 
models, therefore, have the potential to provide more economic benefits to local people than 
the ‘enclave’ model, as the owners and managers of the businesses are often local people, 
however, in reality there are other problems that retain the concentration at profit at the 
international level. 
 
Local businesses in tourism are often highly concentrated in the lower value-added stages of 
the industry, particularly accommodation-provision, day tour operators, food, domestic 
transport and souvenirs. In contrast, the higher value-added branding, marketing and airline 
stages of the tourism value chain remain largely dominated by developed country firms as they 
are highly capital and technology-intensive. While some local hotel owners in developing 
countries have advanced to develop a brand that they can then franchise, in many cases firms 
from developed countries own the big hotel chain brands (Clancy, 1998). These foreign 
companies often leave the physical service-provision of accommodation or tours to local 
businesses, instead selling their brand names to local service-providers, who need the brand 
recognition in order to attract tourists uncertain of services in developing countries. This limits 
the access of developing country firms to the profits from the industry. By focusing on 
developing brands that can be sold to local service-providers, foreign companies have the 
advantage that they do not have to take responsibility for costly remodelling, redecoration or 
upkeep of accommodations, and less risk, taking fees from hotels on gross receipts rather than 
profits. 
 
The continued control of foreign owned firms over the tour packaging and airline stages of the 
industry, however, retains inequalities between developing and developed country firms. The 
large foreign tour packagers are able to negotiate cheap prices with local service-providers, as 
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they can buy in large volume, there are many service-providers looking for their business and 
they have significant influence over which service-providers and destinations tourists choose 
(Pattullo, 2005; Curtin and Busby, 1999). A substantial proportion of tourists buy their holidays 
from tour package agencies, 48 per cent of UK tourists who took an overseas holiday in 2012 
booked their holidays as a package deal, and this number is increasing, from 37 per cent in 
2010 and 42 per cent in 2011 (ABTA, 2013: 7). Tour packages offer tourists more control over 
their budget, as they can buy all-inclusive holidays and pay one sum for the entire holiday. 
Group tour packages have also become popular, offering tourists safety, companionship, 
convenience and good value for money (Chang, 2007). Tour package agencies often prefer to 
buy from larger hotels, which are less likely to be locally owned, and where they do buy from 
smaller service-providers, they often drive hard bargains to reduce prices, which small 
businesses often struggle to afford (Pattullo, 2005). Local service-providers are therefore 
extremely vulnerable to the whim of branders and marketers, as for example, omission of a 
hotel from a brochure could lead rapidly to bankruptcy (Britton, 1977).  
 
Local accommodation-providers are also at the whim of international airlines, often owned by 
foreign investors, who control routes, the location of airports, schedules, fares and control 
reservation systems. Developing regions are becoming particularly dependent on airlines; in 
2013, the fastest growing regions for the world air transport market were the Middle East (11.2 
per cent), Asia and Pacific (7.2 per cent) and Africa (7 per cent), with growth in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (6.3 per cent) also higher than that in Europe (3.8 per cent) and the US (2.2 
per cent) (Caribbean Tourism Organisation, 2014: 5). As Costa Rica is not an island, it does 
not suffer from the same level of dependency on airlines as many small island developing 
states, whose tourists have few other means of arriving. A fairly large proportion of tourists 
still arrive in Costa Rica by air, however, 67 per cent in 2013 (Costa Rica Tourism Board, 
2013). Many more tourists likely depend on airlines in order to visit Costa Rica, as there is 
much cross-border travel between Costa Rica and its neighbours via road, and some tourists 
travel through a series of countries in the region before flying home. International airlines, 
therefore, carry a lot of clout, as the suspension or reduced frequency of particular flights can 
cause hotels to go out of business (Pattullo, 2005). As a result, airlines are in a strong position 
to bargain with developing countries for cheaper landing slots, reduced hotel rates for cabin 
crew, and increased marketing for the destinations from developing countries dependent on 
tourist arrivals. 
 
 85 
 
Furthermore, in both enclave and franchise/local tourism value chains, host countries usually 
pay the costs for infrastructure such as sewerage, airports, roads, electricity and water, and 
therefore foreign companies often do not have to absorb these costs either (Britton, 1977). The 
contribution through taxes of tourism businesses often does not cover these costs. The cruise 
industry’s contribution to taxes is particularly low, with a very low head tax paid to developing 
country governments, while developing country governments are left to take responsibility for 
the expensive development and maintenance of infrastructure for port facilities. Furthermore, 
cruise ships do not pay local tax on their onboard businesses, including casinos and restaurants, 
despite these being in use while they are docked at developing country ports (Pattullo, 2005).  
 
Therefore, inequalities in both the ‘enclave’ and ‘franchise’ models of tourism place local 
service-providers in a precarious position. It is estimated that large tour operators based in 
developed countries retain at least 75 per cent of the price of retail packages paid by tourists, 
using their influence in the market to pressure small service-providers in developing countries 
to lower their prices (Jules, 2005). The fact that 47 per cent of international tourist arrivals are 
in ‘emerging’ economies, and yet only 36 per cent of international tourism receipts are retained 
in ‘emerging’ economies, also indicates an imbalance in profits (UNWTO, 2014). Clancy 
(1998) suggests that the structure of the tourism value chain allows international firms even 
more control over the industry than buyer-driven chains in manufacturing industries, due to the 
heavy dependence of local owned hotels on well-known international brand names in order to 
attract tourists.  
 
Mitchell and Faal (2007) suggest that global value chain analysis for the tourism industry 
overstates the extent of ‘leakages’ from developing countries, as they argue that it is wrong to 
claim that developing countries ‘own’ the whole value chain and should therefore receive all 
of its benefits, as without the international aspects of the tourism industry, tourism would not 
exist at the local level. The objective of sustainable development as defined in this thesis, 
however, is not that all of the economic benefits of tourism should be retained at the local level, 
but instead that a more equitable distribution of profits from the tourism industry should be 
established, given the disproportionate risks and costs that local stakeholders shoulder. 
Mitchell and Faal (2007) argue that another major flaw with value chain analysis is that it 
underestimates the importance of discretionary income for destination countries, including 
expenditure from shopping, local travel and local tours, as this income often goes straight to 
the local people who need it. In response, however, this discretionary income is often very low, 
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with profit from local tours being extracted through the franchise arrangement discussed above, 
and purportedly ‘local’ handicrafts sometimes even shipped in from abroad to sell to tourists.  
 
The economic benefits that the tourism industry does bring to developing countries from either 
of these tourism value chains, furthermore, are often volatile, due to vulnerability to a decline 
in market demand, for example, as a result of threats such as hurricanes, unpredictable oil 
prices, climate change, financial crises, terrorism or health outbreaks such as SARS and Avian 
Influenza (Bishop, 2010: 102). Therefore, even if a small developing country manages to 
escape the above challenges of the global value chain, there are many more obstacles to 
sustainable development. As indicated above, small developing countries are particularly 
vulnerable to income fluctuations as a result of their often lack of diversified development 
industries. Tourism has in cases lured communities to abandon multiple established local 
industries as a result of perceived high profits to be made, and yet this income can dry up due 
to changes in market demand. The impact of this has already been seen to some extent as a 
result of the global recession, where tourist arrivals in Costa Rica dipped from 2.4 million in 
2008 to 2.3 million in 2009, and tourist expenditure decreased from US$2.5 million in 2008 to 
US$2 million in 2009 (World Tourism Organisation, 2013). Therefore, tourism is inherently a 
difficult industry to rely upon for development.  
 
As a result of these economic concerns with ‘mass’ forms of tourism, new concepts of tourism 
started to emerge. Government officials and a number of non-governmental organisations in 
Costa Rica viewed ‘eco’ or ‘sustainable’ tourism as a model that has the potential to empower 
local communities, improving their quality of life with minimal environmental impacts 
(Horton, 2009). The concept of ‘ecotourism’ was used increasingly, attracting international 
criticism over its lack of regulation. A tourism business running a nature tour, but with no 
commitment to sustainable practices, for example, might call itself an ‘ecotourism’ venture. 
There was, therefore, a significant need for governance in order to further develop this concept 
of ‘ecotourism’ and the ventures associated with it in order to ensure their benefits for the local 
economy. 
 
As well as the economic challenges of tourism so far described, tourism can also have adverse 
social impacts. The effects of tourism on local communities is particularly concerning, for 
example, tourist resorts can increase water shortages, as tourists expect to have constant access 
to water, despite the fact that locals may not have this (Pattullo, 2005). Golf courses are 
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particularly notorious for large water usage, with examples of local communities suffering 
droughts nearby. A US-style golf course, for example, can require the same amount of water 
per day as five to ten thousand local people (Honey et al, 2010). Tourism can degrade the 
culture of communities, for example, increasing alcohol consumption and crime, including 
prostitution and drug abuse. It can also cause isolation of local people from local nature, such 
as the beaches. While women have been able to earn an income in many cases for the first time, 
for example, in opening small businesses such as restaurants, these roles are often extensions 
of their roles in the home, such as cooking and serving others, while the best paid jobs, in roles 
such as nature guides, fishing and scuba diving, are still largely filled by men (Horton, 2009). 
Furthermore, while tourism improves local infrastructures such as roads, this is often built with 
the sole purpose of benefiting the tourism industry, resulting in tarmac roads ending at the point 
in a street past which there are no more resorts. 
 
While it is arguable that tourism can be a stimulus for increased protection of the environment, 
including the introduction of administrative and planning controls such as beach clean-ups and 
improved waste disposal (Milne, 1990), tourism is also notorious for its environmental impacts, 
both locally and more broadly, at the global level. Local environmental damages from tourism 
include erosion of beaches, damage to coral reefs, marine and coastal pollution from water 
sports, dumping of waste and raw sewage and destruction of wetlands and salt ponds (Pattullo, 
2005). Local infrastructures are often unable to cope with the large increases in sewage and 
waste. Small developing states often have particularly vulnerable ecosystems, due to their 
relative wealth of natural assets such as beaches, volcanoes and rainforests, and the fact that 
many integrate these assets into their tourism industry for tourists to enjoy. The significant 
greenhouse gas emissions created by the tourism industry, particularly through international 
flights, which account for between 3.5 per cent and 4.6 per cent of total greenhouse gas 
emissions (Becken, 2007: 351), also have the potential to cause environmental degradation. 
These effects, as indicated above, are likely to be felt more significantly in small developing 
states such as Costa Rica, as they have less capacity for risk reduction measures and adaptation 
due to their lack of economic diversification, are more likely to experience the effects of climate 
change, which will manifest as rising sea levels, warmer air and water temperatures, more 
intense tropical storms, and increased risk of extreme events such as floods and droughts 
(Becken and Schellhorn, 2007). The squeezing of profit margins from local service-providers 
in order to provide tourists with competitive prices also often leads to tourists shouldering little 
of the social or environmental costs of the tourism industry (Curtin and Busby, 1999).  
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Overall, therefore, the tourism industry poses numerous challenges to economic development, 
social equity and environmental protection in Costa Rica. Global value chain theories provided 
a particularly useful tool through which to understand the different arrangements within Costa 
Rica’s tourism industry. ‘Enclave’ tourism clearly posed many challenges to sustainable 
development, while ‘franchise’ and ‘local’ models provided problems of their own. Claims for 
emerging ‘sustainable’ tourism have been subject to significant criticism due to perceived 
‘greenwashing’ and a lack of regulation of the ‘ecotourism’ label. These concerns around the 
impacts of tourism have led to the design and implementation of a series of governance 
mechanisms aimed at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. This started with a small 
group of Costa Rican scientists and conservationists, which encouraged the government to 
protect its natural resources, fuelled by access to transnational contacts, funding and expertise 
(Horton, 2009). Thus, governance mechanisms for tourism started to emerge in Costa Rica and 
have since developed into a fairly extensive framework of national park systems, coastal zone 
legislation, certification, environmental education, activism and technical assistance 
programmes. The rest of this thesis, therefore, will explore how far these governance 
mechanisms in Costa Rica have promoted sustainable tourism. This thesis avoids the term 
‘ecotourism’, as it is highly contested, as a result of cases of businesses using the term to 
‘greenwash’ unsustainable practices and concern in the academic and international community 
as to how far ‘ecotourism’ businesses actually are sustainable. ‘Ecotourism’ is also generally 
applied to a subsection of the tourism market, typically small-scale local-run businesses. The 
focus of this thesis, however, is on how far governance can make the industry as a whole more 
sustainable, including larger-scale businesses. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to identify the challenges to sustainable development and 
sustainable tourism faced by Costa Rica. The chapter first outlined insights in the ‘small states’ 
and small developing island states’ literature around the challenges to development faced by 
small developing states. These included dependency on a few primary exports and openness to 
the international market, all of which lead to unstable and limited economic development and 
often adverse impacts on social equity and the environment. The chapter then explored how 
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Costa Rica’s development history has been shaped by these challenges, particularly its 
dependency on the banana and coffee industries. It was outlined how the decreasing prices for 
primary products and the low economic benefits from manufacturing industries had encouraged 
Costa Rica to adopt tourism as a new development model.  
 
The final section of the chapter demonstrated the significant challenges that tourism poses to 
economic development, social equity and environmental protection in Costa Rica. These 
included that, economically, local people are often unable to start their own businesses and 
where they do, they provide services at the local level as opposed to the higher value-added 
sectors of marketing, branding and retailing. Tourism provides fewer employment 
opportunities than expected as often labour is imported from abroad, and the employment it 
does provide for locals is often unstable, low-skilled and low paid. Far fewer linkages than 
were hoped for have come to fruition, with enclave styled resorts importing many of the 
products they need in order to meet the high expectations of Western tourists, leading to 
significant leakages. With regard to social equity, tourism can cause resource shortages, as 
resorts often require significant amounts of water, while the close proximity of ‘Western’ 
culture to local communities has led to increases in prostitution, crime and culture-erosion. The 
environmental impacts of tourism can also be severe, with local infrastructures struggling to 
cope with large increases in water use and sewage. Ecotourism, furthermore, can bring tourists 
to some of the most fragile areas. 
 
The next three chapters will explore the effectiveness of different types of governance 
mechanisms at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, and seek to identify success 
factors enhancing the impact of any particularly effective governance mechanisms. Chapter 
Five will explore the impact of legal mechanisms, Chapter Six will discuss bargaining 
mechanisms, and Chapter Seven, the impact of persuasive mechanisms. The final chapter will 
discuss the conclusions of the thesis and reflect on the utility of the theoretical model in 
exploring the effectiveness of different types of governance for sustainable tourism.  
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Chapter Five 
Legal Mechanisms for Sustainable 
Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
 
This thesis aims to explore the effectiveness of different types of governance mechanisms for 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. The Introduction indicated how Costa Rica’s adoption of 
sustainable tourism as a central pillar of its development strategy, coupled with its middle-
income status and extensive institutional support for tourism, suggests that its case may 
represent a success story for governance and sustainable development. Chapters Two and Three 
developed a model through which to understand and theorise the effectiveness of governance 
in promoting sustainable tourism. Chapter Two defined sustainable development as comprising 
economic development, social equity and environmental protection, pursued in a context where 
local stakeholders disproportionately shoulder the risks and costs of industry. Chapter Three 
drew on the work of Bemelmans-Videc et al (1998) and Börzel and Risse (2002) in order to 
develop a model of three types of governance, including highly choice-constraining ‘legal 
mechanisms’, moderately choice-constraining ‘bargaining mechanisms’ and low choice-
constraining ‘persuasive mechanisms’. These chapters identified how governance must address 
the particular tensions inherent in sustainable development between business interests and local 
stakeholders, as well as both social and environmental aspects of sustainable development.  
 
Chapter Four identified how Costa Rica’s small developing status, and thus, limited 
development options and yet significant biodiversity, has led it to adopt tourism as a 
development strategy, and the many challenges that the industry poses to sustainable 
development. The concentration of economic influence in the hands of international 
stakeholders, the volatility and low-skilled nature of local employment and significant 
environmental damages indicated the need for governance in Costa Rica in order to promote a 
more sustainable tourism industry. The rest of this thesis will, therefore, use the theoretical 
model to assess the effectiveness of Costa Rica’s governance mechanisms for sustainable 
tourism, and identify any success factors in Costa Rica’s case. In theoretical terms, it will 
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evaluate the utility of the theoretical model in providing a framework through which to explore 
the impact of governance for sustainable tourism and sustainable development, and provide 
insights into general governance questions from the empirical findings.  
 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explore the effectiveness of the first type of 
governance mechanism identified in the theoretical model, legal mechanisms, in promoting 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Legal mechanisms involve the creation of law, backed by 
the threat of negative sanctions, such as fines or imprisonment, with the aim of prescribing or 
preventing certain types of human behaviour (Vedung, 1998; Lemaire, 1998). Broadly defined 
as legislation, they are also referred to as ‘stick’ mechanisms (Bemelmans-Videc et al, 1998) 
or command and control instruments. With regard to environmental legal mechanisms, for 
example, this could involve the identification of a target such as a limit on emissions of a 
pollutant (the command), with penalties where the target is not met (the control) (Gunningham, 
2009). 
 
The theoretical model identified a series of hypothetical strengths and weaknesses of legal 
mechanisms that will be tested in this chapter in the case of tourism in Costa Rica. It suggested 
that the highly choice-constraining nature of legal mechanisms provides them with the capacity 
to enforce compliance with their standards, including among the most prolific offenders. On 
the other hand, the model argued that legal mechanisms may face a number of obstacles. Firstly, 
legal mechanisms are potentially limited in use as a result of international trade agreements, 
such as the GATT/WTO and GATS, which require that goods and services from all trading 
partners are treated equally in the provision of access to the market, thus preventing violation 
of the most favoured nation principle. Another potentially limiting factor is the growing trend 
towards new public management, which argues for the reduced use of highly choice-
constraining governance in order to limit the impact of state inefficiencies. Secondly, the 
implementation of legal mechanisms may face obstacles including increased risks of corruption 
and inefficiencies, a short-term policy focus that is not consistent with the long-term 
projections required for environmental protection, and fragmented state institutions that are 
typically unable to coordinate promotion of all three aspects of sustainable development 
simultaneously. Furthermore, the way in which the authority of states is restricted to the 
national level makes legal mechanisms less relevant to the increasingly global nature of many 
issues such as security, transnational production and, indeed, sustainable development. This 
chapter will start by outlining the different types of legal mechanisms for tourism in Costa 
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Rica, and will then evaluate the effectiveness of four of these in particular, given the potential 
challenges highlighted in the theoretical model. The final section will explore the theoretical 
implications of these findings for broader debates around governance. 
 
The Impact of Legal Mechanisms on Sustainable Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
There are a number of legal mechanisms in Costa Rica related to sustainable tourism, shown 
in Figure 12. Some are economic and social, including investment in the Papagayo Tourism 
Pole, where a second international airport and large number of all-inclusive resorts have been 
developed; regulation against the exploitation of children in the tourism industry; restrictions 
on the height of buildings to reduce vulnerability to earthquakes and regulations to enable 
access for disabled people to buildings. Most legal mechanisms related to sustainable tourism, 
however, are environmental. Indeed, according to a local industry source, Costa Rica has more 
legal mechanisms for environmental protection than many other developing countries 
(confidential interview #10). The most renowned and extensive include a Maritime Zone Law, 
which restricts building on the first two hundred metres of the entire coast line; the national 
park and private reserve system which protects 25 per cent of Costa Rica’s territory from 
deforestation (INBio, 2001: 6); and a regulation which requires hotels to secure a number of 
permits from the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAET) in order to build, including 
ensuring that the operation of water treatment plants meets environmental standards 
(confidential interview #5).  
 
Other environmental legal mechanisms less relevant to tourism include anti-hunting laws, a 
water tax where dams, water providers and farmers pay the local people who live upstream a 
sum of money as an incentive to keep the river clean, and legislation to ensure that all 
municipalities have a recycling centre and a well-established system for managing waste 
(confidential interviews #17 and 15). The Environmental Court (the TAA) is the government 
institution responsible for addressing cases where individuals or organisations have caused 
environmental damages. Typical cases involve the inappropriate disposal of waste water, the 
expansion of business services beyond their capacity to treat waste water; invasion of protected 
zones through the construction of hotels, for example, beside a river; and the felling of trees 
without permission (confidential interview #5). Where there is non-compliance with 
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environmental legal mechanisms, the TAA requires that the environmental damage is rectified 
and compensation is paid (confidential interview #5).  
 
Some of these environmental legal mechanisms are considered to be leading-edge in Central 
America and worldwide. Costa Rica’s 1998 Biodiversity Law won the international 2010 
Future Policy Award, for example, which recognises pioneering legal protection of the 
environment (The Guardian, 2010). Costa Rica was also one of the first developing states to 
implement certain environmental legislation. A local industry source indicated that Costa Rica 
had one of the first laws in Central America to protect water, despite its small size and large 
availability of water (confidential interview #10). The quantity of environmental legal 
mechanisms such as this in Costa Rica is attributed to the ‘decades’ worth of work by dedicated 
politicians and implementation staff, who had a clear vision of what they wanted to achieve 
through environmental legislation (Bennett and Hennington, 2009; confidential interview #10). 
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Figure 12: Legal Mechanisms for Tourism in Costa Rica 
Aspects of Sustainable Development Main Legal Mechanisms for Tourism in 
Costa Rica 
Economic Gulf of Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia 
International Airport 
Social Regulation against abuse of children in 
tourism 
Height restrictions for building to lessen 
earthquake risks 
Disabled access provision to buildings 
Law for the Promotion of Rural Community 
Tourism 
Recognition of the Rights of Inhabitants of 
the South Caribbean Law 
Coastal Community Tourism Law 
(TECOCOS) 
Environmental Maritime Zone Law (ZMT) 
National park and private reserve system 
Hunting regulations 
Water treatment system regulations 
Requirement for recycling centres and 
municipality systems for waste management 
Deforestation regulation 
Disposal of waste water regulations 
 
This section will assess the effectiveness of four of the most pivotal legal mechanisms for 
tourism in Costa Rica: the national park system, the Maritime Zone Law (ZMT), legislation 
recognising rights to land for communities and the Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia 
International Airport. It will identify how far the impact of these mechanisms can be explained 
by the theoretical model developed earlier in this thesis, in order to assess the utility of the 
theoretical model. It will argue that the evidence suggests that they have a moderate impact on 
sustainable tourism. This level of impact is attributed to the high choice-constraining capacity 
of legal mechanisms, which has ensured a certain level of compliance, including in some cases, 
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prolific offenders against sustainable development. On the other hand, it will be indicated how 
factors largely pointed to in the theoretical model - including corruption, inefficiencies, short-
term policy making, uncoordinated institutions and lack of authority beyond the national arena 
– restrict the further effectiveness of legal mechanisms. The impact of international trade 
agreements and new public management is less clear, although the limited number of economic 
and social legal mechanisms for tourism points to the indirect impact of these factors. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that there are few legal mechanisms that address economic 
and social aspects of sustainable development, while environmental legal mechanisms may be 
extensive, but are ineffectively implemented. The theoretical model, therefore, is shown to be 
useful in identifying the hypothetic strengths and weaknesses of legal mechanisms. The 
effectiveness of each of the four legal mechanisms above will now be discussed in turn. 
 
The National Park System 
The first key legal mechanism for sustainable tourism in Costa Rica is the national park system.  
This is renowned internationally and covers 25 per cent of the country’s territory, a significant 
percentage. The national park system restricts movements and activities within the park borders 
in order to protect the 75 per cent of Costa Rica’s plant and animal species that are found in 
these protected areas. Restrictions include the requirement in certain locations that visitors stay 
on the paths and are accompanied by guides, and the regulation of activities such as farming 
and logging. In some respects, the evidence suggests that the national park system is effective. 
It adopts a scientifically sound approach to protection, focusing on whole ecosystems and 
basins, rather than just protecting a few key flower or animal species (Ramírez, 2004). 
Furthermore, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al (2003) found that deforestation rates were negligible 
inside national parks and biological reserves, and significantly reduced in all biological 
corridors between 1986 and 1997. This indicates at least some degree of effectiveness of the 
national park system. 
 
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that the design of the park system limits any further 
effectiveness. Sánchez-Azofeifa et al (2003) argue that protected areas in Costa Rica are too 
isolated to enable species to travel to other areas through biological corridors, which limits 
gene flow. Furthermore, it is suggested that the purchase of land for protection by the state has 
been guided by price, rather than the land that is at the greatest threat of deforestation (Pfaff et 
al, 2009). As a result, the land that is protected is often not under significant threat as it is not 
suitable for agriculture or tourism development; leading Pfaff et al (2009) to argue that the 
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national parks overall only reduce deforestation by two per cent. Therefore, the design of the 
national park system does not adequately address environmental aspects of sustainable 
development. Furthermore, the impact of the national park system is also limited by the way in 
which its establishment was riddled with conflict, as much of the rural population depended 
economically upon the use of natural resources that the government sought to protect 
(Brüggemann, 1997). In some cases there have also been allegations that government has 
seized land for conservation areas without paying the owners. Thus, the national park system 
has in some respects also failed to address the social equity indicator of sustainable 
development.  
 
The evidence suggests that the implementation of the national park system is problematic 
primarily due to inefficiencies and a shortage of resources. The park system struggles to 
maintain itself financially, with some parks unable to afford basics such as toilet paper and 
resources for fire prevention (CEPF, 2006). The problem is fuelled by the way in which many 
of the national parks bring in revenue, but they then have to channel this money to a central 
government account, instead of keeping it themselves (CEPF, 2006). As a result, parks do not 
have an incentive to increase their income from the public and tourists. An industry source 
indicated that funds for national parks are, furthermore, not distributed in terms of need; for 
example, a wild area of 120 hectares may only have two members of staff to protect it, and 
often only one member of staff at a time if the other is on leave (confidential interview #20). 
Another informant indicated that in 2011-12, MINAET suffered 30-40 per cent budget cuts 
due to resource shortages, and as a result, they struggle to even afford fuel for their vehicles in 
order to work outside of San José (confidential interview #4). This lack of financial, technical 
and human resources has led national parks and biological reserves to be severely damaged by 
squatters, illegal loggers, hunters and miners (Corbera et al, 2011). Thus, the inefficiencies of 
the state identified in the theoretical model restrict the effectiveness of legal mechanisms here.  
 
The Maritime Zone Law (ZMT) 
The second legal mechanism to be assessed in this chapter is the ZMT, which restricts 
construction activities on coastal land. The aim of these restrictions is to reduce environmental 
damages, such as coastal erosion and coral reef bleaching, maintain public access to the 
beaches and protect local buildings from the impact of weather events. The ZMT, therefore, 
prohibits construction on land within 50 metres from the high tide mark (designated the ‘public’ 
zone) and regulates construction on land between 50-200 metres from the high tide mark 
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(named the ‘restricted’ zone). Whereas before the rapid expansion of the tourism industry, this 
land was largely inhabited by locals, demand for building space from investors has dramatically 
intensified since the 1980s. In order to operate construction activities within this restricted 
zone, it is necessary to secure a concession permit from the local authority and the ICT, which 
require an adequate zoning plan that recognises and mitigates any environmental concerns 
associated with constructing on the land. The ZMT, therefore, has the potential to have a 
significant role in protecting both environmental and social interests in inherently vulnerable 
coastal areas. 
 
The evidence points to some cases where the ZMT appears to have been effective. One local 
industry source stated that the authenticity of beaches has been ‘saved’ in many locations by 
the ZMT, through the prevention of construction of high rise hotels (confidential interview 
#11). The media has also reported various cases where hotels and other buildings have been 
demolished as a result of illegal construction on protected coastal land. The ‘Tico Times’ in 
2008 reported how the coastal towns of Playas del Coco, Nicoya and Santa Cruz over the course 
of a year demolished a series of houses and bars in the public zone of the ZMT, in one case in 
order to construct a publicly funded pedestrian boulevard along a one kilometre stretch of beach 
(Tico Times website, 2008). Another Tico Times article (website, 2005) indicated how more 
than 20 structures had been demolished in Santa Cruz as a result of ZMT regulations. The 
highly choice-constraining nature of the ZMT, therefore, has enabled it to take action against 
some of the most prolific offenders of unsustainable development. 
 
In other examples, however, disorganised and poorly coordinated implementation of the ZMT 
is indicated to limit its overall effectiveness. Responsibility for the ZMT and coastal tourism 
development in the northwest region of Guanacaste, for example, sees at least 23 national 
institutions, 11 municipalities and four district councils having roles in overseeing enforcement 
(Ross and Wood, 2010). Honey et al (2010) argue that there is a lack of clarity over the 
responsibilities of each institution, which creates conflict and uncertainty. Furthermore, 
responsibility has been decentralised but local authorities rarely have the knowledge or 
resources to monitor and plan effectively for tourism, even those in the most popular tourist 
zones (Monge-González, 2010). A survey undertaken by Ross (2010) indicates that the 
environment is, furthermore, not a primary concern of most municipalities, with only 12 per 
cent stating it as their most serious municipal problem, whereas 35 per cent pointed to crime 
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and violence, and 18 per cent to the economy. 84 per cent of municipalities, however, stated 
that there were not sufficient resources for environmental protection (Ross, 2010).  
 
As a result, some individuals operate illegally in these zones without the appropriate 
concessions zoning plans. The poor monitoring of the zones by local authorities has encouraged 
the initiation of construction without permission which, when challenged, in reality often are 
able to pay a small fine and start the process of gaining a permit, allowing construction to 
continue (Miranda et al, 2007). Most of these illegal operations are local enterprises that have 
occupied the zone for decades; while a few locals have recently taken advantage of the anarchy 
in order to build illegally in the zone. While local authorities are authorised through the ZMT 
legislation to seize and demolish these illegal construction sites on the public zone, in reality 
few have done so.  
 
One cause is that government institutions do not have the capacity to challenge illegal 
operations in the coastal zones effectively. Miranda et al (2007) identify a case where the 
Municipality of Liberia denounced on a number of occasions the occupation of land by one 
particular hotel which was located on land administrated by the ICT. However, the 
Municipality did not receive the required response from the ICT and therefore, was unable to 
take action. The TAA also has responsibility for challenging illegal activity in the protected 
zones. Yet, an industry source indicated that there are cases that the TAA has not been able to 
address due to a shortage of people and resources (confidential interview #5). The TAA’s 
caseload was described as ‘unmanageable’, with thousands of open inquiries and only 20 civil 
servants to address them (confidential interview #5). Data exploring the level of confidence of 
Costa Ricans in the judicial system also supports indications here of its limited effectiveness, 
with only 7 per cent of interviewees saying that they had a lot of confidence in the judicial 
system, 28 per cent saying some, 34 per cent, little, and 28 per cent, none (Latinobarómetro, 
2011). Thus, again, the state inefficiencies identified in the theoretical model are seen here. 
 
Where operators have secured concessions to occupy restricted land in the coastal zone, in 
some cases, these concessions provide more influence over the land than the law allows, or for 
long periods of time, due to the corruption identified in the theoretical model (Noorloos, 2011). 
As responsibility for the ZMT has become decentralised to municipalities, more concessions 
have been granted for construction on coastal areas through political influence and bribery due 
to the low pay of employees, shortages of resources and lack of monitoring of funds (Ross and 
 99 
 
Wood, 2010). Thus, private developers are often able to direct land use planning (Honey et al, 
2010). One industry source indicated that there have been cases where businesses are given 
permits to operate in environmentally sensitive areas, as they say that they can make lots of 
money (confidential interview #17). Another informant reported that some larger companies 
ignore regulations due to their economic status or their name (confidential interview #22). In 
one case, the Municipality of Golfito, on the West coast of Costa Rica, was found to have 
authorised six businesses to operate in the maritime zone without an appropriate zoning plan 
(La Nación, 2011). The perception of the existence of corruption in Costa Rica is also indicated 
by the Latinobarómetro (2011), which indicates that 46 per cent of people interviewed in Costa 
Rica agree with the statement that formal procedures are often bypassed. 33 per cent of Costa 
Ricans also agreed with the statement that paying a public official is the only way to obtain 
what is required. Similarly, 23 per cent of Costa Ricans said that they knew of an act of 
corruption that had taken place. These figures, therefore, suggest that corruption is perceived 
to be a significant problem in Costa Rica.  
 
Locals have also protested against irregularities in the implementation of the ZMT, as there 
have been cases where local fishermen have been evicted from the public and restricted zones 
while large hotel and resort complexes have been allowed to remain (Noorloos, 2011). Local 
people have, in some cases, also been prohibited by the ZMT from repairing or renovating their 
properties (Haddock, 2012). The ZMT, therefore, appears to not be addressing the 
unsustainable behaviour of many larger tourism businesses. As many of these larger resorts are 
likely to be foreign owned, given that foreign resorts comprise 63 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
hotels and international investors often have more resources in order to run larger resorts 
(Pattullo, 2005), the inequalities between the interests of large corporations and local people 
identified in the sustainable development framework through global value chain analysis 
appear to be reinforced here by governance mechanisms. 
 
In some cases, occupants have secured the appropriate concessions but are not meeting the 
regulations laid out by the concessions. For example, they may be failing to put the agreed 
zoning plans - which are intended to protect the local environment - into practice. In May 2007, 
Miranda et al (2007) found that around 1,600 concessions had been allocated, but that the 
individuals to who they were awarded often treated the land as their own private property, 
changing and degrading it in ways prohibited by the ZMT. Some occupants have also illegally 
sold their concession permits or tenure rights (Miranda et al, 2007). There have been cases 
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where foreign companies have taken advantage of loopholes in order to get around restrictions 
on multiple concessions and foreign ownership, and some even have a dedicated representative 
who spends their time locating people with possession of concessions in order to offer to buy 
the land use rights (Noorloos, 2011; Miranda et al, 2007). Overall, therefore, the effectiveness 
of this mechanism for sustainable tourism is only moderate, despite its highly choice-
constraining capacity.  
 
Recognition of Rights to Land for Communities 
Alongside these regulations to protect national park and coastal land are a series of protracted 
conflicts and political and legal battles initiated by local communities, many of which have 
lived on this land for decades, and oppose their own eviction in the interests of 
environmentalism. One cause of these disputes is that local communities are often not involved 
in planning processes or, when they are consulted, they do not always want to participate for 
fear of legitimising the process (Haddock, 2012). Local communities have, therefore, called 
for recognition of their rights to land, and, although they have had some successes for local 
communities, these are not yet concrete. The Recognition of the Rights of Inhabitants of the 
South Caribbean Law passed in 2014 redefines the borders of the Gandoca-Manzanillo 
National Wildlife Refuge on the South Caribbean coast of Costa Rica in order to allow Afro-
Caribbean communities that were under threat of eviction from the national park to continue 
living on their 900 acres of land (Clark, 2014). There is no guarantee, however, that the new 
President will give legal property title to the communities and, therefore, the future of these 
residents is still uncertain (Clark, 2014). Following local activism from many Costa Rican 
communities around the injustice of eviction from coastal land that they had owned for years, 
the government was pressured to propose the Coastal Community Territory Law (TECOCOS). 
This aims to protect the rights of local Costa Ricans living in the ZMT’s protected zones and 
is currently passing through Parliament. If passed, the law will form a historical precedent 
worldwide for the rights of coastal communities (Haddock, 2012). Therefore, although legal 
mechanisms have historically been more extensively environmental than economic or social, a 
backlash from local people has facilitated new regulations that are more economic and social 
in nature. The full impact of these, however, is yet to be determined. 
 
Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia International Airport 
The final key legal mechanism for tourism in Costa Rica is the Papagayo Tourism Pole and 
Liberia International Airport investment, where the state has made a large investment in a series 
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of resorts and a second international airport in order to promote tourism in the northwest 
Guanacaste province. This legal mechanism does not specifically aim to address sustainable 
tourism, and indeed, will be indicated below to actually promote mass tourism, but is important 
to mention as it is the state’s most extensive tourism investment and has played a significant 
role in shaping the tourism industry in Costa Rica.  
 
Evidence from local industry sources suggests that this policy has only furthered inequalities 
in economic and social benefits from tourism as it has encouraged the rapid development of 
‘enclave’ tourism – in the form of the model identified in Chapter Four - in the region. In 
Guanacaste, almost 75 per cent of residential tourism developments are at least partly of North 
American origin, compared with only 35 per cent that are partly of Costa Rican origin 
(Noorloos, 2011). The Papagayo Tourism Pole project saw the poorly planned development of 
many all-inclusive hotels, individual vacation homes, gated communities and condos, as 
tourists could fly in directly from the US within a couple of hours. The sheer quantity of rooms 
in this region, and that of the Central Valley where business tourism is common, shows the 
extent of tourism development in these regions compared to the rest of Costa Rica. 25 per cent 
of tourist rooms in Costa Rica in 2013 were in the Central Valley, 24 per cent were in 
Guanacaste, and each of the other regions in Costa Rica accounted for less than 12 per cent of 
tourist rooms (Costa Rican Tourism Board, 2013). This indicates the significance of impact of 
the Papagayo project on the nature of Costa Rica’s tourism as a whole. While this project has 
been an important part of the government’s overall tourism strategy, it does not reflect the 
sustainable vision promoted by other elements of tourism policy, such as the national park 
system discussed above. 
 
The types of tourists attracted to this region are also less experienced travellers who stay for 
shorter periods and engage in fewer nature-based activities (Honey et al, 2010). Figures show 
that from 2011-12, arrivals at the Daniel Oduber airport in Liberia increased by 25 per cent, 
and that in 2013, 73 per cent of arrivals at this airport were from the US (Costa Rican Tourism 
Board, 2013). US tourists, in particular, often have shorter holidays than European tourists, and 
were indicated by several local sources to be less interested in sustainability (confidential 
interviews #14, #22 and #26). They have few reasons to leave these resorts as everything is 
provided, and often on an all-inclusive basis. Therefore, many of their tourist dollars stay within 
the resorts, and thus, in foreign hands. Thus, the type of tourism promoted by the Papagayo 
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Tourism Pole is not as sustainable as smaller, local-run ventures, which have greater links with 
the local economy and visitors that are more interested in the environment.  
 
While there have been some local economic and social benefits as a result of the Papagayo 
project, these have not reached the level expected. Honey et al (2010) describe, for example, 
how the Papagayo project has improved road and electricity infrastructures and community 
education and social welfare programmes, such as transportation for local people to and from 
their jobs in the resorts, job training and health education. Tens of thousands of jobs were 
predicted as a result of the Papagayo project, but only about 1,400 jobs appeared in reality, 
relatively few considering the size of the project (Christian et al, 2011). Although some of the 
higher-skilled and better paid jobs, often requiring a high standard of English, have gone to 
Costa Ricans from the Central Valley, many have gone to foreigners and few to locals in the 
Guanacaste region (Honey et al, 2010). Overall, therefore, the local economic and social 
benefits have only been moderate, and less than expected. One local source indicated that 
people in the tourism industry are frustrated at the ICT’s focus on this policy, as they perceived 
that tourists would be more likely to visit these sites, as opposed to more sustainable 
alternatives in Costa Rica (confidential interview #11).  
 
With regard to the environmental impact of these new resorts, there are numerous examples of 
extensive environmental damages from resorts in this region, including beach erosion during 
the construction of several hotels, illegal deforestation, and the closure of two hotels after they 
disposed of their waste into the sea in front of their buildings (Honey et al, 2010). While 
Chapter Six will present some evidence that the Certificate for Sustainable Tourism 
certification system has increased the sustainability of a number of the resorts in this region, 
the type of tourism that the Papagayo project promotes is far from sustainable. Furthermore, in 
the implementation of the Papagayo project, there have been multiple cases of corruption, with 
a number of government officials accused of corruption and violation of environmental and 
labour laws (Honey et al, 2010).  
 
In the case of the Papagayo Tourism Pole, therefore, the economic development element of 
sustainable development has been pursued in isolation from, and indeed in conflict with, social 
equity and environmental protection elements. The impacts described above, such as low levels 
of local employment in the Papagayo resorts and beach erosion, demonstrate the effects of 
pursuing one aspects of sustainable development over others. In Dawe and Ryan’s (2003) 
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three-legged stool model of sustainable development, the economic development leg of the 
stool would be longer here than the other two, making the stool, which represents sustainable 
development, unstable. 
 
The way in which the Papagayo project does not appear to be designed in order to promote 
sustainable tourism points to the influence of business interests and an uncoordinated policy 
approach, factors identified in the theoretical model. A local industry source suggested that the 
Costa Rican Tourism Board, the ICT, has a ‘double discourse’, where it makes theoretical 
commitments to sustainable tourism but in practice these ideas are often not backed up with 
concrete actions (confidential interview #10). An industry source suggested that the Costa 
Rican government appears to be applying lots of rules for sustainable tourism but in fact, they 
have made sure that if someone wants to invest $100 million without meeting environmental 
standards then they can (confidential interview #26). Indeed, Horton (2009) argues that the 
promotion of less sustainable models of tourism reflects the embedded nature of neoliberalism 
in the region. A local industry source indicated that this policy focus on tourism expansion and 
foreign investment has been promoted by all governments for the last 30-35 years (confidential 
interview #26).  
 
While there is some evidence of effective economic and social regulation for tourism, this is 
very limited. For example, one industry source indicated that regulation against the sexual 
abuse of children in the tourism industry has been very effective as it is a well-respected 
regulation and the government has put a lot of pressure on this (confidential interview #22). 
This lack of further progressive economic and social legal mechanisms for tourism points to 
the impact of international trade agreements and new public management. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, GATS restricts the use of legal mechanisms for tourism through its 
requirement for equal treatment of all trading partners, the granting of access for foreign 
suppliers to domestic markets and equal treatment for domestic and foreign suppliers (Jules, 
2005). On the other hand, Chapter Six will discuss the ICT’s Certificate for Sustainable 
Tourism, which does demonstrate a considerable commitment to sustainable tourism, and 
suggests that the Costa Rican state is moving towards policy that adopts a more sustainable 
model for tourism. 
 
This problematic and uncoordinated approach in Costa Rica is also indicated to be a result of 
the way in which responsibility for sustainable tourism is fragmented between not only the 
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Institute for Tourism (ICT), but also the Ministry of the Environment (MINAET), the Ministry 
of Health and the Ministry of Education and Training. Industry informants indicated that even 
the different departments within the ICT do not communicate or coordinate their policy, and 
that when approaching the ICT, it is necessary to have a conversation with someone on each 
floor individually, as communication within the building is poor (confidential interviews #10 
and #16). This would explain the inconsistent approach of the government to tourism. It also 
illustrates how different aspects of sustainable development are promoted by parties with 
differing, and sometimes conflicting, interests. In this case, one section of the ICT has 
prioritised economic development over the other aspects of sustainable development while, as 
indicated above, environmental factors have been prioritised by other agencies. While 
significant sustainable tourism policy such as the national park system, ZMT and CST, exists 
on the one hand, on the other, the interests of foreign stakeholders still appear to be prioritised 
over sustainable development at the local level. A key example of this is that, despite expert 
opinion that a new airport in the southwest Osa peninsula should be for regional and national 
flights only in order to bolster nature and cultural tourism, the government still plans to build 
a third international airport in this southern peninsula, which will likely attract ‘enclave’ and 
‘franchise’ style tourism to a very ecologically-fragile area (Honey et al, 2010). 
 
Implications for Theoretical Debates on Governance 
 
The findings in this chapter provide a number of insights for the broader debates outlined in 
Chapter Three around governance and the degree to which there has been a dispersal of power 
from state to non-state actors, and from hierarchical command and control mechanisms to more 
voluntary forms of governance. It was indicated how neoliberal and civil society scholars argue 
for the benefits of decentralising power from the state to local authorities and non-state actors, 
in order to increase economic efficiency and empowerment. Governance scholars, on the other 
hand, take an empirical focus, using evidence from research to point to the varying significance 
of the state in governance. The theoretical model of governance developed for this thesis has 
enabled the testing of these assumptions, as it clearly distinguishes between state and non-state 
mechanisms, and also between those that are more and less choice-constraining.  
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The four highly choice-constraining legal mechanisms focused on in this chapter were all state-
run, and that three of them were found to be moderately effective indicates the continuing 
significance of both the state and highly choice-constraining mechanisms for governance. The 
state’s authority here was crucial in enforcing the regulations and enabling the high-level 
planning of the tourism industry in the north-west peninsula. These findings thus reflect 
arguments in the literature around the state’s significant role in governance by scholars such as 
Bramwell (2011) and Klick (2011). On the other hand, this chapter also identified many of the 
challenges for state-led and highly choice-constraining mechanisms pointed to in the 
theoretical model and the governance literature. These reflected arguments particularly in 
neoliberal and civil society accounts by scholars such as Bauer (1972), Dodds and Butler 
(2010) and Lal (1983), around fragmented, disorganised and under-resourced institutions, and 
corruption. There was, furthermore, evidence of devolution of authority to some extent to local 
municipalities, which are often responsible for implementing environmental policy, reflecting 
perceptions of decentralisation from scholars such as Flinders (2011). The lack of capacity in 
local municipalities in this case, however, challenges the assumptions of the neoliberal and 
civil society literature that devolution can lead to improved outcomes.  
 
Similarly, the assumption in the civil society literature of the fairly superficial impact of state 
mechanisms compared with non-state mechanisms was reflected here, along with the lack of 
capacity to address the behaviour of international actors in global value chains. This challenge 
pointed to the influence of large, and often international, business interests and potentially, 
international trade agreements such as GATS. These findings, therefore, point overall to the 
continuing significance of the state, although also to the ongoing challenges that affect its 
impact. The distinction in the theoretical model between state-run legal mechanisms and state-
run less choice-constraining mechanisms here enabled exploration of the benefits and 
challenges of each in isolation, given their different characteristics and thus, different impacts. 
This enabled a more in-depth understanding of the role of the state in governance and the 
different types of mechanisms that it employs. This approach is in contrast to parts of the 
existing analytical governance literature, which often leads to a focus on either state or non-
state mechanisms as a homogenous group of governance instruments. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the effectiveness of legal mechanisms for sustainable tourism in 
Costa Rica, and how far the theoretical model of governance for sustainable development can 
explain these findings. The model identified a series of hypothetical challenges for legal 
mechanisms, including corruption, inefficiency, short-term policy making, rigid institutional 
structures, a lack of capacity to address the increasingly global nature of many sustainable 
development concerns and restrictions on highly choice-constraining regulations from 
international trade agreements and new public management. This chapter then assessed the 
effectiveness of four of Costa Rica’s key legal mechanisms for tourism: the national park 
system, the ZMT, legislation for the recognition of rights to land for communities, and the 
Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia International Airport investment. 
 
The chapter argued that these legal mechanisms have a moderate impact on sustainable tourism 
in Costa Rica. This impact was argued to be a result of the highly choice-constraining nature 
of legal mechanisms, which has enabled a certain level of compliance, and addressed some of 
the worst cases of unsustainable tourism. On the other hand, it was indicated how many of the 
obstacles to legal mechanisms identified in the theoretical model restricted their further impact. 
The Papagayo project has only promoted further the interests of international business interests, 
as opposed to the local interests integral to sustainable tourism. Corruption reduced the 
effectiveness of the ZMT, while inefficiency and short-term policy making were a major 
obstacle for the effectiveness of the national park system. Overall, therefore, this case suggests 
that the theoretical model is fairly accurate in its expectations of the challenges to legal 
mechanisms for sustainable development. This chapter concluded by exploring the theoretical 
insights pointed to by these findings. The following two chapters will explore the effectiveness 
of bargaining and persuasive mechanisms for sustainable tourism in Costa Rica in turn. 
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Chapter Six 
Bargaining Mechanisms for Sustainable 
Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
 
 
This thesis is exploring the effectiveness of different mechanisms of governance at promoting 
sustainable development, using the case study of tourism in Costa Rica. The first part of the 
thesis developed a theoretical model, which defined sustainable development as consisting of 
economic development, social equity and environmental protection, and identified three types 
of governance mechanisms - legal, bargaining and persuasive - that potentially promote these. 
The rest of the thesis now seeks to explore how far these governance mechanisms are effective 
at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Chapter Four indicated how, as a small 
developing state, Costa Rica has become dependent on tourism due to limited development 
options, and faces potentially significant challenges from the industry, such as limited local 
employment opportunities and environmental damage. The previous chapter indicated that the 
highly choice-constraining nature of legal mechanisms enables them to be moderately effective 
at promoting sustainable tourism, but argued that their further effectiveness is limited by state 
inefficiencies, corruption, a focus in some cases on a mass tourism model, and the way in which 
they do not address the activities of international stakeholders in the industry. This chapter will 
explore the impact of the second type of governance mechanism identified in the theoretical 
model - moderately choice-constraining bargaining mechanisms.  
 
As moderately choice-constraining mechanisms, bargaining modes of governance have some 
levers with which to encourage compliance, but fewer than legal mechanisms. These levers are 
‘carrots’, or incentives, offered to governed actors on the grounds that they will use more 
sustainable practices. The resource being ‘bargained’ can be either a positive incentive or a 
disincentive. With positive incentives, a material resource, such as funds, equipment or 
recognition through the use of a mark, is given to an individual or organisation in order to 
improve their economic conditions or reduce the costs and risks of a more sustainable action. 
On the other hand, a disincentive deprives an actor of a material resource, such as through 
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taxation of funds, in order to increase the costs and risks of their taking an unsustainable action 
(Vedung, 1998). ‘Governed’ actors will not be fined or imprisoned as a result of failure to 
comply with these standards, as bargaining mechanisms do not have this enforcement power, 
which potentially limits their impact (Cashore, 2002). Instead, bargaining mechanisms rely on 
the incentives above to attract compliance more voluntarily, often in combination with 
persuasive arguments that actions are in the self-interest of governed actors, the ‘right thing to 
do’ or understandable or accepted practices (Cashore, 2002). The impact of these persuasive 
methods will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
The theoretical model suggests that there is potentially considerable scope for bargaining 
mechanisms to be employed as a result of restrictions on the use of legal mechanisms by 
WTO/GATT regulations and trends in internal policymaking towards new public management. 
Bargaining mechanisms are also potentially better placed than legal mechanisms to address 
sustainable development at the international level, as they are not limited by a national 
enforcement capacity. As moderately choice-constraining mechanisms, however, bargaining 
mechanisms are potentially limited in the number of actors that comply with their standards as 
they have fewer levers with which to encourage compliance than legal mechanisms. Where 
bargaining mechanisms offer a positive incentive, they are collaborative mechanisms, whereas 
where they offer a disincentive, they often take a more confrontational role.  
 
The model suggests that collaborative bargaining mechanisms are more likely to address 
sustainable development in greater depth, due to their close, and often prolonged, relationship 
with individual actors, while confrontational bargaining mechanisms are more likely to target 
the worst offenders, with the aim of rapid behaviour change, although with a shorter-term, and 
therefore, shallower, impact. The model indicated that the impact of bargaining mechanisms 
may also be restricted by the way in which they have to compete with each other for compliance 
from actors, for example, if several certification systems are targeting the same market. Where 
bargaining mechanisms are run by states, their authority can potentially increase compliance 
rates, but they are then also potentially limited by obstacles such as inefficiency and corruption. 
The model suggests that non-state bargaining mechanisms may have less authority, but 
considerable expertise around sustainable development, due to their often extensive experience 
of working closely with local actors and thus, knowledge of ‘what works’. This chapter will 
outline the three main bargaining mechanisms for sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, and 
explore the effectiveness of these, along with the extent to which the expectations of the 
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theoretical model are realised in these cases. It will then reflect on the theoretical implications 
of these findings. 
 
Bargaining Mechanisms for Sustainable Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
In Costa Rica, the main bargaining mechanisms for tourism are certification systems, which 
offer businesses recognition, marketing and the use of a logo in exchange for their commitment 
to certain sustainable standards. These programmes operate on the assumption that tourists will 
use them to inform their purchasing decisions, encouraging businesses to sign up in order to be 
more attractive to consumers (Poncibò, 2007). Four key stages of certification can be identified 
(see Figure 13), drawn from a more extensive framework by Toth (2002). The first stage 
involves the design of economic, social and environmental standards, which actors have to 
fulfil in order to achieve certification. The second stage is the application by actors for 
certification. The third stage is the assessment of the level of sustainability of businesses, where 
documentation is provided in order to demonstrate that practices conform to the standards. The 
fourth stage is the awarding and publication of results, in order to market the certification 
system and its certified businesses. Each of these stages, if problematic, can have significant 
implications for the impact of a certification system. 
 
Figure 13: The Four Stages of Certification (drawn from Toth, 2002) 
1. Design of standards 
2. Application of actors for certification 
3. Assessment of level of sustainability of actors 
4. Awarding and publication of results 
 
Tourism certification has become more common globally as a result of growing international 
scepticism from the media, consumers, civil society and businesses over the degree of 
commitment within the tourism industry to sustainable values. The nature-based tourism that 
attracted biologists to Costa Rica in the 1980s was inherently sensitive to its impact on host 
destinations, but gave way to mass tourism in the 1990s, which attracted a much larger number 
of tourists, who knew very little about environmental issues and were typically unaware of 
their impact (Bien, 2002). As a result of increasing environmental degradation, from the mid-
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1990s, the international media began to question the degree to which Costa Rica was actually 
an ‘eco’ destination. As a result of a combination of an international political climate where 
state intervention in economic, social and environmental issues had been discouraged, as 
discussed above, and yet, concerns around these very issues had heightened, certification 
became an attractive option for many states, international governmental organisations, non-
governmental organisations, businesses and consumers. The rapidly increasing development 
of, and participation in, certification systems, coupled with increasing recognition of 
certification by public authorities and policy makers, has led certification to become 
increasingly professionalised and well-established as an important component of public policy 
arrangements in many countries (Marx, 2010).  
 
At first there were many competing tourism certification schemes in Costa Rica, including the 
Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST), the Rainforest Alliance Verification, the Ecological 
Blue Flag programme (PBAE, but hereafter referred to for ease as the Blue Flag programme), 
the Green Deal and ISO 9000. The main certification systems today, however, are the CST, 
Rainforest Alliance Verification and the Blue Flag programme, shown in Figure 14. The CST 
was founded in 1995 and is run by the Costa Rican Tourism Board (ICT), a government agency. 
It is the prominent, and most effective, certification system in Costa Rica for tourism, the 
reasons for which will be discussed below. The scheme certifies accommodation, tour 
providers, vehicle hire companies and parks, using a system of five ‘leaves’, which reflects the 
five ‘star’ quality certification for hotels. Businesses with the highest level of sustainability are 
awarded five leaves and the rest are awarded four, three, two, one or zero leaves, depending on 
their level of sustainable practices.  
 
Figure 14: Certification Systems for Sustainable Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
Certification System State or Non-State Run 
Certificate for Sustainable Tourism (CST) State 
Rainforest Alliance Verification Non-state 
Ecological Blue Flag Scheme State 
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The Rainforest Alliance’s Verification programme was created alongside the organisation’s 
technical assistance programme, as a result of demand from companies that had received 
technical assistance, and wanted formal recognition of their work with the Rainforest Alliance. 
To achieve Verification, a business must meet at least 50 per cent of the Rainforest Alliance’s 
best management practices; no other distinction is made between different levels of 
sustainability. The Blue Flag Programme started in 1996 and replicated the Blue Flag 
programme in Europe, but has been further developed in order to certify not just beaches, but 
seven other entities as well, such as educational institutions, communities and protected natural 
areas. The programme is run jointly by a number of government institutions, including the ICT, 
MINAET and the Institute of Aqueducts and Drains (AyA). To certify a beach, representatives 
from local businesses and other organisations must form committees in order to organise action 
and responsibilities for protecting the coastal area.  
 
As collaborative bargaining mechanisms, the theoretical model would suggest that these 
certification systems have the potential to address sustainable development in considerable 
depth. On the other hand, the number of actors that they are able to engage with may be limited 
by their moderately choice-constraining nature, as the number of incentives that they have to 
offer actors in exchange for compliance is limited. The state-run CST and Blue Flag 
programmes potentially face obstacles such as corruption, inefficiencies, short-term policy-
making and rigid institutional structures. The model suggests that the non-state Rainforest 
Alliance Verification may be able to avoid these obstacles and, in addition, potentially has 
significant expertise, which may enhance its impact. The model also indicates that all three 
certification systems may be able to address sustainable development at the global level, as 
they are not limited by national enforcement powers, as is the case for legal mechanisms. The 
existence of three certification systems for tourism within one country, however, may lead 
them to compete for compliant businesses and thus, reduce their individual levels of 
compliance and, therefore, their impact. 
 
This section will argue that the CST is moderately effective at promoting sustainable tourism, 
and slightly more effective than the national park system and ZMT legal mechanisms discussed 
in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the Rainforest Alliance Verification and Blue Flag 
programme will be argued to be limited in effectiveness. Four key factors will be indicated to 
attribute for the CST’s moderate level of impact, which are partly identified in the theoretical 
model. Firstly, as identified in the theoretical model, the moderately choice-constraining 
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capacity of the CST enables it to attract compliance from a moderate number of tourism 
businesses, while its collaborative nature enables it to work with individual businesses in 
relatively extensive depth. The moderately choice-constraining nature of the CST does, 
however, limit its further effectiveness, as its limited levers restrict the number of businesses it 
reaches, along with its ability to enforce compliance from some of the most resource-intensive 
businesses. The second success factor for the CST is the heightened receptiveness towards 
sustainable development pointed to by some local sources, which is indicated to have increased 
compliance rates with the CST, encouraging actors to comply for moral reasons, and in order 
to compete in the industry. 
 
The third factor argued to contribute to the CST’s moderate effectiveness is the state’s authority 
and bureaucratic competence, which position the CST as the frontrunner certification system 
in Costa Rica and ensure that it is run fairly efficiently. The Rainforest Alliance Verification is 
argued to be limited in impact primarily as a result of its lack of ability to compete with the 
authority of the CST. The theoretical model identified the potential impact of state authority, 
but did not foresee the technical capacity of the state in this case. The state-run Blue Flag 
programme does not experience the same level of impact as the CST, as the state promotes the 
CST over the Blue Flag, and the latter is also a more generic programme, less relevant as it 
focuses solely on environmental indicators, and therefore less effective, at tackling tourism.  
 
The final success factor for the CST is the expertise brought to the programme through 
collaboration with non-state organisations, both in consultation around its design and in the 
provision of technical assistance for businesses to apply. The cooperation here between state 
and non-state actors in one governance mechanism is not captured in the theoretical model. 
One limitation of all three certification systems, furthermore, is that despite the indications of 
the theoretical model, none of these three certification systems adequately govern the actions 
of international stakeholders. These arguments will be explored in more depth through a 
discussion of the effectiveness of these certification systems at each of the four stages identified 
above: design of standards, application, assessment and awarding and publication of results.  
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Design of Standards 
 
Standards are technical specifications or other precise criteria for use as rules and guidelines 
against which to assess a set of practices (Poncibò, 2007). They inform service providers of 
what needs to be done, inform consumers of what has been done, and enable comparison of 
practices used across products (Schepel, 2005). The CST has over 100 standards, arranged into 
four categories: physical-biological parameters; infrastructure and services (for 
accommodation providers) or service management (for tour agencies); external client and 
socio-economic environment. Across these, economic indicators include the training of 
employees and local people in hospitality, permanent relationships with local or regional 
microbusinesses, and the promotion of products made in the local area. Social indicators 
include measures against child abuse, the enabling of access to the business for disabled people 
and the inclusion of sociocultural aspects in tours. Environmental indicators include, for 
example, the use of biodegradable soaps and environmentally-friendly cleaning fluids and the 
installation of native plants in hotel gardens. 
 
While the CST and Rainforest Alliance’s standards address a range of indicators across all 
three aspects of sustainable development, the Blue Flag programme’s standards only address 
environmental aspects of sustainability. As a result, the impact of the Blue Flag programme on 
sustainable tourism is limited. A local industry insider suggested that as the Blue Flag 
programme does not have any economic or social standards, it is not a very strong certification 
and does not indicate, for example, whether businesses are exploiting their employees 
(confidential interview #17). Here, the environmental aspects of sustainable development are 
pursued over the economic and social. This shows again, as indicated in Chapter Five, how the 
various interests potentially involved in sustainable development prioritise different aspects of 
it over others. In this case, the Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (AyA – 
Costa Rican Institute for Aqueducts and Sewerage), which is the primary agency responsible 
for the Blue Flag programme, albeit supported by other agencies, has focused on its interest in 
environmental aspects of sustainable development. The way in which responsibility for 
sustainable development is fragmented between multiple, and uncoordinated, government 
departments, indicated in the previous chapter on legal mechanisms is pointed to as the origin 
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of this limited scope (confidential interviews #10 and #16). As the Blue Flag programme only 
has limited relevance to sustainable tourism, therefore, it will just be touched upon in this 
chapter. 
 
There is only limited data on the quality and impact of the Rainforest Alliance Verification 
standards, as relatively few businesses have applied for the programme. One informant 
suggested that the Rainforest Alliance Verification programme had drawn their attention, in 
particular, to how hiring processes could be made more sustainable, and encouraged them to 
document all of their sustainability practices to ensure continuity through staff changes, which 
they had not considered doing before (confidential interview #11). Evidence around the quality 
of the Blue Flag’s standards is mixed. One industry source stated that the Blue Flag’s 
environmental standards are very useful; they used the standards for climate change in order to 
structure their own work (confidential interview #7). On the other hand, another industry source 
said that the standards are superficial and could be more profound, but that it is a good first 
step (confidential interview #13). 
 
Despite the potential lack of expertise of state-run bargaining mechanisms identified in the 
theoretical model, there is significant evidence that the CST’s standards are effective. To start, 
they have been approved by the tourism ministries in every country in Central America, and in 
Mexico (Cayuga, 2013). As indicated above, they also address all three aspects of sustainable 
development concurrently, where the Blue Flag scheme, and the legal mechanisms discussed 
in Chapter Five, have not. As a result, the three-legged stool described by Dawe and Ryan 
(2003) to represent sustainable development is stable, and thus, there is the potential for 
sustainable development to take place here.  
 
Local industry sources indicated, furthermore, that the CST’s standards require tourism 
businesses to have very structured, and therefore, thorough operations, such as documented 
sustainability practices, along with significant practical changes, from community impacts to 
the types of soaps and bedsheets used (confidential interviews #10 and #17). An ICT report 
undertaken in 2011 (document #1) indicates how levels of sustainability of business practices 
have improved since CST certification, suggesting again that the standards are relatively 
effective. 58 per cent of hotels in their sample indicated that their water usage had decreased, 
while 60 per cent of hotels had bought more food locally. Among tour operators, 75 per cent 
indicated that their electricity consumption had decreased, 62 per cent indicated that their 
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recycling had increased and 82 per cent of tour operators said that their paper use had 
decreased. This report was, however, conducted by the ICT itself through self-questionnaires, 
which raises potential concerns about the extent of its reliability. Furthermore, these figures do 
not indicate how far the sustainability of CST certified hotels and tour operators has increased 
compared to all hotels and tour operators in Costa Rica, which also decreases their usefulness. 
 
 The robustness of the CST’s standards is at least partly a result of consultation by the state 
with non-state actors. One industry source indicated that non-state organisations provide 
essential ‘know how’ for sustainable tourism; the government has some knowledge but not 
enough, so it relies upon NGOs (confidential interview #26). The National Commission for 
Accreditation, the accreditation agency for the CST, draws on expertise from a variety of 
sources, including the ICT, the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAET), major 
educational institutions, the National Tourism Chamber (CANATUR) and international 
conservation groups (Vivanco, 2013). Furthermore, tourism businesses provide advice to the 
CST on how to improve their standards. Thus, the state-run CST is able to enhance its expertise 
around sustainable development through consultation with non-state actors. This analysis 
suggests that the distribution of expertise between state and non-state actors is less 
straightforward than the strict dichotomy identified in Chapter Three. This expertise is 
indicated to be a contextual success factor for Costa Rica. While the Rainforest Alliance, a key 
provider of technical assistance for the CST, also operates in other developing states, one 
informant indicated that the level of knowledge around sustainable development is 
considerably higher in Costa Rica than other developing states in Central America, as more 
research has been conducted in Costa Rica, resulting in knowledge gaps in other states 
(confidential interview #20). 
 
There are, however, two particular concerns with the CST’s standards that reduce its ability to 
promote sustainable tourism further. Firstly, despite the potential for bargaining mechanisms 
to address sustainability in considerable depth, Vivanco (2013) argues that the CST’s standards 
address the simplest aspects of sustainability, such as high efficiency light bulbs, but do not 
address some of the deeper requirements of sustainability, such as the impacts of the 
construction process in building a hotel. An industry source argued that the CST does not 
promote real change; it is only a band aid to cover the problems as, for example, businesses 
have to show that they are planting trees, not that they are not cutting them down in the first 
place (confidential interview #17). One industry source stated that the CST is currently revising 
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their standards and that it was hoped that the standards would go deeper, beyond just using 
organic products and less electricity (confidential interview #17). On the other hand, however, 
the collaborative nature of the CST enables it to work closely, and therefore in some depth, 
with businesses in order to achieve certification, which to some extent counteracts the 
simplistic nature of the standards. This will be discussed further below in the section on 
assessment. 
 
The second concern is that the CST’s standards in cases do not represent the diversity of 
approaches to sustainable tourism and, as such, do not adequately reflect the breadth of 
sustainable development. For example, one of the CST’s standards requires contribution to a 
social responsibility project based in the local area. One certified hotel said that their extensive 
social programme, which works with around 30 pregnant women who have been victims of 
sexual abuse in Alajuela, did not count because it was around ten miles from the hotel rather 
than in the close locality (confidential interview #3). Furthermore, an industry source indicated 
that the CST’s standards also do not distinguish between where a business makes a small 
contribution to a social project once per year as opposed to running an established project all 
year round (confidential interview #7).  
 
Furthermore, the CST’s standards are less relevant to smaller businesses. For example, an 
industry source indicated that the CST’s criteria for a full system of smoke alarms, sprinklers 
and big fluorescent ‘emergency exit’ signs is not fitting for a very rural hotel with only six 
bedrooms. They argued that small hotels should not lose points for this, and suggested that it 
would be more appropriate to allow, for example, a flexible evacuation plan to fit the individual 
characteristics of each hotel (confidential interview #7). Furthermore, the CST measures water 
and energy conservation through the existence of mitigation devices rather than absolute 
consumption, such as litres of water used per guest per night (Bien, 2002). As a result, a hotel 
with a large water consumption, due to facilities such as swimming pools and golf courses, but 
which has a mitigation device, will score more highly than a hotel without these facilities but 
which uses much less water or energy overall. The mitigation equipment is very expensive and, 
therefore, can prevent smaller businesses from achieving higher levels of certification. As a 
result, one industry informant indicated that certification benefits larger hotels more than those 
of a smaller size, as it was perceived that foreign-owned hotels in Costa Rica often have five 
leaves with the CST certification, whereas local organic tourism businesses often only have 
three leaves (confidential interview #17). This challenges the implication of our theoretical 
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model that bargaining mechanisms may not reach the worst offenders of sustainable 
development, as larger businesses are almost always more resource-intensive than smaller 
enterprises. 
 
A concern here is that the CST may be legitimising the development of large hotels and resorts, 
at the expense of smaller hotels which have traditionally practised a fairly high level of 
sustainability without certification, and therefore, may function ‘as nothing more than [a] 
marketing gimmick for large-scale enterprises of the growing tourism industry’ (Sasidharan et 
al, 2002: 172). One industry source stated that she does not believe that big hotels with 500 
rooms have the potential to be sustainable due to their environmental impacts, yet they are able 
to apply to the CST, which to some extent legitimises their large size and disproportionately 
negative impacts on sustainability (confidential interview #17). Another industry source made 
the point that the fundamental premise of ecotourism is flawed: it does not matter how small 
an impact each tourist has; when there are 600,000 tourists per year, as is the case in some of 
the national parks in Costa Rica, there are going to be negative impacts on the local 
environment (confidential interview #4). While this may be the case to some extent, in terms 
of the aim of increasing the overall sustainability of the tourism industry in Costa Rica, the 
CST’s standards address some of the actors with the potential for the highest levels of 
unsustainable practices, namely, the larger hotels and resorts, due to their size and, thus, 
inherently larger environmental footprint. Therefore, the applicability of the CST’s standards 
to large tourism businesses is a valid expression of sustainable development. Furthermore, it 
will later be indicated how smaller tourism businesses receive support from the Rainforest 
Alliance in order to participate in the CST and that, therefore, the risk that the CST is less 
relevant to them is, to some extent, mitigated.  
 
The CST has, however, recently improved its standards and invites feedback from certified 
businesses in order to continue developing them. An industry source reported that the CST 
used to penalise businesses for standards that were not applicable to them, but has since adapted 
its standards to increase their applicability. In one case, a standard which dictated that hotels 
should have gardens with native plants, and subsequently penalised hotels without a garden, 
was adapted to avoid disadvantaging hotels to which this standard did not apply (confidential 
interview #7). Another industry source said that they are working with the CST to help them 
understand the impact of their standards on smaller businesses, and that as a result, the 
standards are becoming more flexible and sensitive to these variations (confidential interview 
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#7). Thus, overall, these issues likely reflect to some extent the challenge of representing and 
quantifying the diverse characteristics of sustainable development, and making them 
universally relevant to an industry with a very varied range of stakeholders. Given these 
challenges, it is unsurprising that the CST’s standards are not universally endorsed. 
 
A final concern with the standards of all three of these certification schemes is that they are not 
relevant to the international branding, airline or tour package actors in the tourism industry. 
The theoretical model indicated that non-state actors are more likely to address sustainable 
development at the global level, but the findings here suggest that neither state nor non-state 
bargaining mechanisms are addressing international stakeholders. This is problematic as, for 
example, significant proportions of tourists purchase their holidays through tour package 
agencies: a study in the mass tourism region of Nicoya found that 55 per cent of respondents 
had bought a tour package (Almeyda et al, 2010). Raventos (2006) reports that in 2000, 
Travelocity alone accounted for 35 per cent of online gross bookings. The exact reasons for 
this are unclear; interviewees rarely mentioned the significance of international actors in the 
tourism industry. With regard to the CST and Blue Flag programmes, the discouragement of 
regulation of transnational corporations, inherent in ideology and policy, potentially prevents 
an international scope for the state. Costa Rica’s small size, and thus, potentially restricted 
international influence and dependency on foreign investment and tourists, may also contribute 
to this lack of international scope. The extent to which these certification systems have effective 
application processes will now be explored.  
 
Application of actors for certification 
 
The application process of a certification system must be accessible and attractive in order to 
encourage a significant number of compliant actors and to accurately measure the sustainability 
of individual actors. The findings indicate that a relatively significant proportion of tourism 
businesses comply with the CST in Costa Rica. An industry source indicated that the number 
of CST certified businesses has increased significantly recently: from only 50 in 2009 to 265 
in the summer of 2012 (confidential interview #19). The ICT used to certify nine extra 
businesses per year from 2002-2009, but from 2009 they were certifying an extra nine 
businesses per month (confidential interview #19). Data suggests that 8.7 per cent of hotels 
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(219 out of 2,515 hotels) and 20 per cent of travel agencies (70 out of 358 travel agencies) in 
Costa Rica are certified by the CST (figures drawn from Costa Rica Tourism Board, 2013 and 
CST website, 2014). This is higher than the figures of five per cent of the market and 50 
businesses that critics argue is the average or highest compliance rate (Bendell and Font, 2004; 
Font, 2007), and therefore, suggests that the CST’s application process is fairly effective at 
encouraging compliance. These findings suggest that, despite its moderately choice-
constraining capacity, the CST addresses a larger proportion of tourism businesses than the 
theoretical model would suggest. Furthermore, as with the standards above, the state-run nature 
of the CST has not impeded its ability to attract compliance. 
 
A lower proportion of tourism actors comply with the standards of the Rainforest Alliance 
Verification and Blue Flag programme. An industry source indicated that between 60 and 70 
tourism businesses in Costa Rica are certified by the Rainforest Alliance Verification 
(confidential interview #14). This accounts for around two and a half per cent of hotel and 
travel agency businesses in Costa Rica (figures drawn from Costa Rica Tourism Department, 
2013). There is no data on the range of applicants to the Rainforest Alliance Verification 
scheme. On the other hand, the Blue Flag programme has 112 certified beaches, around a third 
of overall beaches in Costa Rica (confidential interview #14; AnywhereCostaRica website, 
2014). A local industry source indicated, furthermore, that every year more beaches are being 
certified (confidential interview #23).  
 
There is some evidence that the focus of the Blue Flag programme on actors such as 
communities and education institutions is very effective. One industry informant suggested that 
the Blue Flag programme was strong because it encouraged communities to take responsibility 
for sustainability, and communities are powerful as they often know who is causing the 
damage. They, therefore, often have the knowledge and power to increase sustainability 
(confidential interview #23). The same informant indicated that the Blue Flag award for 
educative centres is important because, if a child goes to a school that is certified by the Blue 
Flag, then they already have sustainability in their minds, and that this is key (confidential 
interview #23). Another industry source suggested that the Blue Flag programme is creating a 
shift in consciousness, such as through children in education centres, who are going to be the 
businessmen and women of the future (confidential interview #8). An additional source 
indicated that the Blue Flag programme has a significant impact with the local population, 
particularly with reaching school children and also adults who had previously missed out on 
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sustainability education, for example, if a child criticises an adult for wasting water 
(confidential interview #10). Therefore, the Blue Flag programme is reaching a set of niche 
actors in the tourism industry, particularly the communities around beaches and children in 
schools, but this has the potential to have significance. The limited remit of the Blue Flag 
programme to environmental factors indicated above, however, significantly restricts its 
overall impact, despite the relatively significant proportion of beaches certified and impacts on 
potential future business and political leaders. 
 
Findings suggest that the CST’s relatively high compliance rate is facilitated by three factors: 
two of which are intrinsic to this model of governance, and one is derived from potentially 
more contextual factors. Firstly, that the CST is state-run has made it difficult for some tourism 
businesses to avoid certification, and has increased resources in order to make CST certification 
a cheaper option. An industry source indicated how, for tourism businesses to operate legally 
in Costa Rica, they have to have one of two papers; either a declaration from the ICT that they 
can operate or the CST (confidential interview #17). Another informant indicated that they 
knew some businesses which had tried to avoid applying for the CST but in the end they 
realised that it was impossible (confidential interview #17). Therefore, the CST is more 
effective than the Rainforest Alliance Verification and Blue Flag schemes, as the state’s 
authority provides it with powerful ‘levers’ through which to encourage businesses to apply 
for the programme. 
 
Furthermore, an industry source indicated that the ICT refused to allow the Rainforest Alliance 
to label its scheme ‘certification’. It had to be called ‘verification’ instead, in order to avoid 
competition with the CST (confidential interview #17). Thus, the competition between 
bargaining mechanisms identified in the theoretical model as a potential problem has reduced 
the significance of the Rainforest Alliance Verification programme. It does not, however, 
reduce the impact of the CST, as the state’s authority has established it as the dominant 
certification system for tourism in Costa Rica. Furthermore, as indicated by an industry source, 
CST certification is cheaper than that from the Rainforest Alliance because the application 
process is free; the only cost for businesses is in the implementation of the sustainable practices, 
whereas the Rainforest Alliance requires payment for the application process (confidential 
interview #7). The Rainforest Alliance Verification used to be free of charge for businesses to 
apply as they had World Bank funding. Now, however, this has been cut, leading Verification 
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to cost around $1,300, considered quite an expense by some businesses (confidential interview 
#17).  
 
The second factor behind the relatively high compliance rate with the CST is the support for 
the programme from the Rainforest Alliance and other consultants through the provision of 
technical assistance to businesses in order to improve their sustainability. A local industry 
informant indicated that the support provided by these agencies for smaller businesses wanting 
to apply for certification is absolutely vital; a certification system without this support might 
not be successful, as few businesses would apply (confidential interview #14). The Rainforest 
Alliance, for example, works with around 24 per cent of CST certified hotels and 40 per cent 
of CST certified tour operators (confidential internal document #2). Figures suggest that, from 
2005-2010, only one per cent of CST certified hotels that worked with the Rainforest Alliance 
saw a reduction in their certification level, compared with five per cent that had not worked 
with the Rainforest Alliance, and only one per cent of CST certified hotels that worked with 
the Rainforest Alliance lost their certification completely, compared with seven per cent of 
those that had not worked with the Rainforest Alliance (confidential internal document #2). 
That these factors are significant levers for the CST is surprising, given that it is assumed in 
much of the certification literature that pressure from consumers is the key driving force for 
compliance (see, for example, Poncibò, 2007). Again, the theoretical model does not anticipate 
that state-run mechanisms might be enhanced by the expertise of non-state actors.  
 
Thirdly, the findings suggest that the relatively high compliance rate of the CST is in part a 
result of a heightened receptiveness towards sustainable development, which a number of local 
industry sources suggested exists in Costa Rica (confidential interviews #13, #19 and #25). A 
local informant suggested that there are small businesses in Costa Rica both within and outside 
the tourism industry that have practiced sustainability as part of their ‘core’ business from their 
beginning, and not because the market demanded it of them; it is part of their ‘nucleus’ 
(confidential interview #13). Two separate industry sources indicated that Costa Rica is a very 
‘fertile ground’ in which to try out new ideas around sustainability, as it is believed that there 
is an understanding of sustainability and a heightened receptiveness towards it (confidential 
interviews #14 and #19). 
 
This heightened receptiveness is also indicated by the growing requirement within the tourism 
industry for certification. A local industry informant was that it is almost a requisite for tourism 
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businesses to have the CST certification as while it is not a legal requirement, it is an informal 
requirement in order to compete in the industry as clients who are environmentally conscious 
will look for an agency with the certification (confidential interview #18). Another source 
indicated that there are some tourism companies that will only work with certified businesses, 
and that he expected that this would become more common as more and more industry 
representatives are starting to require certification from their industry partners (confidential 
interview #24). Another informant from a hotel indicated that they had only applied for the 
CST certification in order to work with a management company that required it (confidential 
interview #3).  
 
While the intangible nature of this heightened awareness around sustainability makes it 
difficult to observe or measure, other data sources also indicate an enhanced interest in the 
environment in Costa Rica compared with other developing states in the region. Data from the 
Latinobarómetro (2011), for example, found that 83 per cent of Costa Ricans interviewed 
believe that priority should be given to the environment rather than economic development, as 
opposed to 75 per cent of Nicaraguans and 63 per cent of Panama citizens. Similarly, when 
comparing levels of awareness around the environment in Costa Rica with more developed 
states, a heightened awareness is still visible in Costa Rica. Vignola et al (2013), for example, 
found that over 85 per cent of respondents in Costa Rica were concerned or very concerned 
about climate change, compared with 65 per cent of US citizens that were fairly concerned or 
very concerned about climate change by Nisbet and Myers (2007), albeit in a study conducted 
four years earlier. In Costa Rica, this awareness takes various forms, including long-standing 
debates around issues such as forest reserves and frequent discussion of environmental 
education on the television and radio and in the newspapers (Blum, 2008). 
 
While there is evidence that this heightened awareness has increased across Costa Rica’s 
population as a whole, action as a result of this heightened awareness is only seen significantly 
from tourism professionals and businesses. There is only limited evidence that the public uses 
more sustainable practices, with one interviewee explaining that while some sections of the 
public make the effort to recycle, there are still others that throw rubbish into the rivers 
(confidential interview #3). The lack of action by the public will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Seven. On the other hand, one interviewee indicated that tourist businesses and 
organisations do a lot of work for sustainable development, while the rest of the country does 
not (confidential interview #19).  
 123 
 
 
This heightened receptiveness is likely derived from Costa Rica’s significant variation in 
biodiversity, which has facilitated an affinity between people and nature. Costa Rica comprises 
only 0.03 per cent of the world’s land mass and yet, four per cent of the world’s biodiversity 
and a wealth of rainforests, mountains, volcanoes, beaches and waterfalls exist within its 
borders (INBio, 2001: 21). This unique range of biodiversity is a result of Costa Rica’s varied 
microclimates and its status as a biological corridor between North and South America, which 
has caused a significant variety of flora and fauna to flourish. The existence of this range of 
biodiversity has, in turn, facilitated a significant amount of interest and research in Costa Rica, 
which has generated substantial knowledge about its various species. One local source 
indicated that the extent of research that has taken place in Costa Rica hasn’t been mirrored 
elsewhere and that as a result, people come to Costa Rica to buy a book to find out the types of 
butterflies that might exist in Panama (confidential interview #20).  
 
Findings from local sources indicate, furthermore, that this heightened receptiveness is not 
generated solely in order to preserve the potential for future income and benefits from Costa 
Rica’s biodiversity, but from its intrinsic value in itself. It was indicated how it is seen as a 
‘personal honour’ in Costa Rica to run a sustainable business, and how some businesses see 
sustainability as a core requirement, rather than a market demand (confidential interview #25 
and #13). A representative from a hotel with five leaves said that they saw sustainability to be 
their responsibility, and one that would be increasingly important into the future (confidential 
interview #24).  
 
On the other hand, as less than ten per cent of tourism hotels are certified by the CST, the 
percentage of the target market reached is still limited. Examining the range of CST certified 
businesses provides some insight into the reasons behind this. 219 hotels comply with the CST, 
71 travel agencies, five adventure parks and six vehicle hire companies (CST website, 2014). 
As indicated above in the discussion around standards, figures suggest that larger hotels are 
more likely to apply for the CST than smaller hotels. While the average number of rooms in a 
hotel in Costa Rica is 19, the average number of rooms in a CST certified hotel in June 2014 
is 54 (figures adapted from Costa Rica Tourism Board, 2013; and CST website, 2014). 
Furthermore, while around 75 per cent of hotels overall in Costa Rica have less than 20 rooms, 
only 39 per cent of CST certified hotels have under 20 rooms (Rivera, 2002; figures adapted 
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from CST website, 2014). Therefore, the evidence suggests that many smaller businesses are 
not applying for the CST. 
 
The causes of this are largely attributable to the fact that, despite the lower cost of the CST 
compared to Rainforest Alliance Verification, the perceived and real costs of certification deter 
smaller businesses from applying. Some businesses believe that the CST charges a lot for 
businesses to apply, despite the fact that the CST application process is free of charge 
(confidential interview #19). While CST application is free, the process of preparing a business 
for certification is costly, as it requires a considerable amount of evidence gathering, and many 
businesses need to employ a person working full-time on this or hire a consultant to guide them 
through the process (confidential interview #17). An industry informant indicated that 
businesses have to change everything they are doing, including bed sheets, manuals, their 
impact on the community, and the creation of an operations or emergency manual, which many 
small businesses would not normally already have (confidential interview #17). The same 
informant indicated that a small business with only 15 or so members of staff would not be 
able to afford this. Vivanco (2013) estimates that it would cost between several thousand and 
tens of thousands of dollars for a medium-sized eco-lodge to prepare for the formal audit. 
Indeed, a representative from the ICT said that there are many tourism businesses in Costa Rica 
that use sustainable practices but do not seek certification because the process of gathering 
evidence is too time-consuming (confidential interview #19). Thus, smaller businesses can be 
deterred from applying for these cost-related reasons. Again, this finding challenges the 
assumptions of the theoretical model, which suggests that more prolific offenders against 
sustainable development, in this case larger businesses, are less likely to comply with 
collaborative bargaining mechanisms. Here, the increased resources of larger businesses better 
equip them to apply for certification. 
 
There is mixed evidence as to whether the CST is attracting compliance from foreign-run 
tourism businesses. These are potentially less sustainable than local-run businesses as, as 
indicated in Chapter Four, foreign-run businesses are often integrated into all-inclusive 
‘enclave’ tourism value chains, where profits are concentrated at the international level, while 
environmental impacts are felt most strongly at the local level, as foreign-run businesses are 
typically larger in size and hence more resource-intensive. On the one hand, a significant 
proportion of hotels in the regions most penetrated by mass tourism have been certified. 
Guanacaste and the Central Valley have the second and third highest proportion of CST 
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certified hotels, seven per cent and 14.6 per cent, compared with 19 per cent for Llanuras del 
Norte (including Alajuela and Heredia), six per cent in Puntarenas and three per cent in Limon 
(figures adapted from Costa Rica Tourism Department, 2013 and CST website, 2014). This is 
shown in Figure 15. This suggests that foreign tourism businesses are applying for certification 
and indicates that the CST is at least to some extent addressing foreign tourism businesses in 
the franchise and enclave tourism value chains. On the other hand, data suggests that overall 
more local businesses apply for certification than foreign, as a local industry source indicated 
that 80 per cent of CST certified businesses are local-run, as opposed to 37 per cent of tourism 
businesses overall in Costa Rica (confidential interview #19; UNEP, 2014). 
 
Figure 15 (figures adapted from CST website, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry sources suggested that the perceived lack of benefits from the CST is another key 
factor preventing more businesses from applying to the CST. While incentives are offered, 
including discounts for stands at trade fairs (through which an industry representative indicated 
that a certified business can save approximately $10,000-$12,000 per year) and promotion 
through the ICT and Rainforest Alliance’s websites and promotional materials, these are often 
not known about or recognised (confidential interview #24 and #17). One industry informant 
indicated, for example, that they saw few benefits from applying for CST certification 
(confidential interview #3). Another industry source suggested that some hotels complain about 
the lack of benefits from the CST, arguing that it is a waste of time and money (confidential 
interview #24). The CST does not adequately promote these benefits, in particular, it has not 
produced a document to outline the benefits of certification; and to inform tourism businesses 
 126 
 
that certification is free (confidential interview #19). The CST here, therefore, again appears 
to be reaching only the ‘low hanging fruit’, a result of its limited levers to persuade less 
interested businesses to comply, a potential problem identified in the theoretical model. 
 
Assessment of sustainability 
 
The processes for assessing the fulfilment of business practices of the above standards can also 
affect the success of a certification system. Businesses must be assessed fairly in order to give 
consumers, and other stakeholders, accurate information about each individual business’s 
adherence to the standards. The evidence suggests that the rigour of the CST’s assessment 
process is mixed, although its state-run nature does not appear to have caused the problems 
suggested in the theoretical model. The CST uses a combination of first and second party 
assessment, with businesses providing evidence for every question on a survey, such as dated 
photographs of environmental practices in action, or signed letters from communities to 
confirm their relationship with the business, followed by a visit from an ICT inspector to check 
that everything has been carried out correctly (confidential interview #19). This two-fold 
process is positive, as second-party inspection reduces the risk of fraudulent claims by 
businesses. The CST then submits its assessment to its accreditation agency, which has 
representatives from a range of public and private bodies to ensure the quality of the CST’s 
assessment processes (confidential interview #19).  
 
One industry source indicated that the CST assessment process is positive because the evidence 
requires businesses to be honest, although there are still some businesses that have been 
awarded certification when they did not meet the criteria; somehow they faked the evidence or 
the inspectors missed it (confidential interview #7). Another industry source suggested that the 
CST is one of the best programmes in terms of rigour; the decision for certification is made not 
just by a public or private body, but by a number of parties (confidential interview #14). The 
assessment process also engages with individuals businesses very closely, and over a fairly 
protracted length of time, which, indicative of a collaborative bargaining mechanism, enables 
the CST to effect fairly in-depth change. An informant (confidential interview #19) indicated 
how, as part of the assessment process, an inspector from the CST visits each applicant and 
provides advice on how to increase their level of sustainability. Applicants are then given six 
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months in which to improve their sustainability, before they are visited again for the formal 
assessment. As indicated above, one informant indicated how businesses seeking CST 
certification often have to change the nature of their activities quite significantly, from the types 
of bed sheets that they use to the creation of a full operations manual (confidential interview 
#17). Thus, as indicated in the theoretical model, the CST’s collaborative nature leads it to 
enhance the sustainability of certified actors in relatively significant depth. This level of impact 
indicates that the CST is moderately more effective than the legal mechanisms discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The assumptions of the theoretical model might lead to expectations that efficiency and 
resourcing problems would significantly limit the effectiveness of the assessment process of 
the CST. While there is evidence of inefficiencies, the state has managed, at least in part, to 
avoid these. Industry sources indicated that the CST has become quicker at assessing 
businesses; it used to take a year and a half, and now it takes a year (confidential interviews #7 
and #19). Other industry sources, however, indicated that the process still takes time and is 
inefficient and bureaucratic (confidential interviews #18 and #25). The resource shortages are 
evidenced in the fact that, as of August 2012, the CST department had only seven members of 
staff to certify over 200 businesses (confidential interview #19). Another industry source 
indicated that the assessment process is very drawn out, and that a few years previously, many 
businesses were very sceptical about the amount of paperwork that the CST required and many 
tried to avoid it, as it takes a long time, with four chapters and 300 pieces of evidence 
(confidential interview #17). The industry source indicated, however, that the assessment 
process becomes easier once a business has been certified for the first time, as the documents 
are all digital and the existing evidence just needs to be updated each time an assessment is 
conducted (confidential interview #17). Therefore, one success factor in the case of Costa Rica 
appears to be the bureaucratic competence of the state, which was not evident in the previous 
chapter’s discussion of legal mechanisms, but can be seen as an important factor here. The 
cause of this relative competence with the CST compared to legal mechanisms is pointed to by 
the very fragmented nature of policy making for sustainable development in Costa Rica, both 
across departments and within the ICT, which appears to lead to different outcomes across 
divisions (confidential interviews #10 and #16). 
 
A number of other concerns about the assessment process were raised, however, which affect 
the level of impact of the CST. Firstly, one informant suggested that the number of leaves 
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awarded to each business depends in part upon the individual inspector allocated to their case, 
as some inspectors require everything to be labelled in a certain way, whereas newer inspectors 
are less particular about how evidence is documented (confidential interview #7). Furthermore, 
there appear to be some cases where evidence is faked in order to meet CST standards. One 
local informant stated that they know a hotel where the rubbish is separated into different 
recycling piles in order to fulfil the CST standards and then all piled back together afterwards; 
it was indicated that this was not large scale but it does take place (confidential interview #26). 
A second concern is that assessment only takes place once per year, and thus, standards may 
be met only for the period of time when the evaluation is carried out. One local industry source 
said that whilst high sustainability standards may be in place when an auditor visits, three 
months later they could be completely different (confidential interview #10). A representative 
from a sustainable tourism management company said that their hotels are five leaves all year, 
not just for the evaluation. They made reference to how some hotels do this, for example, by 
making a one off contribution to sports, arts or health, rather than an established project that 
gives all year round (confidential interview #7).  
 
Once the assessment process has taken place, the CST has a five leaf system where businesses 
that comply with 20 per cent or more of criteria achieve one leaf, 40 per cent or more achieve 
two leaves, 60 per cent or more achieve three leaves, 80 per cent or more achieve four leaves 
and ninety five per cent or more achieve five leaves. There is a fairly even distribution of 
businesses across the two, three and four leaf ‘levels’ of sustainability (23-24 per cent at each), 
with slightly fewer with one leaf (16 per cent) and five leaves (12 per cent). Industry 
perspectives on the effectiveness of the CST’s grading system are again mixed. It is suggested 
that it is difficult to achieve the higher levels of certification. One hotel with five leaves said 
that it takes most businesses several attempts before they are able to achieve five leaves, as it 
requires a lot of commitment and alterations to practices (confidential interview #24). That the 
difference between one leaf and two leaves is over 20 aspects of sustainability on the survey 
also indicates a significant difference between stages. This suggests that the CST identifies 
relatively effectively the different levels of commitment to sustainability by businesses.  
 
The data suggests that larger hotels are, overall, more likely to achieve a higher level of 
certification from the CST than smaller businesses. Figure 16 shows the percentages of CST 
certified hotels with under 20 rooms and below, and 20 rooms and above, across the levels of 
leaves. It indicates that hotels with 20 and over rooms are more likely to have four or five 
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leaves on the CST than hotels with under 20 rooms (17 per cent of hotels with over 20 rooms 
have five leaves, compared with 15 per cent of hotels with under 20 rooms; 25 per cent of 
hotels over 20 rooms have four leaves, compared with 20 per cent of hotels with under 20 
rooms). While a higher proportion of hotels with under 20 rooms have two or three leaves than 
those with over 20 rooms, a higher number of hotels with over 20 rooms have one leaf than 
hotels with under 20 rooms. This reflects the finding earlier in the chapter that larger businesses 
are better able to afford and navigate the CST application and assessment processes, but 
suggests that there is also a proportion of larger businesses with certification that are not 
strongly committed to sustainability, instead satisfied with a lower level of certification. 
 
Figure 16 (figures adapted from CST website, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That a proportion of large businesses are only interested in achieving a low level of certification 
is also supported by the fact that, despite being the regions with the second and third highest 
percentage of hotels certified, certified hotels in the mass tourism regions of Guanacaste and 
the Central Valley are the least likely to have four or five leaves. Around 34 per cent and 36 
per cent respectively of certified hotels in these regions have four or five leaves, compared to 
the average of 40 per cent of all certified hotels across Costa Rica (see Figure 17). In other 
words, larger hotels with four and five leaves are largely located in regions other than the 
typical mass or ‘enclave’ tourism zones, and thus, the CST may not be significantly increasing 
the sustainability of mass tourism hotels. Despite suggestions above that the CST is reaching 
the more resource-intensive tourism businesses, this suggests that in terms of the depth with 
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which it influences actors, the most resource-intensive businesses are less likely to achieve 
higher levels of certification. This finding therefore reflects to some extent the indications of 
the theoretical model.  
 
Figure 17 (figures adapted from CST website, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The picture is different with regard to travel agencies, as the data from the CST’s certified 
businesses, shown in Figure 18, indicates that over 50 per cent of the travel agencies certified 
(20 per cent of the total travel agencies in Costa Rica) have four or five leaves, suggesting that 
travel agencies have a high level of commitment to sustainability. A local industry source 
confirmed this finding, stating that most of the large travel agencies have three, four or five 
leaves on the CST; they are all committed to sustainability (confidential interview #18). Thus, 
the concern with the CST is primarily with the lower levels of certification achieved by larger, 
mass tourism, hotels. 
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Figure 18 (figures adapted from CST website, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to the other two certification programmes, an industry source stated that the 
Rainforest Alliance Verification programme requires the same level of commitment as the 
CST, but that it is more flexible in how it allows businesses to fulfil the criteria: for example, 
they do not require a full time member of staff to work on sustainability, whereas the CST does 
(confidential interview #14). The Rainforest Alliance programme relies less on documentation 
and more on onsite visits from inspectors (confidential interview #7). The Blue Flag application 
process, meanwhile, is also perceived to be quite straightforward (confidential interview #7). 
Again, however, this evidence on the application process of these two programmes is rather 
superfluous, given the limited focus of the Blue Flag programme on environmental standards 
only, as highlighted above, and the Rainforest Alliance’s very limited compliance rate.  
 
Awarding and Publication of Results 
 
The final role of a certification system is to inform the public and industry about the level of 
commitment of certified actors to sustainable development. This takes place, firstly, through 
the granting of permission for the certified actor to display a ‘mark’ or ‘ecolabel’, often in the 
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form of a word, name, symbol or device, which signifies an actor’s compliance with the 
standards (Poncibò, 2007). Secondly, this information is often released on the website of the 
certification system, in order to enable consumers to differentiate between the levels of 
sustainability of different products. This theoretically leads them to put pressure on businesses 
to use sustainable practices if consumers preferentially buy sustainable products.  
 
The findings suggest that there is mixed evidence as to the level of recognition of certification 
by tourists in Costa Rica. With regard to the CST, several industry sources suggested that 
tourists are willing to pay more to stay in hotels with sustainable practices, and that the CST 
certification is used as a marketing strategy to increase prices (confidential interviews #7 and 
#25). Another informant, however, suggested that tourists do not choose hotels as a result of 
their sustainable practices; they had not seen a significant increase in visitors since their CST 
certification (confidential interview #3). Several local industry sources indicated that 
businesses get more recognition internationally for their Rainforest Alliance Verification on 
their website than the CST certification; people know about the Rainforest Alliance; the little 
seal is on everything; in the US market in particular it is very well known (confidential 
interviews #7 and #10). Newton et al (2004) argue that this lack of recognition of the CST from 
international tourists is a primary limitation of the scheme. 
 
The evidence is also mixed with regard to the effectiveness of the awards stages of the Blue 
Flag programme. One industry source indicated that, when announcements are made each year 
as to which beaches have lost their certification, the demand from tourists for these beaches 
drops significantly (confidential interview #10). Another industry source indicated, however, 
that they did not know of one case where a tourist had changed their mind over their choice of 
beach as a result of whether it had achieved a Blue Flag award, and only once had he heard a 
tourist ask about the Blue Flag programme (confidential interview #26). One other industry 
informant confirmed that although they like to bring their tourists to clean beaches, tourists do 
not ask for the Blue Flag (confidential interview #18).  
 
The cause of this limited interest from tourists in certification and sustainability is likely 
multiple. Firstly, there is the challenge of educating tourists about certification in their origin 
countries before they make purchasing choices for their holiday - a result of the common use 
of tour package companies and recognised international brands. An industry source suggested 
that tourists are less likely to recognise certification in the tourism industry than in other 
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industries, such as food, as they make their decision before they arrive at the product 
(confidential interview #13). Certification systems appear to lack the resources and 
mechanisms to promote themselves internationally. The CST presents the surveys completed 
by each certified business on its website, but although a brief outline of the businesses’ 
performance across the four categories of standards is available in English, French, Spanish 
and German, the full surveys are only available in Spanish. Furthermore, very few people, 
including tourists and businesses, know that these questionnaires are available online 
(confidential interview #10). CST certified businesses also do not exploit their certification as 
much as they could do, for example, they do not always make their commitments to 
sustainability clear on their websites (confidential interview #10). As a result, an industry 
informant indicated that the CST is well known nationally in the tourism industry, but it is not 
so recognised internationally (confidential interview #7). Therefore, the indication of the model 
again that bargaining mechanisms are likely to address sustainable development at the global 
level, is not reflected in the case of the CST. 
 
Other sources said that the problem with the Blue Flag programme is that from the beginning 
it left out the most important stakeholder: the tourist. Tourists have not been educated about 
the meaning of the Blue Flag awards (confidential interview #26). A representative from a 
sustainable tourism management business said that the way in which the Blue Flags are 
presented is very positive, for example, one year the Vice President gave out the awards, which 
motivated people to engage with the programme. In this sense, the Blue Flag programme is 
better promoted than the CST (confidential interview #7). The ICT promotes the Blue Flag 
scheme quite strongly, although there could be more resources to better communicate the 
programme (confidential interview #10). Another industry informant indicated that the Blue 
Flag programme is taught to all children in schools (confidential interview #23). An industry 
source indicated that the Blue Flag programme should give more recognition to certified 
entities both at the national and international level, for example, they should be given priority 
in official recommendations of places to visit (confidential interview #20). 
 
The second factor behind the lack of interest from tourists in certification is that, although the 
Rainforest Alliance and Blue Flag programmes are better recognised internationally than the 
CST, but not so well recognised within Costa Rica, there is little evidence that these influence 
tourists’ choices (confidential interview #7). One potential reason for this is that cost is often a 
very significant deciding factor for tourists, a result in part of the way in which the brochures 
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of tour package operators emphasise very similar features across multiple destinations, 
including sun, sea, beaches and entertainment, leaving tourists to make decisions based on cost 
and convenience, rather than a destination’s particular attributes (Curtin and Busby, 1999). An 
industry informant stated that sustainability is the second, third or fourth deciding factor for 
tourists as to which hotel they choose to stay at (confidential interview #7). Another industry 
informant indicated that some tourists prefer uncertified hotels, as they conflate sustainability 
certification with seriousness, and therefore, limitations on perceived ‘fun’ activities, such as 
shouting and smoking (confidential interview #26). Indeed, the industry source said that it is 
recommended that hotels do not advertise their sustainable practices on the front page of their 
website as tourists think that a certified hotel is very serious and that they will have to pay more 
(confidential interview #26). Even if this is the case, CST certification has still been relatively 
successful in Costa Rica without significant tourist awareness, through factors discussed above, 
including a heightened receptiveness towards sustainability and industry pressure. As indicated 
above, therefore, the levers making the CST successful are not those traditionally linked to 
certification.  
 
Implications for Theoretical Debates on Governance 
 
As in the previous chapter, the findings here have a number of implications for ongoing debates 
in the governance literature identified in Chapter Three around the significance of the state, 
and hierarchical versus voluntary mechanisms, in governance. The approach taken by the 
theoretical model in separating bargaining mechanisms from less choice-constraining 
persuasive mechanisms, and also legal mechanisms, enables an in-depth understanding of 
moderately choice-constraining mechanisms, and their different impacts when they are run by 
state or non-state actors. The moderate effectiveness identified in this chapter of a state-run 
certification system indicates, firstly, the significance of voluntary mechanisms of governance, 
and the shift away from reliance on traditional command and control mechanisms. This 
reinforces the arguments in the literature of scholars such as Pierre and Peters (2005) and 
Jordan et al (2003) that new, and less choice-constraining forms of governance can be more 
cost effective and less politically contentious. The findings also indicate the shifting role of the 
state from command and control to more voluntary mechanisms of governance, as the state 
here facilitates the CST certification system. This supports the arguments of scholars such as 
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Pierre and Peters (2005) that states are using more voluntary forms of governance and stresses 
the continuing significance of states in governance. Indeed, the way in which the state in this 
case has deterred a non-state actor (the Rainforest Alliance) from establishing a competing 
certification system reinforces the power and authority of the state. 
 
A significant finding in this chapter is the way in which the state draws upon its authority to 
encourage higher levels of compliance with a voluntary mechanism of governance, as non-
state actors do not have this authority with which to reinforce less choice-constraining 
governance mechanisms. This finding runs contrary to the assumption of the neoliberal and 
civil society literatures, which point to the strengths of decentralised state institutions and non-
state actors. Similarly, the empirical governance literature also does not widely recognise the 
strength of state-run voluntary mechanisms, instead often associating voluntary mechanisms 
with non-state actors. Thus, the approach taken by the theoretical model has here enabled a 
more in-depth and detail understanding of the impact of bargaining mechanisms run by state 
and non-state actors. 
 
On the other hand, the challenges identified here for bargaining mechanisms are reflected in 
the theoretical literature, including the limited impact on those actors less interested in 
compliance. The way in which bargaining mechanisms are not addressing international actors 
in the tourism industry is not widely recognised in the literature, which points to the potential 
for voluntary mechanisms to have international influence due to their lesser need for authority, 
which is sourced from national sovereignty. These findings, therefore, provide a contribution 
to the existing governance literature by pointing to the need to recognise the significant 
challenges for both more and less choice-constraining mechanisms in addressing actors at the 
international level of the global value chain. They also suggest that there is a gap in the capacity 
of governance mechanisms as a whole to address these international facets of an industry. 
 
A final observation here is the usefulness of the degree of granularity provided by the 
theoretical model in distinguishing between state and non-state and more and less choice-
constraining mechanisms. The focus often taken in the existing literature is on the impact of 
the state versus non-state mechanisms, as opposed to command and control versus voluntary 
mechanisms. Where the latter are recognised, they are often equated to state versus non-state 
mechanisms. The findings here suggest the need for analytical models to recognise the 
complexity of governance, and how states may be increasingly using more voluntary 
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mechanisms of governance. Similarly, where the literature does recognise voluntary 
mechanisms, it does not often distinguish between moderately and low choice-constraining 
instruments, as this theoretical model does. This distinction enables a greater understanding of 
the different types of voluntary mechanisms and the ability to compare and contrast their levels 
of impact. This is particularly useful, as the existing certification literature is fairly insular, and 
is not recognised or referred to by much of the wider governance literature.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the impact of bargaining mechanisms on sustainable tourism in Costa 
Rica. Three main bargaining mechanisms for sustainable tourism were identified: the CST, 
Blue Flag and Rainforest Alliance Verification schemes. The theoretical model indicated that 
the moderately choice-constraining nature of bargaining mechanisms potentially enables them 
to address a certain number of actors, but may also limit the overall number of actors that 
comply, as they have fewer levers with which to encourage compliance. The collaborative 
nature of certification systems was indicated to potentially enable them to have an in-depth 
impact. It was indicated that state-run bargaining mechanisms may suffer from obstacles such 
as corruption and inefficiency, while non-state bargaining mechanisms may have superior 
expertise. The chapter explored the effectiveness of the three certification systems through the 
four stages of certification in turn: design of standards, application, assessment, and awarding 
of certification. 
 
The chapter argued that the CST is moderately effective at promoting sustainable tourism, 
while the Blue Flag programme and Rainforest Alliance Verification have a limited 
effectiveness. Despite the moderate effectiveness of legal mechanisms argued in the previous 
chapter, this chapter has argued that the CST is slightly more effective than these legal 
mechanisms, although still has an overall ‘moderate’ level of effectiveness. Four key factors 
were identified to explain the primacy of the CST over the other two certification systems. 
Firstly, the moderately choice-constraining and collaborative nature of these certification 
systems enabled them to attract compliance from a low to moderate number of actors, and to 
work with these actors in some depth. Secondly, the heightened receptiveness towards 
sustainable development evidenced in Costa Rica, as a result of its unique biodiversity and 
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thus, historic concern for the environment, increases compliance with these schemes for moral 
and market competition purposes. Thirdly, the state has promoted the CST within Costa Rica 
very effectively, while its promotion of the Blue Flag programme has been less significant. The 
non-state Rainforest Alliance Verification, as a result, also does not have the high profile of 
the CST. The CST has managed to avoid internal state obstacles, such as corruption and 
inefficiencies. The Costa Rican state also has shown significant bureaucratic competence in its 
implementation of the CST, which has reduced the impact of obstacles such as inefficiency. 
The final factor explaining the relative effectiveness of the CST was the technical expertise 
provided to the CST by non-state actors, which supported the design of the CST and provides 
technical assistance to businesses seeking to apply. The fact that none of these certification 
systems govern international stakeholders in the tourism industry was indicated to be 
problematic, and to reduce their effectiveness. 
 
The chapter argued that the theoretical model partly identified these factors determining the 
impacts of these three schemes. The model indicated the effect of moderate choice-constraint 
and the collaborative nature of certification systems, and the potential for a state-run scheme 
to have increased authority. It did not, however, identify the significance of a heightened 
receptiveness towards sustainable development in increasing compliance rates, the 
bureaucratic competence of the state, the impact of technical expertise provided to state 
schemes by non-state actors, or the failure of these schemes to address international 
stakeholders. Thus, the model was partly useful in identifying the impact of bargaining 
mechanisms in this case. This chapter, finally, reflected on the theoretical implications of these 
findings for broader governance debates. The following chapter will explore the effectiveness 
of persuasive mechanisms at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Like bargaining 
mechanisms, the theoretical model suggests that non-state persuasive mechanisms may be able 
to avoid the limitations of internal state obstacles and to address sustainable development at 
the global level. Chapter Eight of this thesis will then draw on examples of tourism governance 
in other developing states in order to understand how far Costa Rica’s case is unique.  
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Chapter Seven 
Persuasive Mechanisms for Sustainable 
Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
 
 
This thesis is exploring the effectiveness of different mechanisms of governance in the 
promotion of sustainable tourism. Chapters Five and Six argued that legal mechanisms and the 
CST certification system have a moderate impact on sustainable tourism, while other 
bargaining mechanisms have only a limited impact. Following the theoretical model of 
governance developed in Chapter Three, this chapter will explore the effectiveness of the third 
governance mechanism outlined in the theoretical model in Chapter Three: low choice-
constraining persuasive mechanisms. Persuasive mechanisms use information and persuasion 
to encourage an actor to change their behaviour, often through provision of data, facts, 
knowledge, arguments or moral appeals ‘about what is good or bad, right or wrong’ (Vedung 
and van der Doelen, 1998: 104). Recipients of this information are under no obligation to 
change their behaviour, as these mechanisms are low choice-constraining. Like bargaining 
mechanisms, they can be run by either state or non-state actors, and are either confrontational, 
such as through protests and demonstrations, or collaborative, where they work more closely 
with individual actors to provide technical support or education.  
 
Persuasive mechanisms are by nature more diverse than legal or bargaining mechanisms, due 
to the way in which they can target a diverse range of different actors, through either 
collaborative or confrontational methods, and do not exchange resources with actors, or have 
enforcement power, and therefore, can be employed by a diverse range and number of 
governance actors. Persuasive mechanisms, therefore, can take very different forms and 
potentially compete with each other, due to their lack of formal authority. This chapter will 
assess the effectiveness of persuasive mechanisms at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa 
Rica. The chapter will, firstly, outline the key persuasive mechanisms for sustainable tourism 
in Costa Rica, and their potential strengths and weaknesses identified in the theoretical model. 
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It will then explore the impact of each of these mechanisms in turn, before exploring the 
theoretical implications of these findings for broader debates around governance. 
 
Persuasive Mechanisms for Sustainable Tourism in Costa Rica 
 
In Costa Rica, lobbying and activism were, until recently, the most common persuasive 
mechanisms, using confrontational methods in attempts to facilitate behaviour change. 
Persuasive mechanisms, typified by organisations such as the Costa Rican Association for 
National Parks and Zoos and the Organisation for Tropical Studies, first emerged in Costa Rica 
with some force in the early 1970s, housing environmental activists and spearheading political 
struggles throughout the decade (Steinberg, 2001). Members of these organisations criticised 
the actions of the government, writing letters to express their concern at the country’s 
deteriorating natural environment. They won a number of environmental struggles, including 
the opposition of the construction of an intercontinental oil pipeline from the Caribbean to the 
Pacific. Through mobilising their networks of domestic political contacts, pipeline protesters 
forced the president to annul the agreement (Steinberg, 2001). More recently, collaborative 
forms of persuasive governance have become common, a result of both increasing concerns 
around unsustainable behaviours, and recognition by businesses and governor actors that more 
can be achieved through cooperation.  
 
Three main types of persuasive mechanism are identifiable in Costa Rica. The first is the 
provision of technical assistance by non-state actors to businesses and communities that seek 
to practice more sustainable tourism. This mechanism uses information in order to encourage 
these actors to use more sustainable practices. Persuasion is first used in order to encourage 
actors to sign up to receive technical assistance, whether through paying fees for individualised 
support or attending workshops, and then persuasion is required throughout the provision of 
technical assistance in order to convince businesses to adopt suitable sustainable practices. 
Continual persuasion is necessary due to the extent of the lack of knowledge that tourism 
businesses have around sustainability, and a tendency to select cost-effective options that may 
not be the most sustainable. One informant indicated how sustainable practices such as the 
installation of solar panels can be costly for businesses, and there is not always money 
available; it is a challenge to balance cost-effectiveness and sustainability (confidential 
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interview #8). Thus, tourism businesses need persuasion and support in order to adopt new 
practices. Another informant stated that smaller tourism businesses have a particular void of 
knowledge around the need to retain staff jobs throughout the year, rather than just in the high 
season, and to use local produce and services, although they may be more expensive 
(confidential interview #12). The same source also indicated that changing behaviour of 
tourism businesses is a challenge, as it involves shifting resources and changing the way they 
do business; getting business owners and managers to participate in training and then 
internalise this learning is always a challenge. Thus, persuasion is required in order to convince 
businesses of the merits of these practices for sustainability.  
 
Furthermore, as another local source indicated, some businesses seek fast and easy solutions to 
sustainability, rather than the most effective (confidential interview #13). Thus, the role of 
persuasive mechanisms here is to convince actors throughout the programmes not to implement 
‘quick fixes’, but rather practices that will promote sustainability effectively. Another 
interviewee from a certification system indicated the need to convince businesses of the merits 
of sustainability, as those businesses most interested in sustainability are already complying; 
the challenge now is to convince those which are less interested (confidential interview #19). 
Potential arguments to attract compliance from businesses and communities include persuasion 
that an action is in the self-interest of an actor, for the moral good, or an accepted practice used 
by many other similar actors (Cashore, 2002). In addition, not all individuals within a business 
are as easy to convince as others; one representative from a tour operator said that it is difficult 
to convince staff to adopt sustainable practices such as turning off the lights when they leave a 
room (confidential interview #18). Technical assistance programmes are collaborative forms 
of governance as they engage in-depth with individual businesses in a cooperative manner in 
order to promote sustainability. 
 
The second persuasive mechanism is the education of the public and tourists about sustainable 
tourism, provided by both state and non-state actors. Education uses persuasive arguments to 
encourage the public and tourists to use more sustainable practices, for example, teaching them 
about the cultural and historical value of Costa Rica’s biodiversity, and the importance of 
biodiversity for industries such as tourism. This is again a collaborative persuasive mechanism 
as it works in-depth with individual actors. The third, confrontational, persuasive mechanism 
is the lobbying of governments and businesses for increased commitment to sustainable 
development, carried out by local populations and communities. Lobbying uses the persuasive 
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arguments identified above to convince governments and businesses to adopt more sustainable 
practices or policies. While these three types of persuasive mechanisms are quite different in 
nature, they all have in common a limited number of levers through which to enforce 
compliance and as such, the theoretical model suggests that they potentially face a similar set 
of strengths and weaknesses, which is the reason for which they are all explored in this chapter. 
Figure 19 sets out these three types of persuasive mechanisms, along with the type of governor 
actor, the governed actor/s that they target and whether they are confrontational or collaborative 
in nature.  
 
Figure 19: Types of Persuasive Mechanisms for Tourism in Costa Rica 
Type of Persuasive 
Mechanism 
Governor actor – 
state or non-state 
Governed actor/s Confrontational/ 
collaborative 
governance 
Technical assistance Non-state Businesses 
Communities 
Collaborative 
Education Both Tourists 
Public 
Collaborative 
Lobbying Non-state Government/ 
businesses 
Confrontational 
 
The theoretical model identifies a series of strengths and weaknesses intrinsic to persuasive 
mechanisms, which vary according to whether they are employed by state or non-state actors, 
and if they are collaborative or confrontational. Persuasive mechanisms have fewer levers than 
legal and bargaining mechanisms with which to encourage compliance. Where they are 
confrontational, persuasive mechanisms are suggested to have the capacity to reach the worst 
perpetrators of unsustainable practices, although at a more limited depth, as the length of 
engagement is shorter than in collaborative relationships. Where persuasive mechanisms are 
collaborative, the model suggests that they may be less likely to reach the worst perpetrators, 
but potentially have a more sustained impact, as a result of their closer, and often long-term, 
relationships with governed actors. The model indicates that competition between persuasive 
mechanisms, and indeed with bargaining mechanisms, may confuse governed actors as to 
which to comply with, and lead to low levels of compliance. Persuasive mechanisms run by 
states may face obstacles of corruption, inefficiencies, short-term policy making and rigid 
institutional structures. The model suggests that non-state persuasive mechanisms may avoid 
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these obstacles and have added expertise, although they may also have less authority than state 
mechanisms. 
 
This section will explore how far these main forms of persuasive governance contribute to 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, examining, firstly, technical assistance for businesses, 
followed by technical assistance for communities, education for tourists, education for the 
public, and lobbying of government and businesses. It will argue that, while technical 
assistance programmes for businesses have a moderate impact on sustainable tourism in Costa 
Rica, the evidence suggests that the other persuasive mechanisms have only a limited or 
sporadic impact. It will be indicated, however, how technical assistance programmes, despite 
having a moderate impact, do not have quite the same level of impact as the CST, discussed in 
the previous chapter. The chapter will show how the strengths and weaknesses of persuasive 
mechanisms identified in the theoretical model partly reflect these impacts. 
 
The moderate effectiveness of technical assistance for businesses will be argued to be caused, 
firstly, by the collaborative nature of this persuasive mechanism, which enables a close 
relationship with individual businesses, and thus, a significant depth of impact. The second 
success factor identified is the expertise and experience of the Rainforest Alliance, which has 
enabled it to become a market leader in technical assistance, avoiding the potential problem of 
competition between providers, identified in the theoretical model. The other determining 
factor for technical assistance for businesses is the heightened receptiveness towards 
sustainable development, identified in Chapter Six, which appears to increase compliance. On 
the other hand, further impact of technical assistance programmes for businesses is limited by 
their low level of choice-constraint, which limits the overall number of compliant businesses, 
and also the range of businesses addressed, often excluding the very smallest or largest tourism 
businesses. Furthermore, technical assistance programmes are limited in their reach to 
international branding, airline and tour package agencies.  
 
The chapter will also identify a series of factors to explain the limited effectiveness of the other 
persuasive mechanisms identified. The effectiveness of technical assistance for communities 
will be indicated to be limited, in particular, by the difficulty for non-state organisations in 
reaching some of the most isolated communities, and the state’s lack of interest in cooperating 
with organisations that work with communities. These factors are partially recognised in the 
theoretical model. Provision of education around sustainable development to tourists will be 
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indicated to be restricted by a lack of reach to the international level, a factor not expected by 
the theoretical model. The limited effectiveness of state provision of environmental education 
to the public will be attributed to inefficiencies and a failure to adequately address the 
complexities of environmentalism, both factors identified in the theoretical model. Finally, this 
chapter will demonstrate a few examples of how lobbying has addressed some of the most 
prolific offenders against sustainable tourism, but argue that overall, its level and depth of 
impact is limited by its confrontational nature, a factor identified in the theoretical model. 
These arguments will now be explored in more depth throughout each of these five persuasive 
mechanisms in turn. 
 
Technical Assistance for Businesses 
 
Technical assistance is offered by non-state organisations to service-provider businesses that 
seek to increase the sustainability of their practices. The Rainforest Alliance is the most 
prominent provider in Costa Rica, offering both general training and workshops, and 
individualised technical support for each business. A local industry source stated that this 
programme originated from the recognition that there were many definitions and commitments 
to sustainable tourism, but little practical information to support businesses to turn this 
philosophy into practice (confidential interview #14). There are other smaller organisations 
that also provide similar technical assistance support to tourism businesses, such as Susterra, 
and the National Biodiversity Institute (INBio), which offers environmental training to tourism 
businesses and employees to develop their understanding of biodiversity in their local area and 
how they might work with it and protect it through tourism (confidential interview #20). There 
are also many independent sustainable tourism consultants in Costa Rica, which provide 
technical assistance to businesses wanting to improve their sustainable practices and support 
their applications for certification. 
 
The findings suggest that, overall, technical assistance for businesses is moderately effective 
at promoting sustainable tourism. Figures suggest that a small, but significant, proportion of 
tourism businesses in Costa Rica have engaged with persuasive mechanisms. The Rainforest 
Alliance has worked with over 7,000 businesses in Latin America, and with hundreds of 
tourism businesses in Costa Rica (confidential interview #14). From 2005 to 2010, the 
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Rainforest Alliance worked with 125 hotels to improve their sustainability, five per cent of the 
total hotels in Costa Rica (confidential internal document #2; Costa Rica Tourism Board, 
2013). While figures on the extent of impact of sustainable tourism consultants in Costa Rica 
are not available, it is likely that this five per cent under-represents the overall impact of 
technical assistance for businesses in Costa Rica, as one industry source indicated that there 
are many sustainable tourism consultants that also provide technical assistance to businesses 
(confidential interview #13). Overall, however, the impact of technical assistance programmes 
for businesses here is slightly less than that of the CST, which reaches nearly nine per cent of 
hotels and 20 per cent of travel agencies, a result of its more choice-constraining nature. 
 
The number and range of businesses that engage with technical assistance is limited, however, 
to those actors that wish to engage, or have the capacity to. Small to medium-sized businesses 
are more likely to receive technical assistance than micro and large businesses. An industry 
source indicated that 80 per cent of businesses that the Rainforest Alliance works with across 
Latin America (except in Mexico) have 30 rooms or less (confidential interview #14). The 
same source, however, also indicated that the very smallest and remotely located businesses 
often cannot afford the $3,000 fee to participate in the Rainforest Alliance programme. As a 
result, technical assistance is often subsidised where possible, but the Rainforest Alliance 
struggles to find funds to pay for this (confidential interview #14). International branding, 
airline, and tour package agencies are also not reached by technical assistance programmes, 
again limiting the overall scope of these persuasive mechanisms. 
 
The findings point to a number of factors that account for this moderate reach and range of 
technical assistance programmes for businesses. As persuasive mechanisms, these programmes 
are low choice-constraining, which limits the number and type of businesses addressed. An 
industry source indicated, for example, that it can be fairly challenging to get businesses 
interested in training and technical assistance; persuading managers and business owners to 
participate in training and then internalising these practices is always difficult (confidential 
interview #16). Furthermore, the reach of technical assistance to international stakeholders is 
also limited. The reasons for this are unclear, but are potentially a result of the structural 
obstacles indicated in the global value chain earlier in this thesis. The potential concern 
identified in the theoretical model that the most prolific offenders against sustainable 
development may not comply with persuasive mechanisms, therefore, is seen here, as larger 
businesses tend to be more resource-intensive and, thus, inherently less sustainable. On the 
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other hand, the theoretical model did not recognise how micro businesses may not have the 
capacity to engage with persuasive mechanisms.  
 
In Costa Rica, however, the evidence points to a heightened receptiveness towards biodiversity 
and sustainability, indicated in Chapter Six, which appears to counteract to some extent the 
weak choice-constraining capacity of technical assistance programme for businesses, 
encouraging businesses to comply. An informant stated that the Rainforest Alliance tests out 
its programmes in Costa Rica first before other states, due to the way in which people there 
‘get’ the theme of sustainability, creating a very fertile ground in which to run projects 
(confidential interview #14). As indicated in Chapter Six, interviewees also suggested that 
businesses see sustainability as an important part of their ‘core business’ (confidential 
interviews #13 and #19). The findings suggest that this heightened receptiveness increases 
compliance with technical assistance programmes as businesses perceive the need to achieve 
certification in order to operate within the tourism industry (as indicated in Chapter Six through 
confidential interviews #3, #18 and #24), and the Rainforest Alliance technical assistance 
programme works with around 24 per cent of CST certified hotels and 40 per cent of CST 
certified tour operators (confidential internal document #2). 
 
There is also evidence that this technical assistance has significantly improved the level of 
sustainability of some service-providers in Costa Rica. In one case, for example, INBio 
supported a hotel to document the different types of butterflies in their region and set up a 
butterfly biological station for its visitors to observe them (confidential interview #20). Thus, 
the individualised and collaborative nature of the support leads to significant impacts on 
individual businesses. Furthermore, an evaluation of one of the Rainforest Alliance’s technical 
assistance programmes in 2008 found that, on a scale of one to ten, one being non-compliance 
and ten being full-compliance, the level of sustainability of five businesses surveyed in 
Sarapiquí, northern Costa Rica, increased from an average of 4.5 to 7.8 after training and 
technical assistance (Newsom and Sierra, 2008). Improved sustainable practices included the 
provision of training and employment to local youths in hotel management, the creation of a 
recycling scheme, and the transition from non-biodegradable to biodegradable soaps and 
detergents (Newsom and Sierra, 2008).  
 
Evidence also suggests that the 24 per cent of CST certified businesses that have worked with 
the Rainforest Alliance have improved their sustainability significantly (confidential internal 
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document #2). From 2005-2010, only one per cent of these saw a reduction in their level of 
certification and a further one per cent lost their certification, compared with five per cent of 
CST certified hotels that had not worked with the Rainforest Alliance seeing a reduction in 
their certification level and seven per cent losing their certification (confidential internal 
document #2). Thus, the indication of the theoretical model around the in-depth impact of 
collaborative persuasive mechanisms is reflected here. 
 
These impacts are at least partly facilitated by the expertise and experience of non-state actors 
identified in the theoretical model. One industry source suggested that the Rainforest Alliance 
does a good job of preparing businesses for the CST certification, while the Vice President of 
Sustainable Tourism at Rainforest Alliance, Ronald Sanabria, is widely respected in the region 
for his work on sustainable tourism (confidential interview #19). Similarly, sustainable 
consultancy businesses, such as Susterra, argue that the rigorous methodologies used in their 
work with businesses lead to significant impacts on sustainability (confidential interview #13). 
The reputation of these agencies counteracts the potential problem identified in the theoretical 
model that persuasive actors can compete for compliance from businesses. One industry source 
indicated, for example, how the work of the Rainforest Alliance has been fundamental in 
gaining credibility for sustainable tourism, and that businesses trust them (confidential 
interview #10). As indicated in Chapter Six, the expertise of non-state actors, despite being 
identified in the theoretical model, may be a contextual success factor rather than one inherent 
to non-state governance mechanisms, due to its likely origin in Costa Rica’s unique range of 
biodiversity, which one informant indicated had promoted considerable research and 
knowledge and does not exist to the same extent elsewhere in Central America (confidential 
interview #20).  
 
The quality of technical assistance provided to businesses can vary, however, depending on the 
level of expertise of the actor delivering it. While the work of the Rainforest Alliance is well-
renowned to be of a high quality, the quality of work of some other non-state providers of 
technical assistance is more questionable, as a result of a lack of adequate training and 
experience. One industry informant was that it is really easy to be a consultant; individuals can 
study a related topic at university and declare themselves consultants, leading some consultants 
to allegedly lack the technical knowledge, experience or resources to be effective (confidential 
interview #13). As a result, the informant indicated that these low quality consultants can take 
a very simplistic approach to sustainability, for example, giving a standard check list of things 
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to do to each business, rather than tailoring a sustainability strategy to each individual business’ 
needs (confidential interview #13). Therefore, some persuasive mechanisms here do not have 
significant expertise and, as a result, do not have the same quality of impact on the sustainability 
of businesses. The theoretical model does not identify how not all non-state organisations have 
this expertise, leading to potentially negligible impacts on the sustainability of businesses in 
some cases. 
 
Technical Assistance for Communities 
 
Although less widespread in Costa Rica than the above technical assistance programmes for 
businesses, similar programmes also exist to support communities to integrate into the tourism 
industry and become service-providers themselves, for example, through running small hotels 
or lodgings, community tours or handicrafts businesses. There are a number of organisations 
in Costa Rica that provide this support, including the Association for the Promotion of New 
Development Alternatives (APRONAD) and Asociación ANAI. APRONAD is a non-state, 
not-for-profit organisation which supports communities to prepare themselves to receive 
tourists, for example, through identifying cultural traits in a community and supporting the 
community to develop programmes where tourists can visit the community and learn about 
their ways of life, such as the type of food that the community eats or how they fish 
(confidential interview #15). This support is valuable for communities, as they often lack the 
capacity to identify how their community might appeal to tourists and to develop and promote 
commercial opportunities in tourism.  
 
This technical assistance can promote sustainable development very directly, as community 
tourism is often inherently more sustainable than other forms of mass tourism, providing a 
direct income to local people, with often a limited impact on the environment due to its small 
scale. An industry source suggested, furthermore, that communities are absolutely key to 
sustainability as they know who caused any contamination and who is doing the damage 
(confidential interview #23). Linking a community into a tourism project can make the tourism 
experience more authentic and can, therefore, be very attractive to tourists. The provision of 
technical assistance to communities has a slightly different focus to that of businesses, as while 
it is still collaborative, it supports communities to integrate into the industry and, therefore, 
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facilitate their own development, as opposed to encouraging businesses to behave in ways that 
benefit local sustainable development.  
 
The theoretical model would suggest that, as technical assistance programmes for communities 
share the same collaborative and non-state characteristics as technical assistance for businesses, 
they are likely to have the same low compliance rate, relatively extensive in-depth impact, and 
significant expertise. There is less evidence of the impact of technical assistance for 
communities, however, than that for businesses, pointing to a limited effectiveness. The 
evidence is mixed as to the effects of these programmes. The communities that Asociación 
ANAI work with, for example, appear to have earned extra income from their tourism activities 
as a result of technical assistance. One of their guesthouses was highly rated in 2000 by the 
international conservation organisation, The Nature Conservancy, and as a result, has been 
incentivised to conserve the rainforest on their land, and to use sustainable agricultural 
practices in cacao production (Drumm and Moore, 2005). On the other hand, an industry source 
suggested that integrating a community into the tourism industry can encourage people to leave 
more stable and better paid jobs outside of tourism in order to participate, which is a negative 
impact of technical assistance (confidential interview #15).  
 
The range and number of communities engaged is fairly limited. A local informant indicated 
that the types of communities that engage with these persuasive mechanisms are also usually 
those where people have jobs or are students, as opposed to the unemployed (confidential 
interview #15). Therefore, they are not necessarily the communities most in need of sustainable 
development. Furthermore, an industry source indicated that some communities are not 
prepared to change their way of life in order to embrace tourism; there is not much interest in 
some communities in developing sustainable tourism and development projects (confidential 
interview #15). It can also be challenging to identify projects with which to engage, as often 
they are very informally organised, for example, just a ‘group of friends’, and furthermore, the 
cost and difficulty of travelling to some of the most remote and isolated communities can 
impede the impact of technical assistance programmes (confidential interview #15). The 
implications of this is that those most in need or most unsustainable may not be being reached, 
as is indicated to potentially be the case by the theoretical model, due to the low choice-
constraining nature of persuasive mechanisms. 
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Another limiting factor is that the inefficient and closed nature of the state and municipalities 
makes technical assistance provision for communities problematic. A local industry informant 
indicated that a large amount of paperwork is required for the community projects; their 
relationship with the municipalities is not what they would hope (confidential interview #15). 
Another informant stated that some organisations in Costa Rica say that they cannot operate 
without more support from the government, especially funding. In other words, it would be a 
lot easier to develop many more projects if there could be more collaboration with the 
government (confidential interview #15). As indicated in the previous chapter, the potential 
value of collaboration between state and non-state actors is not currently identified in the 
theoretical model as a determining factor for the impact of governance mechanisms. 
 
Tourist Education for Sustainable Development 
 
Another role of persuasive mechanisms for tourism identified in Costa Rica is the education of 
tourists about sustainable tourism and sustainable development. This has two aims. The first is 
to encourage tourists to select tourism businesses that use sustainable practices. Drumm and 
Moore (2005) make the obvious point that the choices that tourists make - which destination, 
tour, travel agent or type of tour - can have a big impact on whether or not a sustainable tourism 
project succeeds. The second aim is for tourists to act sustainably themselves, for example, 
disposing of their litter sustainably and re-using plastic water bottles. Education is again a 
collaborative form of persuasive governance and has the potential to be an important catalyst 
for sustainable tourism. Industry sources indicated, for example, how change for sustainability 
needs to come from the education of tourists, so that they start demanding sustainable products 
and behaving in sustainable ways; there will then be more impulse for sustainable tourism 
(confidential interviews #10 and #17). Other local industry sources indicated that educating 
people about biodiversity encourages them to form a relationship with the environment, which 
is key to change (confidential interviews #20 and #23). This education is particularly important 
because some tourists have a misconception of the meaning of sustainability. A sustainable 
tourism consultant indicated how tourists have a certain idea about what sustainability should 
look like, and if they do not see these particular aspects of sustainability in the tourist products 
that they use in Costa Rica, then they assume that sustainability is not taking place (confidential 
interview #10). Education can address this problem.   
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Education for tourists about sustainability is provided by both state and non-state actors, but 
comes mainly from businesses, a requirement of their participation in the CST. This education 
takes place, for example, through the provision of information booklets on a hotel’s 
commitment to sustainability, or the running of tours around the hotel for guests to see all the 
aspects of sustainability in practice. The Rainforest Alliance also plays a role in educating 
tourists about sustainability before they leave their country of origin. For example, their website 
sustainabletrip.org raises awareness about the economic, social and environmental benefits of 
sustainable tourism. The CST also promotes its certified businesses on its website. The state 
provides informal learning about sustainability for tourists through state-run national 
conservation areas (Blum, 2008). An informant indicated how tourists are educated by nature 
guides, who are often the first face that tourists see, and explain to them how actions such as 
smoking, removing plants and feeding animals are prohibited (confidential interview #18). A 
representative from one sustainable tourism business, for example, claimed that their mission 
was to get tourists to take away something from their experience at their hotels and to change 
one or two of their own habits as a result (confidential interview #7). Another representative 
from a hotel with three leaves on the CST said that they educate tourists, for example, not to 
remove any of the flora or fauna from national parks (confidential interview #6). The NGO 
INBio also runs INBioparque, a park to educate tourists and Costa Rican visitors about the 
different species that exist in Costa Rica (confidential interview #20).   
 
The theoretical model indicates that, as a collaborative mechanism, education has the potential 
for an in-depth impact on sustainable development, but on the other hand, as it is only low 
choice-constraining, may not attract compliance from a significant number of tourists. The 
evidence suggests that these indications are largely accurate and, thus, how education around 
sustainable development for tourists is only limited in effectiveness. Firstly, there is only 
anecdotal evidence that tourists have become more informed about sustainability. One local 
industry informant (confidential interview #14) suggested that Costa Rica is an educative place 
for tourists and sustainability. They argued that Costa Rica places a seed of initial knowledge 
about sustainability in the minds of tourists, as if they are informed of the level of sustainability 
of their hotel then their environmental consciousness is developed. A representative from a 
hotel with three leaves on the CST said that their tourists were interested in sustainability, 
although some were more interested than others, but that all of them separate their recycling 
(confidential interview #6). A sustainable tourism consultant said that they knew of some 
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young families that came as tourists to Costa Rica in order to show their children sustainable 
hotels, indicating that they valued the education about sustainability (confidential interview 
#26). A representative from a sustainable tourism management company said that their tourists 
are blown away when they find out about all the practices that the hotels employ in order to be 
sustainable, in particular when they learn that it is not just about environmental practices but 
also supporting local communities as well (confidential interview #7).  
 
Another industry source held the belief that Costa Rican tourists are better informed about 
sustainability than tourists in other states (confidential interview #8), although it is not clear 
whether this is a result of education in Costa Rica, or just that tourists that are interested in 
sustainability are more likely to visit Costa Rica. One interviewee indicated that there are a lot 
of ecotourism projects in Costa Rica, and a lot of passionate people that work on them, 
suggesting both that tourists that are interested in sustainability are more likely to visit Costa 
Rica, and that they are educated at least to some degree about sustainability whilst they are 
there (confidential interview #4). There is no evidence to quantify the impact of this tourist 
education. Furthermore, some local sources indicated that more emphasis should be placed on 
tourist education. One interviewee, for example, said that the ICT should play a stronger role 
in educating tourists through its promotion programmes, and that sustainability should also be 
incorporated more significantly into tourist experiences at the destinations (confidential 
interview #10).  
 
There is also little evidence that this education affects the purchasing decisions of tourists, as 
is also indicated in the previous chapter on bargaining mechanisms. Industry sources indicated 
that sustainability is not the first, but the second, third or fourth deciding factor for tourists on 
which hotel to stay in (confidential interview #7). In a survey of guest opinions at the well-
renowned Punta Isleta eco-lodge in the Nicoya Peninsula, which has five leaves on the CST, 
Almeyda et al (2010) found that sustainability and responsibility, local arts and crafts and local 
music, dance and culture were less important to guests than many other factors, including 
scenic landscapes, personal safety, cost and good food and dining. One interviewee stated that 
only ten per cent of tourists make a decision on their holiday that is based on sustainability 
(confidential interview #11). 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that some tourists are not at all interested in sustainability. One 
sustainable tourism consultant indicated that some tourists that they have met actually prefer 
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hotels without the commitment to sustainability, as they assume that these are very serious and 
limit activities perceived to be ‘fun’, such as smoking (confidential interview #26). The 
consultant indicated that in an online survey with tourism professionals as to whether tourism 
businesses should advertise their sustainable practices on the front page of their website, nearly 
everyone agreed that they should not, as tourists think that they will have to pay more for a 
sustainable hotel. Therefore, the overall impact of this persuasive mechanisms is only limited. 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, a major challenge for governance mechanisms in 
educating tourists about sustainable development is that in order to influence their purchasing 
habits, it is necessary to reach them in their origin country, as tourists often book holidays 
without seeing or sampling the product beforehand. One industry informant (confidential 
interview #13) indicated that, when purchasing juice, for example, a consumer is provided with 
information about the sustainability of the product before they select which brand to buy. With 
tourism, on the other hand, consumers choose which hotel before they leave their house, not 
when they arrive in Costa Rica, yet much of the information around sustainability in tourism 
is only given to tourists once they arrive. One local industry source (confidential interview #10) 
said that tourism professionals in Costa Rica have not perceived the need to go and sell Costa 
Rica’s vision of sustainability at the international level to tourists. Reaching tourists before 
they leave their origin country is particularly challenging given that international tour package 
agencies often handle interactions with tourists before they arrive in the destination. The 
theoretical model does not identify this structural challenge, instead suggesting that non-state 
persuasive mechanisms should have capacity to reach the international level. It does, however, 
identify the structural challenges presented by the global value chain, which indicates the 
concentration of economic influence at the international stages of the industry, and thus, in the 
hands of these tour package agencies. 
 
Education also appears to be targeted at European tourists, as they are most likely to visit 
sustainable hotels. Several local industry sources indicated that European tourists are primarily 
the most interested in sustainability, as they get more holiday and plan their holidays eight or 
nine months in advance; whereas US tourists often only have two weeks a year in holiday and 
they come to Costa Rica seeking a more conventional package holiday (confidential interviews 
#14, #22 and #26). One representative from a tour operator said that European tourists will use 
a reusable water bottle, for example, throughout the whole of their holiday, whereas a US 
tourist might only use it a couple of times (confidential interview #22). Informants also 
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indicated that Latin American tourists are even less interested in sustainability than US tourists 
(confidential interviews #18 and #22). The fact that US and Latin American tourists made up 
38 and 37 per cent respectively of Costa Rica’s total tourists in 2013 suggests that, if this 
sentiment is accurate, education programmes are missing a large proportion of visitors (Costa 
Rica Tourism Board, 2013). Thus, their overall impact is again indicated here to be limited. 
 
Public Education for Sustainable Development 
 
The potential significance of public education around sustainable development was indicated 
by one informant, who stressed how members of the public, and particularly children, will 
potentially run the country or be the business owners of the future, and therefore educating 
them about sustainable development can potentially make them more likely to practise 
sustainable development themselves in the future (confidential interview #10). Furthermore, as 
tourists often spend time in the local communities around their resorts, sustainability in the 
local communities can also be an important part of a sustainable tourism industry. The state is 
the main provider of education about sustainable development to the public. It has made a 
significant investment in environmental education, as a result of perceived economic benefits 
from ecotourism and the belief of liberal nation-builders that education is the most important 
means for development, leading the national curriculum to require sustainability education to 
be included in both primary and secondary education (Blum, 2008). As a result, resources have 
been invested in order to educate teachers about requirements for environmental education.  
 
The insights into the potential impact of environmental education for the public from the 
theoretical model suggest that, as low choice-constraining collaborative mechanisms, they 
likely have low compliance, but potential for in-depth impact where actors are compliant. 
When run by state actors, they may face inefficiency, and when run by non-state organisations, 
they may have more expertise, and thus, more impact. The evidence around the impact of public 
education for sustainable tourism is slightly more positive than that for tourists, although still 
limited, as a proportion of the population still uses very unsustainable practices.  
 
Education around sustainable development is found largely in schools, but also to some extent 
in broader public education programmes. Environmental education is taught in schools, for 
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example, not just as a topic in its own right, but through integration with other education topics, 
such as encouraging music students to listen to natural music (such as the sea, or birds) and 
discuss what would happen if these animals became extinct, or teaching statistics using 
examples of population growth or changes in forest cover (Blum, 2008). University courses, 
however, do not cover much on sustainability, despite the country’s focus on tourism, although 
there is more coverage of sustainability topics in the environmental sciences than in the social 
sciences (confidential interview #20).  
 
The state provides some informal learning opportunities for the general public through state-
run national conservation areas (Blum, 2008). Sustainability topics are also discussed 
frequently in the national media in newspaper, television and radio broadcasts (Blum, 2008). 
Furthermore, NGOs also facilitate environmental education and action at the local level, 
organising public meetings, workshops and seminars, particularly in isolated rural areas where 
the state has historically had less influence, encouraging residents to organise themselves to 
solve local problems (Blum, 2008). An industry source indicated that the existence of tourism 
in Costa Rica also helps to make the public act more sustainably, particularly the younger 
generations, as misbehaving is more notorious and people feel embarrassed if tourists see, for 
example, dirty rivers (confidential interview #12). Alongside state conservation areas, an 
additional one per cent of national territory is protected by private conservation organisations, 
which provide similar informal learning opportunities for the public (SINAC-MINAE, 2003 in 
Blum, 2008). An industry source said that there had been more government campaigns 
discouraging litter-dropping in the last year (confidential interview #24). Another industry 
informant indicated that the media has also positively reinforced environmentally-friendly 
behaviour (confidential interview #12). 
 
Tourism businesses also provide a certain degree of education for the public around 
sustainability. A representative from a hotel with four leaves (confidential interview #3) on the 
CST indicated that they provide training to staff on sustainability most months, covering topics 
such as how much electricity and water the hotel has saved and what can be recycled. The 
interviewee said that staff then take this knowledge back to their families and communities and 
that, as a result, children often know, for example, that they should bring re-usable bags to 
transport their shopping.   
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There was, however, only limited evidence as to the impact of these programmes. On the one 
hand, there was a general feeling among interviewees that the Costa Rican public’s knowledge 
about sustainability issues is increasing overall, and that Costa Ricans are beginning to care 
more about the environment. A local industry source indicated that the education campaigns 
had made a difference. The Costa Rican population, they claimed, is very supportive of 
sustainable development, it is part of the national psyche; a lot of households report separating 
their recycling in the census, although municipalities do not always keep it separate 
(confidential interview #12). Similarly, as indicated in the previous chapter on certification, 
data suggests that over 85 per cent of respondents of a survey in Costa Rica were concerned or 
very concerned about climate change, compared with 65 per cent of US citizens (Vignola et al, 
2013; Nisbet and Myers, 2007). Blum (2008) argues that there is a high public awareness of 
sustainability issues in Costa Rica, at least partly as a result of media coverage of these issues. 
In a survey of employees at the five leaf CST certified Punta Isleta eco-lodge in the Nicoya 
Peninsula, Almeyda et al (2010) found an increased knowledge around the concept of 
biodiversity among employees compared with their neighbours, including an increasing value 
of wildlife, conservation and conservation of resources.  
 
The Ecological Blue Flag Programme discussed in the previous chapter, furthermore, added a 
category to recognise the actions of communities for environmental protection in 2002 as a 
result of requests from communities for recognition of their commitment (confidential 
interview #23). As of August 2012, 45 communities had achieved the Blue Flag (confidential 
interview #23). One local industry source indicated that she was amazed at how many 
communities have applied for the Blue Flag, and that generally she has found that communities 
are supportive of sustainable development (confidential interview #7). The Ecological Blue 
Flag Programme also recognises educational institutions that teach their students about 
environmental issues, indicating that the founders of this programme recognise the importance 
of educating children about the environment. As of August 2012, 859 educational institutions 
had achieved the Blue Flag (confidential interview #23). A local industry source said that a 
child that is in a school that is recognised by the Blue Flag will as a result have sustainability 
in their heads (confidential interview #23).   
 
On the other hand, there are still many significant sustainability problems, one of the most 
common is the dumping of waste, such as fridges and dead animals, in rivers, indicated to be a 
result of poor education (confidential interviews #18 and #25). One informant indicated that 
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public education, furthermore, has not adequately targeted the middle generations, which often 
have little knowledge of, and therefore, are less sensitive to, sustainability issues (confidential 
interview #10). Another interviewee indicated that while tourist businesses and organisations 
do a lot of work for sustainable development, the rest of the country does not (confidential 
interview #19). Another local source indicated that while much of the public supports 
sustainability to a greater extent than it used to, for example, by taking their recyclables to a 
recycling centre, more action needs to be taken against those people who just throw their 
rubbish into the rivers or onto the streets (confidential interview #3). It was indicated, 
furthermore, that there is a consciousness among the public around sustainability, but not at a 
significant enough level for many to start initiatives or campaigns for conservation 
(confidential interview #20). This suggests that while there is a greater degree of awareness 
around sustainable development in Costa Rica than in the past, and when compared with other 
developing states, this has not translated into concrete actions for sustainability by the public. 
This is in comparison to tourism professionals and businesses, which this research previously 
indicated have become increasingly interested in applying for certification and working with 
technical assistance programmes. One sustainability consultant stated that while the country 
has a reputation for sustainability, this image did not concur with the practices going on within 
the country (confidential interview #13).  
 
Two particular problems with these public education programmes were identified. Firstly, 
education programmes have been poorly designed, a result potentially of the state’s lack of 
expertise in sustainable development, as indicated in the theoretical model. An industry source 
indicated that, while children do learn about sustainability issues at school, such as 
photosynthesis, there is little actual interaction with nature or linking this back to sustainable 
living in practice (confidential interview #20). Furthermore, often education around 
sustainability focuses solely on environmental issues: some educators advocate more science-
oriented environmental education, which focuses more on environmental than social issues 
(Blum, 2008). Thus, as with the Blue Flag programme discussed in Chapter Six, this 
mechanism leads to an unstable ‘stool’ for sustainable development, as the environmental leg 
is longer than the other two. This education also does not appear to equip people with the skills 
in order to implement sustainable development themselves. One industry source indicated how 
proposals from university students for funding for sustainable development projects received 
by the micro-funding organisation Fundecooperación are not always well thought out, for 
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example, students do not always know details such as how many salaries they are going to pay 
(confidential interview #16).  
 
Secondly, a lack of resources limits the impact of education programmes, as documented by 
Blum (2008), who argues that schools often lack basic funding and resources, such as paper 
and textbooks. As a result, with heavy demands on the national curriculum and assessment 
system, schools are less likely to devote time and resources to ‘special’ topics such as 
environmental education, leading to some cases where students receive little or no 
environmental education. Blum (2008) indicates furthermore how the Office of Environmental 
Education found it challenging to train teachers in remote rural areas, due to limited time and 
financial resources. Yet, despite attempts to develop self-training guides for teachers, many 
still feel that they are not prepared for environmental education. In addition, as conservation 
areas can vary so significantly in terms of ecology, geography and relationships to local 
communities, there has been a diverse range of local management schemes for environmental 
education. This has led in a few cases to very little environmental education at the local level 
at all, despite national commitments, due to a lack of funding and staff. Thus, the inefficiency 
of the state, identified in the theoretical model, is also pointed to here. 
 
Lobbying 
 
The final main persuasive mechanism for tourism identified in Costa Rica is lobbying. This is 
a confrontational mechanism facilitated by non-state actors against either the government, in 
an effort to encourage an increased focus on sustainable development within policy-making, 
or tourism businesses, in an attempt to encourage more sustainable practices. The theoretical 
model indicates that as activism is facilitated by non-state actors, it is founded on considerable 
expertise, but that its confrontational nature restricts the potential depth of its impact on 
sustainable development. This section will argue that, while there are some cases of successful 
activism, there is only limited evidence to suggest that, overall, this has had a significant impact 
in facilitating sustainable tourism.  
 
There have been a number of sporadic cases where lobbying has had a significant impact on 
business practices. In one case of activism against the unsustainable practices of a tourism 
 158 
 
business, citizens of El Gallo in Guanacaste documented how many trucks of sewage a day 
were arriving in their town from the local Occidental Allegro Papagayo hotel and blockaded 
the road to the dump site to stop the hotel offloading its waste, which was creating an 
unbearable smell in the town (Ross and Wood, 2010). This eventually led to the government 
closing the hotel temporarily until sewage disposal systems were improved. There are also a 
number of cases where activism has challenged and changed government policy. In the 1970s, 
a small elite group of Costa Rican environmentalists, with ties to US and European universities 
and environmental NGOs, had a strong influence over state policy in the creation of the 
Corcovado National Park (Horton, 2009). In the 1990s, Costa Rican activists opposed the 
building of a wood chip plant in the Osa Peninsula, arguing that it would threaten the natural 
environment that was supporting local ecotourism (Horton, 2009). A few years later, activists 
denounced illegal logging in the peninsula through media and political lobbying campaigns 
and direct action such as demonstrations and highway blockages in order to influence policy 
makers (Horton, 2009). In another case, in the Osa Peninsula, hotels are reluctant to build, 
likely due to the well-organised social action against them (Horton, 2009). 
 
Another significant activism movement in Costa Rica has been that of communities against 
legislation to legitimise their removal from coastal areas, as discussed in Chapter Five on legal 
mechanisms. Local communities in coastal areas felt that they were under intense pressure by 
the government and large tourism businesses to sell their land for tourism development. In 
response, representatives from 54 coastal communities, along with social organisations, staged 
protests against large scale tourism development and land expropriation, fighting for the right 
to develop their own tourism model (Noorloos, 2011). In one example of a result, the 
government proposed the Recognition of the Rights of Inhabitants of the South Caribbean Law, 
which protects the rights of Afro-Caribbean communities on the South Caribbean coast to the 
territories where they have historically lived. While this law was passed in 2014, the property 
rights of these communities are still uncertain because the president does not necessarily have 
to give them legal property title to this land (Clark, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, there is significant evidence that the state still fails in a number of ways to 
adequately address sustainable tourism, indicating that lobbying has had limited or, at best, 
sporadic impact. As indicated in Chapter Five, state legal mechanisms are poorly designed and 
inefficient, while the state has not fully internalised sustainable development into its economic 
planning (De Camino et al, 2000). This lack of evidence of impact suggests that, in the wider 
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scheme of things, activism has not had any significant effect on sustainable tourism in Costa 
Rica. Furthermore, another concern with this activism against both businesses and government 
policy is that it often focuses on environmental issues at the expense of economic and social 
aspects of development. In cases this has led to complex land struggles and protests occurring 
between environmentalists, on the one hand, and the state and tourism development companies, 
on the other. Local communities are often divided as to whether they want these development 
projects or not (Noorloos, 2011). Thus, lobbying has become entangled in tensions between 
economic development and environmental protection factors of sustainable development, 
limiting its overall impact. This shows again, as indicated in previous chapters, how the various 
actors involved in sustainable development prioritise different factors over others, leading to 
uncoordinated action and, often, development that does not fully address all three aspects of 
sustainability.  
 
Implications for Theoretical Debates on Governance 
 
These findings, as with those in the previous two chapters, provide insight into the broader 
theoretical questions of governance discussed earlier in this thesis, around the degree of 
continuing influence of the state and hierarchical methods of governance. This chapter has 
pointed, firstly, to the fact that here, voluntary mechanisms clearly have as significant a role in 
governance as command and control mechanisms. This supports changing conceptions of 
governance pointed to by scholars such as Yüksel et al (2005) and Rosenau (1994), with the 
shift from government to governance. The findings in this chapter point, furthermore, to the 
different role of voluntary mechanisms compared to command and control mechanisms, as they 
reach the actors most interested in compliance, and can substantially increase their compliance 
levels. On the other hand, command and control mechanisms were found to address those 
actors less interested in compliance, but to a less significant depth. Thus, despite the low 
choice-constraining nature of persuasive mechanisms, they here have as much significance as 
high choice-constraining forms of governance. 
 
In terms of the significance of the state in governance, in contrast with bargaining mechanisms, 
the only state-run persuasive mechanism in this case was the public education programme, 
which was not found to be particularly effective. The state, therefore, appears to here have a 
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less significant role in the least choice-constraining forms of governance than in legal and 
bargaining mechanisms. The approach taken by the theoretical model has enabled this insight, 
due to its distinction between moderate and low choice-constraining governance mechanisms, 
which are often combined into ‘voluntary mechanisms’ in the existing analytical literature. 
There were in this case examples of much more effective non-state persuasive mechanisms, 
which suggests that state and non-state actors have different strengths and weaknesses. This 
supports assumptions in the civil society literature by scholars such as Banks and Hulme (2012) 
around the empowerment and participatory functions of non-state governance mechanisms. 
The state was indicated to lack the expertise in sustainability in order to develop appropriate 
education programmes, focusing on environmental sustainability, for example, at the expense 
of economic and social factors. The distinction in the theoretical model between state and non-
state mechanisms, therefore, enabled this finding, in contrast with the existing analytical 
literature on governance, which often associates less choice-constraining mechanisms with 
non-state actors.  
 
A further theoretical contribution was the indication of the inter-relationship between 
bargaining and persuasive mechanisms, with the CST relying on the Rainforest Alliance to 
provide technical support for businesses applying for certification. This interdependence is not 
stressed in the literature and indeed, is enabled through the distinction in the theoretical model 
between bargaining and persuasive mechanisms. This points to the complex nature of 
governance, and the importance of recognising how the different types of mechanisms can rely 
upon each other in order to enhance their overall impact. The final theoretical contribution here, 
as indicated in the previous chapter, is the way that non-state actors are here not addressing 
actors at the international level in the global value chain. This is not well-recognised in the 
literature, which implies the potential for non-state mechanisms to operate at the international 
level as their authority is not limited by national sovereignty. This points to the challenge for 
governance as a whole to address actors at the international level, as neither state nor non-state 
actors have been found here to adequately influence all of the global value chain. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the impact of low choice-constraining persuasive mechanisms on 
sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, how far this reflects factors identified by the theoretical 
model. The model suggested that the low choice-constraining nature of persuasive mechanisms 
may enable them to avoid many of the restrictions on legal mechanisms, and that they are also 
better equipped to address sustainable development at the international level. Persuasive 
mechanisms were indicated to be challenged, however, by their low capacity to enforce 
compliance, which provides them with little influence over the number or type of actors that 
comply. The model indicated that non-state persuasive mechanisms are potentially able to 
facilitate sustainable development due to their expertise, while state-run persuasive 
mechanisms face many obstacles, such as corruption, inefficiency or competing policy 
priorities.  
 
The chapter identified three main types of persuasive mechanisms for tourism in Costa Rica: 
technical assistance for tourism businesses and communities, education aimed at tourists and 
the public, and lobbying against government policy and the unsustainable practices of tourism 
businesses. The effectiveness of each of these at promoting sustainable tourism was then 
explored. It was argued that technical assistance for businesses has a moderate impact on 
sustainable tourism, although not as significant as that of the CST, while the other persuasive 
mechanisms have only a limited impact. Success factors in technical assistance programmes 
for businesses were argued to include their collaborative nature, which enabled an in-depth 
impact, the expertise of non-state actors such as the Rainforest Alliance, and a heightened 
receptiveness towards sustainable development, which enhanced compliance rates. These 
factors were indicated to be partly inherent to the characteristics of governance mechanisms, 
while the non-state expertise and heightened receptiveness were argued to originate at least in 
part from significant knowledge of, and research into, Costa Rica’s unique and varied 
biodiversity, which does not necessarily exist to the same extent in other states.  
 
The impact of technical assistance for communities was argued to be limited by the closed and 
bureaucratic nature of the state. This is not a factor identified in the theoretical model. 
Education of tourists was indicated to be limited as a result of its failure to address tourists at 
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the international level, before they arrive in Costa Rica. Education for the public, meanwhile, 
was limited as a result of poor planning and inefficiencies in resource allocation, factors 
identified as internal state obstacles in the theoretical model. Lobbying was argued to have had 
an impact in a number of cases, but there was little evidence to suggest that overall it has had 
any significant or long lasting impact on sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. This is in part a 
result of its focus on environmental aspects of sustainability at the expense of economic and 
social aspects, identified as a challenge in the theoretical model. The final section of this 
chapter explored theoretical insights for governance from the findings into persuasive 
mechanisms. This chapter, therefore, concludes the study of the contribution of each of the 
three types of governance mechanisms to the success of sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. 
Chapter Eight will now draw together conclusions from the thesis, indicate insights for the 
utility of the theoretical model of governance and sustainable development, and suggest 
potential future avenues for research as a result of the findings from this thesis. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has explored the effectiveness of different mechanisms of governance at promoting 
sustainable tourism, and sought to identify success factors behind the most effective 
governance mechanisms. In order to address these questions, the thesis developed a theoretical 
model through which to conceptualise sustainable development and identify three types of 
governance mechanisms - and their associated strengths and weaknesses. The thesis applied 
this framework to the specific case of Costa Rica. This concluding chapter will outline the key 
findings of the research. It will, firstly, summarise the key features of the theoretical model, 
followed by the key research findings derived from the case study of Costa Rica. The chapter 
will then reflect on the theoretical contributions to broader governance debates that can be 
garnered from these findings. It will, finally, explore the general analytical utility of the 
theoretical model of the thesis, before identifying a number of potential future research avenues 
provoked by the findings of this thesis.  
 
The Theoretical Model of Governance for Sustainable Development 
 
The theoretical model aimed to inform and structure the research around the specific case of 
Costa Rica and, in doing so, develop a framework for understanding the potential impact of 
governance for sustainable tourism and sustainable development as a whole. Chapter Two of 
this thesis conceptualised sustainable development, while Chapter Three identified the 
different types of governance and their associated hypothetical strengths and weaknesses. 
Chapter Two identified how orthodox conceptions of development are problematic, with too 
much emphasis on macroeconomic growth and not enough on the actual development impacts 
on local communities. The chapter, therefore, identified and critiqued orthodox theories of 
sustainable development in order to build an alternative framework through which to measure 
its promotion. This framework included economic development, social equity and 
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environmental protection. This chapter also drew on global value chain theories in order to 
recognise the structural challenges facing developing states in pursuing these three aspects of 
sustainable development, as a result of the concentration of economic power and influence at 
the international branding, marketing and retailing stages of the global value chain, which are 
often dominated by foreign interests. 
 
Chapter Three then developed the second part of this theoretical model, exploring different 
typologies of governance mechanisms that might be used to promote sustainable development. 
The chapter indicated how the IPE approach of this thesis required that the governance 
typology, firstly, recognise the different state and non-state actors involved in governance and 
the range of mechanisms that they employ, and secondly, focus primarily on governance at the 
national level. The chapter then explored existing models of governance in the public policy, 
environmental governance, tourism and sustainable development literatures. It examined in 
turn three types of governance typologies, which distinguished between mechanisms by either 
the overall system structure of governance, the different actors involved or the nature of the 
enforcement instrument employed. The chapter argued that the most useful division here is the 
type of enforcement instrument employed, followed by the different actors involved. Insights 
were drawn, in particular, from models by Bemelmans-Videc et al (1998), which provided a 
three-fold typology distinguished by the degree to which each type of governance mechanism 
is choice-constraining, and Börzel and Risse (2002), which provided useful labels for these 
categories of ‘bargaining’ and ‘persuasive’ mechanisms.  
 
Accordingly, a theoretical model of governance for the thesis was developed, based on highly 
choice-constraining ‘legal’ mechanisms, moderately choice-constraining ‘bargaining’ 
mechanisms and low choice-constraining ‘persuasive’ mechanisms. The model also identified 
whether or not these mechanisms were run by state or non-state actors, with legal mechanisms 
being run primarily by state actors, and bargaining and persuasive mechanisms run by either 
state or non-state actors. These mechanisms were further subdivided according to whether they 
are confrontational or collaborative. Legal mechanisms were argued to be inherently 
confrontational, while bargaining and persuasive mechanisms could, again, be either. Whether 
or not a governance mechanism is legal/bargaining/persuasive, state or non-state run and, 
collaborative or confrontational, was argued to affect its potential level and depth of impact on 
sustainable development.  
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The model then considered the potential strengths and weaknesses of these three types of 
governance mechanisms at addressing the core challenges inherent in sustainable development. 
It indicated that the high degree of choice-constraint of legal mechanisms gives them capacity 
to force actors to conform and means that they are technically able to attract compliance from 
a large proportion of the target market, and the most prolific perpetrators. Legal mechanisms 
were indicated, however, to face the challenge of a national jurisdiction, which may prevent 
them from addressing the increasingly non-territorial aspects of sustainable development. 
Furthermore, they are also potentially restricted in use by international law and new public 
management requirements, such as the ‘most-favoured nation’ or ‘national treatment’ clauses 
associated with international trade agreements overseen by the GATT/WTO, meaning that such 
regulations might fall foul of new legal protections afforded to private market actors. As legal 
mechanisms are predominantly run by the state, they have significant authority and legitimacy, 
but are potentially restricted in effectiveness by implementation problems associated with 
corruption, inefficiency and the disruptive effects of short-term electoral cycles, which are not 
always conducive to the longer-term outlook needed to support the environmental aspects (in 
particular) of sustainable development. There might also be additional problems caused by 
bureaucratic infighting, linked to different timeframes and competing policy objectives.  
 
The moderate to low choice-constraining nature of bargaining and persuasive mechanisms was 
indicated to provide them with more limited capacity to enforce compliance from a large 
number of actors and the worst perpetrators. Because of their ‘voluntary’ nature, however, 
these mechanisms were found to be less restricted in use by international law and new public 
management ideology. Where run by states, they may face the same obstacles as legal 
mechanisms. When run by non-state actors, however, they may avoid these problems and, 
potentially, use their technical expertise as a form of ‘epistemic power’ (Adler and Haas, 1992). 
Conflictual bargaining and persuasive mechanisms were indicated to have more potential to 
address the worst perpetrators of unsustainable development, while collaborative bargaining 
and persuasive mechanisms were argued to, typically, have a more sustained impact on 
sustainable development, due to the higher intensity of their relationship with actors. These 
mechanisms can be limited, however, by their potential competition with each other, due to 
coordination problems.  
 
The notions of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘success factors’ that are employed in the thesis were then 
identified. The effectiveness of governance mechanisms was indicated to be either low, 
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moderate or high, depending on both the number of actors reached and the depth of this impact. 
The potential success factors causing more enhanced effectiveness were identified to be either 
inherent to the characteristics of individual governance mechanisms, such as those factors 
identified in the theoretical model, or contextual to the social and political environment of the 
case study in question.  
 
This theoretical model, then, had two main purposes in the following exploration of the case 
study of sustainable tourism governance in this thesis. Firstly, the model defined the sustainable 
development that tourism governance is seeking to promote. Secondly, it identified three types 
of governance mechanisms for sustainable development, in order to provide a starting point for 
the evaluation of the effectiveness of governance, and a structure for the thesis. It also identified 
the potential strengths and weaknesses of these three different types of governance 
mechanisms, in order to support the later findings from the empirical case study. The findings 
in the assessment of the case study of Costa Rica will now be outlined.  
 
 
The Case Study:  
The Impact of Tourism Governance in Costa Rica 
 
Costa Rica was selected as the case study in this thesis due to its reputation for ‘eco’ tourism, 
its diverse natural environment and relatively significant governance mechanisms for 
sustainable tourism, including extensive environmental legislation and a tourism certification 
scheme. Furthermore, that it is one of the countries with the highest levels of development in 
Central America suggested that both its governance mechanisms and tourism industry are fairly 
effective at promoting sustainable development. It therefore had the potential to offer insights 
into the two empirical research questions of this thesis: the most effective governance 
mechanisms for sustainable tourism and factors causing this success, whether they are inherent 
characteristics of individual mechanisms, or more contextual. This section will explore the 
overall findings of this case study of tourism governance in Costa Rica in order to answer these 
questions. It will also identify the contributions from the findings in this case study to the 
literature on sustainable development governance. As indicated in the Introduction chapter, the 
existing literature focuses largely on the challenges and obstacles to sustainable development 
governance, including the inefficiencies facing state mechanisms and the low levels of 
compliance with certification and other voluntary mechanisms. The case study of this thesis, 
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therefore, has aimed to generate insight into the success factors where sustainable tourism 
governance is more effective. 
 
In order to set the context in which sustainable tourism governance takes place in Costa Rica, 
Chapter Four explored how the country came to adopt tourism as a cornerstone of its post-
structural adjustment development strategy. This was a result, in particular, of limited 
development options, due to factors such as a shortage of natural resources suitable for 
extraction and its small market size. Chapter Four used global value chain analysis to discuss 
how the tourism industry presents a number of development challenges. It highlighted two 
potential types of tourism value ‘chains’: enclave and franchise/local chains, which have 
different implications for the distribution of costs and benefits from the industry between local 
and international actors. In enclave chains, the industry is largely foreign-owned, with few local 
jobs or linkages. While local businesses have more opportunity to operate in franchise or local 
chains, they often shoulder a disproportionate amount of cost and risk, due to the economic 
influence of foreign business interests at the marketing, branding and retailing stages of the 
industry. The dependency of tourists on international brands, resulting from the way in which 
tourists are not able to sample their holiday product before purchasing it and, therefore, rely on 
recognised brands to guide them, was argued to be one causal factor for this concentration of 
economic power in the hands of foreign businesses, which are often the developers of 
international brands. Economic and social benefits from tourism, furthermore, were also 
indicated to be volatile due to the seasonal nature of the industry and market sensitivities 
associated with economic shocks such as terrorist incidents, extreme weather events, financial 
crises or health scares. Tourism can also have adverse social and environmental impacts on 
local communities and environments, such as erosion of local culture, coral reefs and beaches. 
These factors were identified as key challenges in the tourism industry that governance 
mechanisms for tourism often seek to remedy, or control.  
 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven then explored how far legal, bargaining and persuasive 
mechanisms promote sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. Chapter Five identified four legal 
mechanisms with the potential to facilitate sustainable tourism in Costa Rica, including the 
national park system, the Maritime Zone Law (ZMT), legislation recognising the rights to land 
for communities, and state investment in the Gulf of Papagayo Tourism Pole and Liberia 
International Airport. Chapter Six identified three key bargaining mechanisms for tourism in 
Costa Rica, all certification systems: the CST, Ecological Blue Flag programme and the 
 168 
 
Rainforest Alliance Verification scheme. Chapter Seven identified three types of persuasive 
mechanisms for tourism in Costa Rica: technical assistance for businesses and communities; 
education for the public and tourists; and activism targeted at tourism businesses and the 
government. 
 
Overall, these governance mechanisms were found to have a limited to moderate effectiveness 
at promoting sustainable tourism in Costa Rica. In the discussions on all three types of 
mechanisms, legal, bargaining and persuasive, cases of moderately effective mechanisms were 
identified, indicating the significant role of all three different levels of choice-constraint. From 
these three chapters, the evidence points to the CST having the most significant impact, 
followed by technical assistance programmes for businesses and the national park system and 
ZMT. Chapter Six found that the CST certification was moderately effective at promoting 
sustainable tourism, having certified 8.7 per cent of hotels and 20 per cent of tour agencies 
(figures adapted from CST website, 2014 and Costa Rican Tourism Board, 2013). The 
Rainforest Alliance Verification and Ecological Blue Flag Programme were found to have only 
a limited impact on sustainable tourism. Chapter Seven argued that, of the three types of 
persuasive mechanisms identified, technical assistance for businesses was moderately 
effective. From 2005 to 2010, the Rainforest Alliance provided technical assistance to 125 
hotels, five per cent of the hotels in Costa Rica (confidential internal document, 2010; Costa 
Rica Tourism Board, 2013). The other persuasive mechanisms (technical assistance for 
communities, education for tourists and the public and lobbying of government and businesses) 
were found to have only a limited impact on sustainable tourism. Chapter Five identified how 
the national park system protects 25 per cent of Costa Rica’s territory and the Maritime Zone 
Law (ZMT) has led to the challenge of unsustainable practices by a number of large hotels. On 
the other hand, there was less evidence of the impact of legal mechanisms promoting the rights 
of communities to land and the Papagayo Tourism Pole. 
 
These findings pointed not only to the significance of governance mechanisms across all three 
degrees of choice-constraint, but also found that each of the types of mechanisms addressed 
particular target groups, and at a different level of depth. The ZMT had the high level of choice-
constraint to tackle unsustainable practices in the larger tourism actors, preventing them from 
building illegally in coastal areas. The CST was found to certify a range of types and sizes of 
tourism business, but the larger businesses that were certified at the highest level were those 
outside of the mass tourism regions, indicating that it is not reaching some of those actors with 
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potentially the most significant impacts on the environment and local communities. The depth 
with which the CST addresses sustainability was found to be significant, with fairly extensive 
evidence of sustainable practices required and inspectors providing advice to businesses on 
how to improve their sustainability. The Rainforest Alliance technical assistance programme 
reached a lower proportion of businesses than the CST (approximately five per cent), but at a 
significant depth, increasing the sustainability of tourism businesses in Sarapiquí from an 
average of 4.5 to 7.8, where one is non-compliance and ten is full-compliance (Newsom and 
Sierra, 2008). In answering the research question around the effectiveness of different types of 
governance mechanisms, therefore, it can be seen here that all three types of mechanisms have 
a significant impact, but rather different functions. 
 
These findings contrast with many assumptions in the existing literature on sustainable 
development governance. In particular, the findings of the moderate impact of the CST are not 
reflected in much of the certification literature, which points to low numbers of certified actors, 
often five per cent or less; the focus of certification systems on ecotourism businesses which 
already have relatively sustainable practices, as opposed to mass market businesses; and a 
general lack of empirical evidence that certification has any environmental or socioeconomic 
benefits (Bendell and Font, 2004; Font, 2003 and Blackman and Rivera, 2010). Indeed, the 
findings above indicate that Costa Rica’s CST has a higher proportion of certified tourism 
businesses than many certification schemes in other developing states. For example, the Smart 
Voyager Agua scheme in the Galápagos Islands had, in 2005, certified 10 per cent of tour boats, 
while the Green Globe 21 certifies six per cent of tourism businesses in the Caribbean and the 
Fair Trade Tourism certification in South Africa has certified six per cent of tourism businesses 
(Smart Voyager website, 2014; Green Globe website, 2014; Singh and Mee, 2008; FTT 
website, 2014 and Rogerson, 2010). This suggests that the CST is a particularly effective 
tourism certification system, the reasons for which will be explored below. Furthermore, while 
the CST attracted to some extent the ‘lowest hanging fruit’, indicated by Haufler (2003) as the 
common target group for voluntary mechanisms, it also attracted compliance from some of the 
larger tourism businesses, albeit not as many in the regions of mass tourism. This case study 
thus points to the significance of certification as a more effective mechanism for tourism 
governance than the existing literature indicates.  
 
Similarly, the impact of the Rainforest Alliance’s technical assistance programme for 
businesses, a persuasive mechanism, was found to be more extensive than is implied for 
 170 
 
voluntary mechanisms by the existing sustainable development governance literature. On the 
one hand, the technical assistance programme does not reach the 20 per cent compliance rate 
indicated by scholars such as Vedung and van der Doelen (1998) as the highest compliance 
rate for voluntary mechanisms, and it attracts the businesses most interested in sustainability, 
rather than those using the most unsustainable practices. Furthermore, this programme did not 
appear to address structural inequalities in the international system, pointed to as a common 
weakness of voluntary mechanisms by scholars such as Edwards and Hulme (2000). On the 
other hand, the depth of impact of the programme on individual businesses is significant, a 
factor not adequately recognised in the existing literature. Furthermore, obstacles pointed to in 
the literature, such as the reduced impact as a result of competition between voluntary 
mechanisms (Kirton and Trebilcock, 2004), were not identified in this case, indeed the CST 
and Rainforest Alliance technical assistance programmes complemented each other.  
 
The impact of legal mechanisms in this case study was also found to be more positive than 
often pointed to in the sustainable development governance literature. Indeed, the argument by 
some scholars in the existing literature that sustainable development is largely addressed 
through ‘new’ mechanisms as opposed to ‘old’, due to their ability to address multiple targets 
across long periods of time, was indicated to not be the case in Costa Rica (Jordan, 2008). In 
particular, the high level of choice-constraint of legal mechanisms was found to be invaluable 
in addressing some of the most unsustainable practices in the tourism industry. On the other 
hand, some of the obstacles for legal mechanisms pointed to in the literature were found to 
restrict their further impact. The inefficiencies and low-level corruption pointed to as common 
challenges to state mechanisms by scholars such as Mauro (1997) and Jordan (2008) were 
identified in Costa Rica. These were not found to restrict the impact of legal mechanisms as 
significantly as is often indicated in the literature, however.  
 
While the literature often explores voluntary and compulsory governance independently, this 
case study pointed to the value of understanding the interdependencies between the different 
types of mechanisms. In particular, it shows the complementary, rather than competing, 
relationship between these governance mechanisms, with each having a slightly different target 
group and depth of impact. While the CST and Rainforest Alliance technical assistance 
programme addressed some of those actors who were more interested in sustainability, 
encouraging them to increase their sustainability further, the ZMT challenged some of the most 
unsustainable practices. This complementary relationship was also pointed to by the way in 
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which the different mechanisms relied upon each other to enhance their impact. The CST, for 
example, relied upon the high level of choice-constraint of the state in order to encourage 
compliance, as the state was able to set the CST as one piece of paperwork that would enable 
tourism businesses to operate in Costa Rica. Similarly, technical assistance provided to 
businesses looking to apply for the CST by the Rainforest Alliance’s programme, a persuasive 
mechanism. This therefore suggests that future studies of sustainable development governance 
might attempt to bridge the gap between these different types of mechanisms, and consider 
their interlinked impact within a single context.  
 
The factors causing the more positive findings in Costa Rica’s case of tourism governance 
compared to the existing literature are pointed to through the findings addressing the second 
research question of this thesis: the success factors for tourism governance in Costa Rica. It 
was indicated earlier in the thesis how success factors can be either intrinsic of the 
characteristics of particular types of governance mechanism, as identified in the theoretical 
model, or more contextual to the broader environment. In this case, it was found that there were 
both intrinsic and contextual success factors in Costa Rica, identified in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Success Factors in Sustainable Tourism Governance in Costa Rica 
Inherent Characteristics of Governance 
Mechanisms 
Contextual Success Factors 
High level of choice-constraint of legal 
mechanisms 
State authority for bargaining mechanisms 
and bureaucratic competence of the state 
Collaborative nature of bargaining and 
persuasive mechanisms 
Heightened receptiveness towards 
sustainable development 
 Expertise of non-state organisations and, in 
some cases, their support for state 
mechanisms 
 
The inherent characteristics of governance mechanisms that acted as success factors in Costa 
Rica’s case included the high level of choice-constraint of legal mechanisms, which enabled 
them to target the most unsustainable businesses. The other inherent characteristic success 
factor is the collaborative nature of bargaining and persuasive mechanisms, which enables them 
to have an in-depth impact on the sustainability of individual actors. For the CST, its 
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collaborative bargaining nature enabled it to attract compliance from a fairly significant 
number of actors, due to its ability to provide a symbol, and yet, to work with individual actors 
closely enough to enhance their sustainability fairly considerably in some cases. The Rainforest 
Alliance’s technical assistance programme was also found to be effective due to its 
collaborative nature, which enabled it to have a fairly significant in-depth impact on individual 
businesses. 
 
The broader contextual factors found to contribute to the success of these governance 
mechanisms were three-fold. Firstly, the Costa Rican state’s bureaucratic capacity enabled it 
to largely avoid the potential obstacles of corruption and inefficiency. The authority of the state 
also enabled it to promote the CST scheme above the other two certification systems. This was 
identified as a contextual factor, as not every state has the potential for this level of capacity, 
and therefore, it is not a factor intrinsic to governance itself. The second contextual factor was 
a heightened awareness around sustainable development, indicated to be facilitated at least in 
part by Costa Rica’s natural environment and biodiversity, in influencing the receptiveness of 
different stakeholders to sustainable development initiatives (confidential interviews #3 and 
#24). The final success factor was the expertise of certain non-state actors. The support 
provided in the design and implementation processes of the CST by non-state organisations 
such as the Rainforest Alliance, which was indicated to be at least partially a result of expertise 
garnered specifically in Costa Rica, due to its unique biodiversity. The Rainforest Alliance, 
along with a number of other consultancy organisations, have substantial expertise with which 
to support tourism businesses to practise sustainable development. This was pointed to be a 
result potentially of a heightened awareness around sustainable development in Costa Rica.  
 
Thus, these findings suggest that Costa Rica’s success is partly due to the level of affinity 
between stakeholders and the natural environment, as much as the independent effects of 
different governance mechanisms. These three contextual factors point to an explanation of the 
more significant impact of the CST compared to other case studies in the literature. Firstly, the 
heightened awareness seen in Costa Rica around sustainable development was indicated in 
Chapter Six, for example, to not be present to the same extent in neighbouring countries. Data 
presented in Chapter Six suggested that 83 percent of Costa Ricans prioritise the environment 
over economic development, compared to 75 per cent of Nicaraguans and 63 per cent of 
Panama citizens (Latinobarómetro, 2011). Furthermore, a local industry source suggested that 
people would come to Costa Rica to buy a book about the different species of butterflies that 
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might exist in Panama (confidential interview #10). Costa Rica also hosts the headquarters of 
the regional Rainforest Alliance sustainable tourism programme. As indicated at the beginning 
of the thesis, Costa Rica has a significant variety of biodiversity, which appears to have 
facilitated this heightened awareness around sustainable development, and it is not seen to the 
same extent in other developing states.  
 
Secondly, the fact that many other tourism certification systems are run by non-state actors, 
including Green Globe 21, Kenya’s Eco-rating Certification Programme, South Africa’s Fair 
Trade Tourism and Ecuador’s Smart Voyager, points to the significant role of the state in 
certification. A combination of the heightened awareness around sustainable development and 
the state’s interest in producing governance mechanisms for sustainable development have also 
likely facilitated the creation of so many legal mechanisms for environmental sustainability. 
As indicated previously, Costa Rica is one of the developing states with the highest quantity of 
environmental legal mechanisms. It is one of the top 20 developing states with the highest 
proportion of protected land territory, and one of the top 25 developing states with the highest 
proportion of protected territorial seas (World Bank, 2014; National Geographic, 2014). Costa 
Rica has also been recognised for its pioneering legal mechanisms for the environment, which 
won it, for example, the international 2010 Future Policy Award (The Guardian, 2010). On the 
other hand, there is no evidence that Costa Rica’s state has more bureaucratic competence than 
its neighbours, Panama and Nicaragua, suggesting that state bureaucratic competence is not 
necessarily a factor distinguishing Costa Rica’s experience in sustainable tourism governance 
from that of other countries. The Latinobarómetro survey in 2013, for example, found that only 
31 per cent of Costa Rica’s had some or a lot of confidence in the state, compared with 41 per 
cent in Nicaragua and 36 per cent in Panama.  
 
While these success factors of strong state-led governance, combined with a conducive 
environment in which sustainable development is naturally high on everyone’s agenda, have 
caused effective governance in Costa Rica, however, it is not necessarily the case that they 
might be effective in other countries. As Kemp et al (2005: 15) argue, there are likely many 
different ways of developing foundations and practices of governance for sustainable 
development; there are different ‘good answers’ for different circumstances. The case of 
Namibia’s sustainable development governance, for example, points to the existence of more 
grass-roots facilitated success factors. In Namibia, community based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) has enabled communities to form common property institutions called 
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‘conservancies’, which gives them rights over wildlife and tourism development within a 
defined area (Hoole, 2010). There is some evidence that this is effective, for example, it has 
facilitated a dramatic recovery of wildlife species such as elephants, mountain zebra and oryx, 
successfully re-introduced more than 2,500 game animals into conservancies since 1999 and 
increased the income and expenditures of some households and individuals (Boudreaux and 
Nelson, 2011; Jones and Weaver, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al, 2009). Thus, while the success 
factors identified above have been key factors in Costa Rica’s case, it should be recognised 
how these might not necessarily be effective drivers elsewhere.  
 
A final insight from this case study points to the need to also continually reflect on the role of 
governance for sustainable development, and the way in which it can promote certain aspects 
or actors of sustainable development over others. There were two key examples in this case 
study where governance with every intention of promoting sustainable development actually 
may have had an adverse impact. Firstly, in the case of technical assistance for communities 
looking to develop local tourism products, governance was actually in some cases steering 
communities towards the less stable income source of tourism as opposed to fishing, or other 
activities that they engaged in beforehand. This reflects points in the ecotourism literature 
around whether sustainable tourism is actually a preferable path for many developing countries. 
Secondly, micro businesses were often unable to participate in the CST and Rainforest Alliance 
technical assistance programme due to limited resources and thus, the larger, and potentially 
inherently less sustainable actors benefited from these mechanisms at the expense of some of 
the most sustainable actors in tourism, which are often run by local people and thus provide a 
valuable local source of income, with a small footprint and thus, little environmental impact. 
The varied impacts of these mechanisms on different actors, therefore, should be recognised, 
as there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. Overall, there is sufficient evidence in this case study 
that governance is a moderately effective driver for sustainable tourism, with state-led 
governance having a particular prominence here. 
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The Broader Theoretical Implications of the Findings for Governance 
Debates 
 
Chapter Three indicated a number of key debates in the broader governance literature, for 
which these findings have implications. Current debates are polarised between arguments for 
the continuing dominance of the state (see for example, Bramwell, 2011; Kemp et al, 2005; 
Klick, 2011; Newman and Clarke, 2009 and Őniş and Güven, 2011) and those that point to the 
decline of the central state and the rising influence of devolved authorities alongside a diverse 
range of non-state actors, from grassroots community groups to large international 
organisations (indicated by scholar such as Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau, 1992; Strange, 1996 and 
Tosun, 2001). Chapter Three outlined how the existing governance literature sees a polarisation 
of opinions around the impact and significance of low choice-constraining mechanisms of 
governance, with scholars on the one hand arguing for benefits such as local participation (see, 
for example, Glasbergen, 2011; Gemill and Bamidele-Izu, 2002; Jepson, 2005 and Keck and 
Sikkink, 2002), and on the other hand, others pointing to the lack of ‘levers’ of less choice-
constraining mechanisms, consequent low level of compliance, and failure to address structural 
equalities in the international system (see, for example, Bendell and Font, 2004; Commins, 
2000 and Edwards and Hulme, 2000). Each of the three empirical chapters in this thesis offered 
a reflection on the implications of the findings for broader debates around governance and the 
role of the state. This section will draw these together and outline the theoretical contributions 
that this research can make to the existing normative and empirical governance literature. It 
will also point to how the theoretical model employed has enabled many of these insights, due 
to the way in which it conceptualises different types of governance mechanisms. 
 
The first theoretical contribution is that the state’s role in governance in this case appears to 
have changed, rather than declined, and indeed, non-state actors also have significance in 
governance. The effectiveness of state-run legal and bargaining mechanisms pointed to the 
continuing significance of the state in governance, and supports the arguments of scholars such 
as Bramwell (2011), who point to the state’s potential ability to offer incentives, or impose 
requirements, on actors to behave in a certain way. These new state mechanisms, furthermore, 
were found to run in parallel with command and control mechanisms, rather than replacing 
them, with their operation still depending to some extent on the hierarchical power of the state. 
This is a finding also echoed by Bell and Hindmoor (2009), but not widely recognised in the 
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literature, which instead often points to the state’s role in one or the other of these types of 
mechanisms, rather than both concurrently. This indicates the need for a more sophisticated 
understanding of the state’s role in governance. This finding also reflects Lawrence’s (2005: 
155) argument that the increasing use of less choice-constraining mechanisms by the state does 
not represent its demise, but rather, ‘an attempt to resolve some of the contradictions inherent 
in capitalist expansion and its consequent impacts on the ecosystem’. Thus, this again points 
to the continuing, but changing, significance of the state in governance.  
 
In keeping with the indications of neoliberalism, the state was found to have devolved 
responsibility for legal mechanisms to some extent to the local municipalities. This was not 
particularly effective, however, due to the lack of expertise and resources at the municipality 
level in order to enforce these mechanisms. The state-run bargaining mechanism was, 
furthermore, central-run, indicating the continuing significance of central state institutions. 
Thus, the assumptions of neoliberal scholars such as Bauer (1972), Lal (1983) and Krueger 
(1980) were only found to partly reflect the findings in this case study. This partial dispersal of 
authority, however, does point to a shift in the make-up of the state and the way in which it 
operates.  
 
This case study also pointed to the significance of non-state actors in voluntary mechanisms of 
governance, particularly with persuasive mechanisms. Non-state actors were found to have 
substantial expertise, which enabled them in this case to run effective technical assistance 
programmes. Thus, state and non-state actors experience different benefits and challenges, 
which lends them to be effective at promoting different types of mechanisms. This points to 
the diverse nature of governance, with many different actors involved, using different types of 
mechanisms. It also provides a theoretical contribution to the literature, reinforcing the above 
indication that the state’s role in governance has changed, rather than declined. The approach 
of the theoretical model has supported these findings through its identification of the state’s 
potential role in high, moderate and low choice-constraining mechanisms, and the subsequent 
ability to identify which of these the state is most effective at promoting.  
 
The second theoretical contribution of this thesis is the insight that all three of the mechanisms 
across the different levels of choice-constraint had a moderately significant impact on 
sustainable development. While the existing literature often points to either the dominance of 
hierarchical or voluntary mechanisms, it was indicated here that both are significant due to 
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their different strengths and weaknesses. The theoretical model, furthermore, enabled an 
understanding of the causes and levels of impact of the different mechanisms, testing 
assumptions from the existing literature. In particular, it indicated how more highly choice-
constraining mechanisms target the most prolific offences to a more limited depth, while less 
choice-constraining mechanisms target actors that are inherently more interested in 
sustainability, and at an increased depth. Similarly, it confirmed the low number of levers for 
voluntary mechanisms identified by scholars such as Bendell and Font (2004), and the state’s 
poorly resourced and uncoordinated institutions (see, for example, Grindle, 2004). In addition, 
the theoretical model explained how the level of choice-constraint of bargaining mechanisms 
can be enhanced through the authority of the state. Thus, here, this study provides a theoretical 
contribution in the sense that it confirms existing findings in the literature, but also provides a 
more in-depth and complex picture to show the impact of different governance mechanisms. 
 
The third theoretical contribution that this thesis can make reflects the interlinked nature of 
different governance mechanisms, which is not widely recognised in the existing literature. 
While the literatures on certification and other voluntary mechanisms are currently fairly 
isolated and insular, the findings indicated how bargaining mechanisms actually rely upon 
persuasive mechanisms in order to provide expertise and support to enable actors to comply. 
This points to the need for more flexible conceptualisations of governance mechanisms, and 
indeed, reflects again the point above for the usefulness of a more sophisticated understanding 
of governance. The distinction in the theoretical model between bargaining and persuasive 
mechanisms, where much of the existing literature combines these as both voluntary 
mechanisms, enables this insight. This finding challenges the fragmented approach to 
governance currently taken in much of the literature, and points to the need to adopt theoretical 
frameworks that recognise the inter-relationships between different types of governance. 
 
The final theoretical contribution is that these findings also highlighted questions for the 
effectiveness of governance as a whole. As legal mechanisms were found to address actors 
least interested in compliance, but to a lower level, while less choice-constraining mechanisms 
were more likely to address actors more interested in compliance, albeit in greater depth, 
governance mechanisms overall appear to have limited scope to significantly increase the 
compliance levels of the most challenging actors. The scope of governance to have an overall 
significant impact on sustainable development is, therefore, reduced. Similarly, the case study 
indicated the focus of these three types of governance mechanisms on actors in the national 
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domain, rather than those at the international level. Yet, as indicated by scholars such as Streck 
(2002), it is questionable how far challenges such as sustainable development can be addressed 
at the domestic level, when they concern global factors such as trade, economic and political 
liberalisation and technological change. The theoretical model’s ability to lay out 
systematically the strengths and weaknesses of the three different levels of choice constraint, 
therefore, has enabled a broader understanding of the effectiveness of governance as a whole. 
To conclude, this section has indicated four theoretical contributions to the governance 
literature from this research, with some insights supporting existing assumptions and 
conclusions, and others providing challenge. The next, and penultimate, section of this chapter 
will reflect on how the theoretical model of governance and sustainable development 
framework employed in this research may be further developed in order to integrate insights 
identified in this case study. 
  
A Reflection on the Utility of the Theoretical Model of Governance and 
Framework for Sustainable Development 
 
The theoretical model and framework developed and employed here provided the basis for the 
focus of the research and the chapter structure of the thesis. Throughout the research, a number 
of insights into the usefulness of the model and framework were garnered, a reflection of which 
will enable a further development of the model and framework for potential use in other similar 
studies. This section will reflect firstly, on the theoretical model of governance, before 
evaluating the framework for sustainable development. It will also reflect on how the model of 
governance, in particular, is a contribution to the analytical governance literature in itself. 
 
The Theoretical Model of Governance 
The initial section in this chapter outlined how the theoretical model of governance 
distinguished between mechanisms employing three different levels of choice-constraint, 
collaborative and confrontational voluntary mechanisms, and state and non-state actors. These 
distinctions were key in guiding the focus of the research, the structure of the thesis and indeed, 
providing the insights into broader debates around governance discussed in the previous 
section. The model had a number of strengths. Firstly, and as indicated above, it was able to 
distinguish between governance mechanisms systematically across a range of levels of choice-
constraint and actors involved, in order to build an overall picture of governance. The 
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employment in this model of a ‘middle’ category of moderately choice-constraining 
mechanisms, which is in many other models combined with other voluntary mechanisms into 
one large category, was useful in highlighting the increased leverage of bargaining mechanisms 
compared to persuasive mechanisms. The labels used also supported explanations of the factors 
behind the varied effectiveness of these mechanisms. They indicated, for example, how 
collaborative forms of persuasive mechanisms can have a more in-depth impact on actors. The 
three levels of choice-constraint also enabled a clear structure for three empirical chapters that 
focused on the most significant divisions between governance mechanisms. 
 
The research also, however, pointed to a number of ways in which the theoretical model might 
be further developed. Firstly, governance mechanisms do not always fit neatly into these 
categories. While the legal mechanisms category appears at first glance to be fairly clearcut, as 
it is always state-facilitated and confrontational in nature, in reality the category is more 
diverse. While the enforcement of the national park system, the coastal zoning regulation and 
recognition of the rights to land for communities were clearly legal mechanisms, as there were 
obvious ‘rules’ that were enforced, the development of the Papagayo project fitted less clearly 
into the legal mechanisms category. This project has no specific enforcement power, but the 
fact that the government was exerting significant influence over the shape of the tourism 
industry, in this case building a new airport and zone that was prone to mass tourism, led it to 
be discussed here as a legal mechanism. The ‘stick’ in this case, therefore, was the way in 
which the government’s authority enabled it to develop significant infrastructure despite 
opposition. Similarly, the findings in Chapter Five also demonstrated how the enforcement 
power of legal mechanisms can vary as a result of factors such as resource limitations, 
decentralisation of power and corruption. Thus, the first insight here is that conceptualisations 
of governance should therefore take into account the potential for a varying level of choice-
constraint among legal mechanisms.  
 
Secondly, and similarly, the recognition in the model of the state or non-state involvement in 
the schemes also helped to explain their effectiveness. The division in the theoretical model, 
however, between state and non-state actors was not seen quite as starkly in reality. In 
particular, the state-run CST relied upon the expertise of non-state actors, indicating that some 
recognition in the theoretical model of the potential links between state and non-state actors 
within one single mechanism would be useful. Similarly, the way in which non-state 
community technical assistance programmes rely upon the state in order to provide permits, 
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for example, also points to the interlinked nature of state and non-state mechanisms of 
governance. This conclusion is reflected in the literature, for example, by Karkkainen (2003), 
who points to the ‘complex web’ of hybrid institutions of governance, which include 
collaborative input from both state and non-state actors. One prime broader example of these 
joint initiatives in the existing literature is that of global environmental standards, such as 
ISO14001, where state and non-state actors are brought together in the design and 
implementation processes (Clapp, 2008). Furthermore, in a similar vein, the theoretical model 
also draws a fairly stark distinction between legal, bargaining and persuasive mechanisms. Yet, 
the findings suggested that the CST relies to some extent on the authority of the state in order 
to attract compliance. It points to the interlinked nature of mechanisms of a different level of 
choice-constraint. This therefore suggests that it is useful when employing the model to 
recognise the potential for links not only between state and non-state actors but also between 
mechanisms with a different level of choice-constraint.  
 
Finally, the empirical analysis in this thesis also identified a number of ways in which the 
predictive ability of the theoretical model might be improved. Firstly, while the theoretical 
model suggested that non-state actors can have considerable expertise, the findings in this 
research pointed to a need to recognise that some non-state actors do not have this expertise, 
and the potential negative implications of this upon a governance mechanism. Secondly, and 
related to the above points around the state/non-state distinctions, the findings suggested that 
the work of non-state actors can be impeded where the state is not open to collaboration. 
Finally, while the model indicated that less choice-constraining mechanisms of governance 
might be better placed to address the behaviour of international actors in the global value chain, 
the case study of this thesis found that structural obstacles prevented any of the mechanisms 
from having any significant impact here. Figure 21 integrates these insights into the theoretical 
model of this thesis developed in Chapter Three. The theoretical contribution of this thesis 
around broader questions of governance, therefore, includes a tried and tested predictive model 
that can be employed in other case studies to enable the study of the impact of governance on 
sustainable development.  
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Figure 21: A Revised Theoretical Model of Governance and Sustainable Development 
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Theoretical Insights for Sustainable Development 
The findings in this case study have also provided a number of theoretical insights into the 
nature of sustainable development. Most significantly, the challenge of addressing all the 
different aspects of sustainable development has been identified. Chapter Two identified the 
diversity of understandings of and approaches to sustainable development. It was noticeable in 
this case study that in some cases of tourism governance, such as the CST, all three aspects of 
sustainable development were adequately addressed, leading to a fairly significant impact on 
actors’ practices. In many other cases, however, the prioritisation of one aspect of sustainable 
development over the others was identified. Legal mechanisms, for example, were found to 
focus predominantly on either environmental protection or economic development, while the 
Blue Flag programme and public education programmes promoted solely environmental 
protection aspects of sustainable development. This reflects Dodds and Butler’s (2010) 
assertion in the literature that the most frequent barrier to effective sustainable tourism policy 
is the prioritisation of economic goals over social and environmental aspects of sustainability.  
 
This inconsistent approach to sustainable development was indicated to be a result of the 
various interests involved in the promotion of sustainable tourism, with no single agency taking 
responsibility for a coherent sustainable development strategy as a whole. Instead, isolated and 
uncoordinated agencies often promoted single aspects of sustainable development. The tourism 
department focused on promoting legal mechanisms that encouraged economic development 
at the expense of other aspects of sustainable development, for example, while government 
departments, with more of an environmental focus, prioritised environmental protection, 
leading to conflicting legal mechanisms, and a very unclear message as to the type of tourism 
promoted by the government as a whole. In another example, Chapter Seven showed how 
environmentalists opposed the intentions of the state and tourism development companies to 
build tourism resorts. Even different sections of the ICT were found to promote different 
aspects of sustainable development. As indicated by Robinson (2004: 373), sustainable 
development ‘means so many different things to so many different people’, which leads to 
differing, and at times conflicting, priorities with regards to the promotion of each of the three 
aspects of sustainable development. The result was that sustainable development was not 
addressed in its entirety and thus, governance mechanisms were not as effective at promoting 
sustainable tourism as is potentially the case. As Bramwell (2011) indicates, the diverse policy 
domains of sustainable tourism make it very difficult to address as a coherent whole. Loorbach 
(2007: 3) indicates how ‘since the destination (what is a sustainable society) is unclear and the 
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roads towards it highly uncertain, the only way forward is to take small steps and regularly 
evaluate whether we are coming closer to or drifting away from our ideal destination’. 
 
Recognition of this fragmented institutional approach to sustainable development, and 
subsequent competing agendas between agencies purportedly promoting a similar concept, 
would be useful in a conceptual framework for sustainable development. The exploration of 
the impact of governance for sustainable development in this study has enabled a clearer picture 
of how, in practice, different agencies are often responsible for implementing different aspects 
of sustainable development. A conceptual framework for sustainable development could take 
into account these competing agendas of agencies, from the government that has interests in 
facilitating growth for businesses, addressing social equity issues such as cultural retention, 
and protecting the environment; to environmentalists and organisations in favour of protecting 
the environment; to industry that wishes to increase economic development; and the local 
communities, which can have differing priorities depending on their level of development.   
 
The research also pointed to a number of other ways in which the framework for sustainable 
development might be further developed in order to improve its utility. Firstly, clarification of 
the different values behind each of the three aspects of sustainable development would enhance 
the usefulness of the framework. In particular, a re-conceptualisation of the dichotomy between 
the positive indicators of economic development and social equity, and the negative indicator 
of prevention of impact to the environment would help to clarify the model. Parris and Kates 
(2003) frame this juxtaposition in terms of ‘what is to be sustained’ (eg. biodiversity, 
ecosystems, cultures and places) and ‘what is to be developed’ (eg. life expectancy, education, 
wealth and social capital). This might be a useful distinction, as it also distinguishes between 
positive and negative needs within the social equity indicator, for example, the need for 
improved education alongside retention of existing culture.  
 
A second way in which this framework might be improved is through further development of 
the social equity indicator. Although commonly used in definitions and frameworks of 
sustainable development, it is not clear exactly how social equity is linked to economic 
development, although clearly there is a relationship between the two. Further exploration into 
what the specific aspects of social equity are would be useful, including factors such as the 
retention of local culture, and gender, race and class equality, in order to clarify the purpose of 
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this indicator, and to show exactly how tourism might be expected to contribute to social 
aspects of sustainable development. 
 
Overall, therefore, the research in this thesis can make two key further theoretical contributions 
to broader questions of governance and sustainable development. Firstly, it provides a tried and 
tested model of governance and framework for sustainable development that can be used for 
the exploration of other case studies. These are detailed, providing a clear breakdown of 
different types of governance mechanisms, and a definition of sustainable development that 
ensures that the actions of all actors in the global value chain are recognised. Furthermore the 
governance model is predictive, providing potential explanations for the degree of 
effectiveness of individual governance mechanisms and thereby supporting empirical analysis. 
The second key theoretical contribution of this thesis is insight into the nature of the concepts 
of both governance and sustainable development and particularly, their complexities and 
contradictions. The challenge has been made clear, for example, of addressing economic goals 
alongside social and environmental aims, along with the diverse nature of different mechanisms 
of governance that do not fit neatly into categories. The theoretical model and framework have 
aimed to recognise these challenges, in order to better understand these concepts and enable a 
more detailed and valid empirical analysis. 
 
Future Research Avenues 
 
The findings of this thesis suggest a number of potential further research avenues that might be 
pursued in order to better understand the impact of governance for sustainable tourism, and 
sustainable development more generally. Firstly, more research into other governance 
mechanisms for tourism would be useful in understanding more fully the impact of tourism 
governance, given the current lack of research. Possible case studies might include the 
Galápagos Islands, which has a national park system that protects nearly 97 per cent of the 
land, one of the largest Marine Reserves and the Smart Voyager Agua scheme, which certifies 
tour boats according to their level of sustainability. Other case studies with significant 
governance mechanisms include Barbados, which has similar coastal zoning legislation to 
Costa Rica; Namibia, which has a fairly extensive community based conservation programme, 
and Venezuela, which has one of the highest proportions of protected land and sea territory. As 
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this thesis has indicated that effective governance mechanisms for sustainable tourism vary, at 
least to some degree, between states, it would be useful to identify the models that exist in other 
developing states, and the determining factors behind these different models. Exploration of 
cases from across the policy spectrum, from strong state leadership to devolution and 
community empowerment, in particular, would be useful, in order to understand more fully the 
implications of these different types of policy environments for effective tourism governance 
mechanisms. Furthermore, it would be useful to explore the significance of global certification 
systems, such as the Green Globe, and whether these are more or less influential for sustainable 
tourism than national schemes, and why. Studies of certification focus largely on national 
certification systems, yet these global schemes have the potential to receive wider recognition, 
including from international stakeholders, and thus, may attract significant levels of 
compliance.  
 
A second potential research avenue would be to explore further the nature of the heightened 
receptiveness towards sustainable development that exists in Costa Rica. This research 
suggested that this heightened receptiveness is derived from the country’s unique and varied 
biodiversity. It would be useful, therefore, to explore how far other developing states with a 
fairly comparable degree of biodiversity, such as Dominica, Belize or Cuba, also see a 
heightened receptiveness towards sustainable development, compared to developing states 
with less significant biodiversity. This would determine how far the heightened receptiveness 
originates from this biodiversity. 
 
The final potential research avenue related to governance for sustainable development, and the 
theoretical model more broadly, is that it would be useful to explore the relevance of the 
insights from this model to other development industries besides tourism. This could 
potentially generate further insights into the success factors behind governance for sustainable 
development that might be generalisable between industries. A suitable industry to examine 
might be that of forestry or food, where sustainable practices, and accompanying governance 
mechanisms such as certification, are common. In particular, it would be useful to explore, 
given the lack of effective governance in the case study examined in this thesis of international 
stakeholders, whether there are any cases in other industries, of relatively effective governance 
of these international actors. Here, insights might be drawn into how governance of 
international stakeholders, in particular, can be made more effective. 
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Conclusion 
 
This final chapter has drawn together the findings of the thesis around the impact of sustainable 
tourism governance and the identification of success factors for effective tourism governance. 
It outlined the theoretical model utilised by the thesis and the findings from the case study of 
Costa Rica. It then reflected on the theoretical contributions of these findings to the broader 
governance literature, before considering the utility of the theoretical model, and identifying a 
number of potential future avenues for research. This research has sought to address the gap in 
the literature identified in the Introduction around potential drivers for sustainable tourism and 
sustainable development in developing states and, particularly, the link between governance 
and sustainable tourism. This research has also sought to bridge the gap in the existing literature 
where the effectiveness of single governance mechanisms has been examined in isolation, by 
comparing the impact of various governance mechanisms in a single country setting. In this 
sense, this research has intended to draw, in particular, on the context in which these 
mechanisms operate, in order to assess the impact and importance of context in determining 
the effectiveness of governance. Finally, this thesis has originality in the way in which it has 
developed and tested a theoretical model with which to explore the impact of governance on 
sustainable development. This model has broadened the applicability of the findings in the 
research from tourism governance within Costa Rica, to other developing states, and also 
potentially for other development industries more generally. A number of theoretical 
contributions to the literature on governance have also been developed through the findings. 
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Appendices 
Interviews 
 
Interview description Role of individual/ 
organisation 
Place of interview Date of 
interview 
Confidential Interview #1 International NGO London, United 
Kingdom 
16/04/2013 
Confidential Interview #2 NGO, organiser of large 
tourism trade fair 
San José, Costa Rica 06/09/2012 
Confidential Interview #3 Medium sized hotel 
with CST 4 leaves, 
located in San José 
San José, Costa Rica 05/09/2012 
Confidential Interview #4 NGO, organiser of eco 
tours 
San José, Costa Rica 04/09/2012 
Confidential Interview #5 Environmental 
government department 
San José, Costa Rica 04/09/2012 
Confidential Interview #6 Small hotel with 3 CST 
leaves in San José 
San José, Costa Rica 31/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #7 Sustainable hotel 
management company 
San José, Costa Rica 30/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #8 Tourism chamber San José, Costa Rica 29/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #9 Environmental 
government department 
San José, Costa Rica 29/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #10 Sustainable tourism 
consultant 
San José, Costa Rica 28/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #11 Domestic airline San José, Costa Rica 28/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #12 International financial 
NGO 
San José, Costa Rica 27/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #13 Sustainable business 
consultancy 
San José, Costa Rica 27/08/2012 
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Confidential Interview #14 International NGO 
which runs its own 
certification programme 
San José, Costa Rica 24/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #15 NGO provider of 
technical assistance to 
communities 
San José, Costa Rica 23/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #16 NGO provider of funds 
to small and micro 
projects with a 
sustainability element 
San José, Costa Rica 23/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #17 Sustainable tourism 
consultant 
San José, Costa Rica 22/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #18 Tour provider with 4 
CST leaves 
San José, Costa Rica 22/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #19 Government tourism 
department 
San José, Costa Rica 21/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #20 Research NGO with 
focus on biodiversity 
San José, Costa Rica 21/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #21 Travel agent with 5 
CST leaves, supports 
small community 
tourism 
San José, Costa Rica 20/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #22 Tour operator with 5 
CST leaves and 
Rainforest Alliance 
Verification 
San José, Costa Rica 20/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #23 Government 
department responsible 
for a certification 
programme 
San José, Costa Rica 17/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #24 International chain 
hotel with 5 CST leaves 
San José, Costa Rica 17/08/2012 
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Confidential Interview #25 Social enterprise 
promoting action 
against climate change 
San José, Costa Rica 16/08/2012 
Confidential Interview #26 Sustainable tourism 
consultant 
San José, Costa Rica 16/08/2012 
 
Documents 
 
Document #1 Instituto Costariccense de Turismo (2011) Impacto del CST en 
Empresas Hoteleras y Tour Operadoras (The Impact of the CST on 
Hotels and Tour Operators), San Jose, Noviembre de 2011 
Confidential Internal 
Document #2 
Document provided by an interviewee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
